Rob Lee (Twitter)
Although there was a 3-week period in which Russian artillery fire was reduced, it increased at the end of February as the 106th Airborne Division played a greater role, which coincided with greater Wagner-VDV cooperation. Russia has a substantial artillery advantage in Bakhmut.
Although there was a 3-week period in which Russian artillery fire was reduced, it increased at the end of February as the 106th Airborne Division played a greater role, which coincided with greater Wagner-VDV cooperation. Russia has a substantial artillery advantage in Bakhmut.
Rob Lee (Twitter)
Wagner commanders are given greater discretion and flexibility to fight as they see fit and to find/exploit weak points (TDF units are often deliberately targeted). Some Wagner units operate at night while others only during the day. Wagner convicts are not allowed to retreat.
Wagner commanders are given greater discretion and flexibility to fight as they see fit and to find/exploit weak points (TDF units are often deliberately targeted). Some Wagner units operate at night while others only during the day. Wagner convicts are not allowed to retreat.
Rob Lee (Twitter)
Bakhmut matters to Russia because its stated goal is to seize all of the Donbas, but Russian forces are struggling to advance towards Kramatorsk-Slovyansk from the other directions. It has also been key to Ukraine’s defense of the rest of the Donbas.
Bakhmut matters to Russia because its stated goal is to seize all of the Donbas, but Russian forces are struggling to advance towards Kramatorsk-Slovyansk from the other directions. It has also been key to Ukraine’s defense of the rest of the Donbas.
Rob Lee (Twitter)
Ukraine is prioritizing forming and training new units in three army corps for its spring offensive while trying to hold the entirety of the front line. But those are competing priorities, and Ukraine is deliberately holding back reserves. https://www.economist.com/zaluzhny-transcript
Ukraine is prioritizing forming and training new units in three army corps for its spring offensive while trying to hold the entirety of the front line. But those are competing priorities, and Ukraine is deliberately holding back reserves. https://www.economist.com/zaluzhny-transcript
Rob Lee (Twitter)
This may give the impression that Ukraine is losing, but, in reality, Ukraine is not committing all of its resources to the front. Ukraine has a better chance of achieving another significant breakthrough this spring than Russia does during its current offensive.
This may give the impression that Ukraine is losing, but, in reality, Ukraine is not committing all of its resources to the front. Ukraine has a better chance of achieving another significant breakthrough this spring than Russia does during its current offensive.
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Rob Lee (Twitter)
Russia is dependent on a small number of elite units for their assaults (e.g. naval infantry, VDV, Wagner professionals), but they can grind their way to slow, costly victories by employing greater forces and artillery. An attritional fight is not in Ukraine’s interests.
Russia is dependent on a small number of elite units for their assaults (e.g. naval infantry, VDV, Wagner professionals), but they can grind their way to slow, costly victories by employing greater forces and artillery. An attritional fight is not in Ukraine’s interests.
Rob Lee (Twitter)
Until its offensive, Ukraine's best strategy is to pick battles where it can achieve a favorable ratio of attrition and expend fewer munitions, which could weaken Russian forces' ability to defend without significantly sapping Ukraine's offensive potential in the coming months.
Until its offensive, Ukraine's best strategy is to pick battles where it can achieve a favorable ratio of attrition and expend fewer munitions, which could weaken Russian forces' ability to defend without significantly sapping Ukraine's offensive potential in the coming months.
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Rob Lee (Twitter)
Although the attrition ratio in Bakhmut has been advantageous for the duration of the battle, the ratio is much less favorable now with Ru forces holding high ground on the city's flanks. Much of Russia's losses are prisoners of less military value than Ukrainian soldiers.
Although the attrition ratio in Bakhmut has been advantageous for the duration of the battle, the ratio is much less favorable now with Ru forces holding high ground on the city's flanks. Much of Russia's losses are prisoners of less military value than Ukrainian soldiers.
Rob Lee (Twitter)
In contrast, in Vuhledar, the share of Russian casualties from elite units is higher than in Bakhmut, and it isn't clear if Wagner's use of convicts would be as effective in a less urban setting.
In contrast, in Vuhledar, the share of Russian casualties from elite units is higher than in Bakhmut, and it isn't clear if Wagner's use of convicts would be as effective in a less urban setting.
Rob Lee (Twitter)
The upcoming Ukrainian offensive will be strategically critical and potentially decisive. Western aid, including ammunition, will likely peak this spring and summer, and it will take years before increases in artillery production capacity can be achieved.
The upcoming Ukrainian offensive will be strategically critical and potentially decisive. Western aid, including ammunition, will likely peak this spring and summer, and it will take years before increases in artillery production capacity can be achieved.
