Rob Lee (Twitter)

1659/
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@jseldin:
#Wagner Group is about at 1,000 ppl "focused in the #Donbas...particularly in and around #Donetsk" per a senior US defense official

Rob Lee (Twitter)

Ukrainian officials are claiming that Wagner took heavy losses yesterday.
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@serhey_hayday:
#Wagner base in occupied #Luhansk region was destroyed, only one racist survived. The enemy base is located at the local stadium in #Kadiivka, which the russians brazenly occupied in 2014 #UkraineRussiaWar https://t.co/cWsIHIzXXd

The Lookout (Twitter)

RT @casusbellintel: 🇲🇱🇷🇺| Update on #Wagner alleged base in #Bamako, #Mali.

The base is now equipped with a security post at the entrance, and new construction is underway on the South and West areas.

A peak of activity is visible in SAR imagery on June 26, 2022. https://twitter.com/casusbellintel/status/1545071698856353793/photo/1

IgorGirkin (Twitter)

RT @MaryseBurgot: 🔴 Les prisonniers russes chair à canon du commando #Wagner.
Notre reportage à #Bakhmout où ces mercenaires russes sont face à l’armée #ukrainienne. Bataille sanglante et civils sous bombardements permanents.
@infofrance2 @franceinfo @EDelevoye @PhotoSath @Harold_HH https://twitter.com/MaryseBurgot/status/1588042651483488257/video/1

‌tom (Twitter)

It should be recognized as an advantage of “Wagner” that the PMK command plans combat operations taking into account the real capabilities of its personnel.  The tasks are set as primitive as possible.
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@wavellroom:
NEW:

#Trenchwarfare in Bakhmut.
how are #Wagner fighting.

These are costly infantry attacks in the style of World War I. The all arms assault familiar to a British soldier is rarely witnessed.

@thinkdefence
@FTusa284
@SpencerGuard

https://t.co/cHJleDXkuM

Dan (Twitter)

RT @ArmanSoldin: #AFP Exclusive images of abandoned Russian soldiers’ bodies on frontline near #Siversk. 'Apparently they were forbidden to retreat. They didn’t even take their wounded’, explains Vladislav, 24 year old Ukrainian serviceman, ’nobody wants to have them.' #ukraine #siversk #Wagner https://twitter.com/ArmanSoldin/status/1619410177014525952/video/1

tom (Twitter)

Insignia of their uniforms indicates these are Malian and Palestinian officer cadets training at Russian military academies in RUSSIA. No indication they are fighting or part of Wagner.
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@matteomaillard:
Une étonnante vidéo montrerait, pour la première fois, des mercenaires maliens et palestiniens combattant avec #Wagner en #Ukraine. #Mali #Palestine #Russie https://t.co/QVYMSds78m

‌IgorGirkin (Twitter)

RT @WhereisRussia: Our translation of Yevgeny Prigozhin's latest update regarding the Battle of Bakhmut.

It seems the Russian position is becoming untenable.

#Ukraine #UkraineWar #Wagner https://t.co/XkisIxP5Ks

Dan (Twitter)

10. Some more context reportedly from today.
Note, that I hesitate for now to use the word 'collapse' in reporting any of these 3 advances until we see more visual evidence.
I hope that changes.
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@WhereisRussia:
The Russian frontline begins to collapse.

Our translation and subtitling of Prigozhin's latest frontline report.

English subtitles with original Russian audio.

#UkraineWar #Ukraine #Wagner https://t.co/kDT6BZH20E

Dan (Twitter)

3. UAF counter-attack on the Bohdanivka/Dubovo-Vasylivka/Berkhivka axis.
The same point in tweet 2 had already been made earlier today by Prigozhin in one of his rants.
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@WhereisRussia:
The Bakhmut Trap

Our translation and subtitling of Prigozhin's latest frontline report.

English subtitles with original Russian audio.

#UkraineWar #Ukraine #Wagner https://t.co/aalEPnnDP4

Def Mon (Twitter)

RT @detresfa_: Vladimir #Putin faces an unprecedented challenge as the #Wagner paramilitary group launches an insurrection in #Russia, now controlling military facilities in three cities, Wagner forces are marching to Moscow, here is a map with @coupsure & @SimTack detailing today's events https://twitter.com/detresfa_/status/1672640399553462272/photo/1

‌The Lookout (Twitter)

Good map of today's events. https://t.co/hJGKhIwukb

Dan (Twitter)

Part of a detailed thread on the recent mutiny/attempted coup, but tracing events back earlier. Among its interesting points it posits that both MoD and Prigozhin were preparing moves against each other but Prigozhin moved early.
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@generalsvr_en:
His personal ratings in second place after #Putin gave him confidence in popular support. On the eve of June 23, #Prigozhin was informed about the plans of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff to strike "in the back" at the rear headquarters of the #Wagner PMC.
11/24 https://t.co/pUL71pY7lM

tom (Twitter)

RT @LucasADWebber: Al-Qaeda claims to have shot down a #Wagner helicopter in #Mali https://twitter.com/LucasADWebber/status/1675938164223930381/photo/1

‌Rob Lee (Twitter)

RT @JohnLechner1: For @ForeignPolicy, Marat Gabidullin - a former #Wagner commander - and I write "Wagner's a reflection of the system Putin built. The same opportunities and challenges that created Wagner will constrain the state’s willingness and capacity to replace it."

https://t.co/t7VRMkNS6i

‌The Lookout (Twitter)

RT @R__Politik: Some remarks concerning the @TheStudyofWar / ISW’s recent thread on #Wagner’s status.
📌 The status of the #WagnerGroup is unequivocally clear from the Kremlin’s perspective - it asserts that the group does not exist. What does exist is a network of militias, compelled to either enter contracts with state entities (they have choices available) or disband.

