Rob Lee (Twitter)
Good section. We need to be careful drawing modern warfare lessons from Feb-March 2022 because Russia committed a number of mistakes based on poor assumptions that other countries likely won't. Many of the initial casual explanations for why Russia's invasion failed were wrong.
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@shashj:
New RUSI report on preliminary lessons from Russia's unconventional warfare (mostly intelligence service led operations) in Ukraine. Authors "have in many instances checked the conclusions with non-Ukrainian agencies", it says. https://t.co/gVu7s4ekAQ https://t.co/uVt7IrBrwJ
Good section. We need to be careful drawing modern warfare lessons from Feb-March 2022 because Russia committed a number of mistakes based on poor assumptions that other countries likely won't. Many of the initial casual explanations for why Russia's invasion failed were wrong.
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@shashj:
New RUSI report on preliminary lessons from Russia's unconventional warfare (mostly intelligence service led operations) in Ukraine. Authors "have in many instances checked the conclusions with non-Ukrainian agencies", it says. https://t.co/gVu7s4ekAQ https://t.co/uVt7IrBrwJ
Rob Lee (Twitter)
Before we can apply lessons from Ukraine to Taiwan, we need to know what actually happened in Ukraine. Many of the early analytical pieces from the spring of 2022 are based on plausible, but incorrect, guesses, which fed into confirmation bias.
Before we can apply lessons from Ukraine to Taiwan, we need to know what actually happened in Ukraine. Many of the early analytical pieces from the spring of 2022 are based on plausible, but incorrect, guesses, which fed into confirmation bias.
Status-6 (Twitter)
RT @APHClarkson: Taking these points from Rob further, sometimes a conflict's specific dynamics don't map on well to other geopolitical flashpoints. A lessons learned exercise can be as much about what is specific to a conflict and not applicable elsewhere (such as Taiwan) as wider implications
RT @APHClarkson: Taking these points from Rob further, sometimes a conflict's specific dynamics don't map on well to other geopolitical flashpoints. A lessons learned exercise can be as much about what is specific to a conflict and not applicable elsewhere (such as Taiwan) as wider implications
Status-6 (Twitter)
RT @RALee85: Good section. We need to be careful drawing modern warfare lessons from Feb-March 2022 because Russia committed a number of mistakes based on poor assumptions that other countries likely won't. Many of the initial casual explanations for why Russia's invasion failed were wrong. https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1641136997405212672/photo/1
RT @RALee85: Good section. We need to be careful drawing modern warfare lessons from Feb-March 2022 because Russia committed a number of mistakes based on poor assumptions that other countries likely won't. Many of the initial casual explanations for why Russia's invasion failed were wrong. https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1641136997405212672/photo/1
Rob Lee (Twitter)
@Convolutedname Some outlets incentivize provocative arguments over those with strong evidence.
@Convolutedname Some outlets incentivize provocative arguments over those with strong evidence.
Rob Lee (Twitter)
This is why I thought arguments that tanks were obsolete based on the first month of the war were wrong. Your conclusions are only as good as your data, and the data from Feb-March are not necessarily that applicable to other potential wars.
https://warontherocks.com/2022/09/the-tank-is-not-obsolete-and-other-observations-about-the-future-of-combat/
This is why I thought arguments that tanks were obsolete based on the first month of the war were wrong. Your conclusions are only as good as your data, and the data from Feb-March are not necessarily that applicable to other potential wars.
https://warontherocks.com/2022/09/the-tank-is-not-obsolete-and-other-observations-about-the-future-of-combat/
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Dan (Twitter)
301-2. East Bakhmut/Zabakhmutka
A destroyed UAF BTR-70 in Zabakhmutka at 48.594817, 38.019592 (geolocation in link), filmed by Russians in the first half of March after UAF withdrew to the west bank of the Bakhmutovka river.
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@GloOouD:
Destroyed #Ukrainian BTR-70
Location: #Bakhmut #Donetsk region
48.594817, 38.019592 @GeoConfirmed
@Rebel44CZ https://t.co/Ny3rHu3sgf
301-2. East Bakhmut/Zabakhmutka
A destroyed UAF BTR-70 in Zabakhmutka at 48.594817, 38.019592 (geolocation in link), filmed by Russians in the first half of March after UAF withdrew to the west bank of the Bakhmutovka river.
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@GloOouD:
Destroyed #Ukrainian BTR-70
Location: #Bakhmut #Donetsk region
48.594817, 38.019592 @GeoConfirmed
@Rebel44CZ https://t.co/Ny3rHu3sgf
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Necro Mancer (Twitter)
Брянская обл., 02/03/23: "спецоперация ФСБ" (полное видео https://tttttt.me/russvolcorps/454) #рдк
Брянская обл., 02/03/23: "спецоперация ФСБ" (полное видео https://tttttt.me/russvolcorps/454) #рдк
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Rob Lee (Twitter)
He also suggests that Wagner aviation is taking heavier losses than the Russian Air Force. 4/
He also suggests that Wagner aviation is taking heavier losses than the Russian Air Force. 4/
tom (Twitter)
RT @joshuachuminski: "If I were to have to pick the figure in...Putin’s inner circle who scares me the most, it would have to be Nikolai...Patrushev." I eagerly await @MarkGaleotti penning a full biography of #Patrushev, but until then, this is a superb @spectator piece. https://t.co/cqnJZgSjFf
RT @joshuachuminski: "If I were to have to pick the figure in...Putin’s inner circle who scares me the most, it would have to be Nikolai...Patrushev." I eagerly await @MarkGaleotti penning a full biography of #Patrushev, but until then, this is a superb @spectator piece. https://t.co/cqnJZgSjFf
The Spectator
Nikolai Patrushev, the man dripping poison into Putin's ear
If I were to have to pick the figure in Vladimir Putin’s inner circle who scares me the most, it would have to be Nikolai Platonovich Patrushev, secretary of the Security Council and the closest thing there is in the Russian system to a national security…
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Dan (Twitter)
@CyborgKlimax @VoiceOfJeff @NOELreports I can tell you that there is one of those concrete constructed farm wharehouses in most large agricultural villages in Ukraine. Some have multiple.
@CyborgKlimax @VoiceOfJeff @NOELreports I can tell you that there is one of those concrete constructed farm wharehouses in most large agricultural villages in Ukraine. Some have multiple.
Rob Lee (Twitter)
RT @halbritz: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen. Milley tells lawmakers that roughly 6,000 Wagner group mercenaries are currently fighting in Bakhmut, with 20k-30k more recruits. Says they are seeing "enormous" casualties as Ukrainians inflict "a lot of death and destruction on these guys."
RT @halbritz: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen. Milley tells lawmakers that roughly 6,000 Wagner group mercenaries are currently fighting in Bakhmut, with 20k-30k more recruits. Says they are seeing "enormous" casualties as Ukrainians inflict "a lot of death and destruction on these guys."
Rob Lee (Twitter)
@kunleforrever @Caucasuswar That's part of it, but I think it was mostly an assumption that Ukrainians wouldn't fight and that Zelensky was weak. Historically bad assumptions.
@kunleforrever @Caucasuswar That's part of it, but I think it was mostly an assumption that Ukrainians wouldn't fight and that Zelensky was weak. Historically bad assumptions.