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Rob Lee (Twitter)
Ukraine will not have air superiority, will face stronger Russian defenses than it did in Kharkiv, and will likely only be able to achieve localized superiority in artillery fire and forces. To gives its offensive the best chance for success, Kyiv needs to husband its resources.
Ukraine will not have air superiority, will face stronger Russian defenses than it did in Kharkiv, and will likely only be able to achieve localized superiority in artillery fire and forces. To gives its offensive the best chance for success, Kyiv needs to husband its resources.
Rob Lee (Twitter)
There is no risk-free option for Ukraine. Retrograde operations are dangerous, withdrawing from Bakhmut could lead to more pressure on Siversk or elsewhere, and there is no guarantee Ukraine would be able to retake the city later if it withdraws.
There is no risk-free option for Ukraine. Retrograde operations are dangerous, withdrawing from Bakhmut could lead to more pressure on Siversk or elsewhere, and there is no guarantee Ukraine would be able to retake the city later if it withdraws.
Rob Lee (Twitter)
But there is a risk that, by committing the necessary forces to continue holding Bakhmut (where its attrition ratio isn't favorable), Ukraine will sap some of the forces available for its strategically more important spring offensive. https://www.wsj.com/amp/articles/russias-wagner-troops-exhaust-ukrainian-forces-in-bakhmut-b58e726c
But there is a risk that, by committing the necessary forces to continue holding Bakhmut (where its attrition ratio isn't favorable), Ukraine will sap some of the forces available for its strategically more important spring offensive. https://www.wsj.com/amp/articles/russias-wagner-troops-exhaust-ukrainian-forces-in-bakhmut-b58e726c
Rob Lee (Twitter)
Another risk is that Russian forces will continue to press to the west to try to seize high ground north of Chasiv Yar, which is defensible terrain for holding Kramatorsk and Slovyansk. Encirclement is also a risk.
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@DefMon3:
Bakhmut
This image shows the difference in the RU forward lines (dashed) between Orange: March 10th and Red: March 19th. https://t.co/zsTrUwwvmP
Another risk is that Russian forces will continue to press to the west to try to seize high ground north of Chasiv Yar, which is defensible terrain for holding Kramatorsk and Slovyansk. Encirclement is also a risk.
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@DefMon3:
Bakhmut
This image shows the difference in the RU forward lines (dashed) between Orange: March 10th and Red: March 19th. https://t.co/zsTrUwwvmP
Rob Lee (Twitter)
Encircling Bakhmut is Russia's best opportunity to inflict a serious defeat on Ukraine. The VDV's 106th Airborne Division has taken on a greater role, and the Russian MoD will likely prioritize cutting off the remaining MRSs by committing more resources.
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@wartranslated:
Update on Bakhmut from the Ukrainian correspondent Yuriy Butusov (https://t.co/0ILhY32A6A):
"The situation in Bakhmut
Ukrainian forces hold most of the city, including the center. Although some of our units were withdrawn from the city, this is more a matter of rotation and not… https://t.co/2TTrqqDkH2
Encircling Bakhmut is Russia's best opportunity to inflict a serious defeat on Ukraine. The VDV's 106th Airborne Division has taken on a greater role, and the Russian MoD will likely prioritize cutting off the remaining MRSs by committing more resources.
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@wartranslated:
Update on Bakhmut from the Ukrainian correspondent Yuriy Butusov (https://t.co/0ILhY32A6A):
"The situation in Bakhmut
Ukrainian forces hold most of the city, including the center. Although some of our units were withdrawn from the city, this is more a matter of rotation and not… https://t.co/2TTrqqDkH2
Rob Lee (Twitter)
The mud season has now begun, which could complicate a withdrawal or reinforcement, particularly if Russian forces advance closer to the O0506 hardball road. This could limit the use of wheeled vehicles.
The mud season has now begun, which could complicate a withdrawal or reinforcement, particularly if Russian forces advance closer to the O0506 hardball road. This could limit the use of wheeled vehicles.
Rob Lee (Twitter)
As in Mariupol and countless other battles, Ukrainian forces have defended bravely and inflicted heavy losses on Russian forces in Bakhmut, which will likely aid Ukraine’s spring offensive. But the conditions have worsened over the past month.
As in Mariupol and countless other battles, Ukrainian forces have defended bravely and inflicted heavy losses on Russian forces in Bakhmut, which will likely aid Ukraine’s spring offensive. But the conditions have worsened over the past month.
Rob Lee (Twitter)
What should Ukraine do? I don’t know. It isn’t a black and white issue and there is uncertainty. Russia may overextend itself trying to take the city and leave itself vulnerable to counterattack. It is ultimately a question of where Ukraine chooses to assume risk.
What should Ukraine do? I don’t know. It isn’t a black and white issue and there is uncertainty. Russia may overextend itself trying to take the city and leave itself vulnerable to counterattack. It is ultimately a question of where Ukraine chooses to assume risk.