📌 “There is no clear unified leader for the #WagnerGroup", says ISW. It is pivotal to underscore that there likely won’t be any. The appointment of a replacement for #Prigozhin is strictly off the table.

📌Troshev isn’t the emerging leader of Wagner; he serves as a senior officer at the Defence Ministry, implementing instructions that limit recruits to individuals who have contracted with the military. This approach aims to extinguish any chances of Wagner sustaining its independence.

📌 Pavel Prigozhin, portrayed by some as an alternative leader of Wagner according to ISW, isn’t a negotiable option. He is an heir, groomed by his father to inherit his position, but post-mutiny, this seems unfeasible. The notion of “Wagner Group elements” proposing leadership is unviable; they lack the authority to propose, and the Kremlin isn’t positioned to enter negotiations.

📌 There are no ongoing negotiations with Rosgvardiya concerning Wagner’s combatants. Rosgvardiya can only engage in wishful thinking that incorporating Wagnerites might elevate Zolotov’s political relevance, which is unattainable. However, Zolotov is permitted to recruit former combatants individually as volunteers: the idea is to provide a possibly more acceptable adaptation to the new status quo for some, rather than joining forces led by despised generals. Above all, any military operations executed by Rosgvardiya’s volunteers will strictly adhere to the guidelines of the Ministry of Defence.

📌 The notion that Wagner might maintain its name, symbols, ideology, commanders, administration, and current standard operating principles is merely a pipe dream entertained by “the prominent Wagner-affiliated source.”

📌 The #Kremlin’s stance on the relationship(s) between Wagner elements and the Russian government is explicit: there are no such relationships—Wagner fighters must subordinate to any proposed state entity, be it directly the army, Troshev’s unit, or Rosgvardiya.

📌 Wagner Group will not re-emerge as a substantial, cohesive organisation under the auspices of Rosgvardiya, the Russian MoD, or any equivalent entity. This possibility is non-existent.

📌 Those fighters from Wagner who decline to embrace the new circumstances may choose to stay in Belarus, albeit without prospects and financial support, or they risk being subjected to criminal prosecution.

📌 Some former Wagner’s elements may try to commercialise their activities independently from any other entity, be it #Russian bodies or Prigozhin’s companies.

We have covered all of this in detail over the past few months. Anyone wishing to keep abreast of the fluctuations in Wagner would do well to save time and simply subscribe to R.Politik: rpolitik.com/category/bullet…

‌The Lookout (Twitter)

RT @R__Politik: Some remarks concerning the @TheStudyofWar / ISW’s recent thread on #Wagner’s status.
📌 The status of the #WagnerGroup is unequivocally clear from the Kremlin’s perspective - it asserts that the group does not exist. What does exist is a network of militias, compelled to either enter contracts with state entities (they have choices available) or disband.

📌 “There is no clear unified leader for the #WagnerGroup", says ISW. It is pivotal to underscore that there likely won’t be any. The appointment of a replacement for #Prigozhin is strictly off the table.

📌Troshev isn’t the emerging leader of Wagner; he serves as a senior officer at the Defence Ministry, implementing instructions that limit recruits to individuals who have contracted with the military. This approach aims to extinguish any chances of Wagner sustaining its independence.

📌 Pavel Prigozhin, portrayed by some as an alternative leader of Wagner according to ISW, isn’t a negotiable option. He is an heir, groomed by his father to inherit his position, but post-mutiny, this seems unfeasible. The notion of “Wagner Group elements” proposing leadership is unviable; they lack the authority to propose, and the Kremlin isn’t positioned to enter negotiations.

📌 There are no ongoing negotiations with Rosgvardiya concerning Wagner’s combatants. Rosgvardiya can only engage in wishful thinking that incorporating Wagnerites might elevate Zolotov’s political relevance, which is unattainable. However, Zolotov is permitted to recruit former combatants individually as volunteers: the idea is to provide a possibly more acceptable adaptation to the new status quo for some, rather than joining forces led by despised generals. Above all, any military operations executed by Rosgvardiya’s volunteers will strictly adhere to the guidelines of the Ministry of Defence.

📌 The notion that Wagner might maintain its name, symbols, ideology, commanders, administration, and current standard operating principles is merely a pipe dream entertained by “the prominent Wagner-affiliated source.”

📌 The #Kremlin’s stance on the relationship(s) between Wagner elements and the Russian government is explicit: there are no such relationships—Wagner fighters must subordinate to any proposed state entity, be it directly the army, Troshev’s unit, or Rosgvardiya.

📌 Wagner Group will not re-emerge as a substantial, cohesive organisation under the auspices of Rosgvardiya, the Russian MoD, or any equivalent entity. This possibility is non-existent.

📌 Those fighters from Wagner who decline to embrace the new circumstances may choose to stay in Belarus, albeit without prospects and financial support, or they risk being subjected to criminal prosecution.

📌 Some former Wagner’s elements may try to commercialise their activities independently from any other entity, be it #Russian bodies or Prigozhin’s companies.

We have covered all of this in detail over the past few months. Anyone wishing to keep abreast of the fluctuations in Wagner would do well to save time and simply subscribe to R.Politik: rpolitik.com/category/bullet…

tom (Twitter)

RT @alleyesonwagner: La bataille de#Tinzaouatene constitue la plus grosse débâcle du groupe #Wagner/ Africa Corps sur le continent. Ces affrontements font suite à plusieurs jours de clashes entre FAMa/Wagner, JNIM et CSP (1)