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Стриминг твитов о российско-украинской войне в ТГ; иногда сообщения также постятся и редактируются вручную
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Status-6 (Twitter)

Huge cloud of smoke was seen rising from the Volgograd oil refinery in southwestern Russia on Thursday, following a Ukrainian drone attack there last night. https://twitter.com/Archer83Able/status/1955793127286935939#m
Special Kherson Cat 🐈🇺🇦 (Twitter)

🇺🇦84 Ukrainians, military and civilian, have returned home from Russian captivity. Among the released civilians are those who were in Russian captivity since 2014, 2016 and 2017.
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Necro Mancer (Twitter)

Прошёл очередной обмен 84 на 84, в том числе были освобождены гражданские заложники, удерживаемые рашистами ещё с 2014-2017 года
https://xn--r1a.website/V_Zelenskiy_official/15634 t.me/mod_russia/55554 #всрф #всу
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Status-6 (Twitter)

- What can we expect in the coming weeks?

- I assume that the Russians will continue to slowly bleed out the Ukrainians in order to open the front and further accelerate their advance west and north towards Kramatorsk and Slovyansk. For now, our main scenario is that what Russian troops are currently doing will not change.

Of course, if any more concrete data regarding a larger deployment of forces emerges, we will update our scenarios on an ongoing basis. The situation is dynamic.

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Status-6 (Twitter)

- How many Russian troops are there right now?

- Around 650,000, with around 40,000 that arrived since January. The Russians are capable of regenerating losses very quickly. Withdrawing a company or battalion that has suffered several dozen percent losses and rebuilding its personnel can take a maximum of two weeks.

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Status-6 (Twitter)

- So there are no signs that this "human river" of Russians will somehow stop?

- Absolutely not. Experts in Ukraine estimate that the Russians will be able to maintain their current recruitment pace at least until the end of this year. Some also estimate that this won't be a problem until at least mid-2026. This will depend on the state of the Russian economy. The pace of creating new units and rebuilding existing ones will be maintained, even though losses on the frontline could be very high.

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Status-6 (Twitter)

- How does their recruitment mechanism work?

- One stream is still based on volunteers, meaning those seeking a substantial bonus for enlisting in the military. They receive this bonus, undergo training lasting from several days to several weeks, and are then assigned to a specific unit. We don't know if they undergo additional training within their unit—this is the case on the Ukrainian side. Generally, Russians who enlist in the military are deployed to the front within a few weeks at most.

Ukrainian soldiers told us that sometimes such a person dies on the frontline just days after signing a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense. A short training period certainly doesn't prepare them for what will happen on the front in Ukraine.

The second stream, which we don't really know much about, but certainly exists, is young Russians who are conscripted in Russia and who are forced through beatings and various forms of torture to sign contracts.

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Status-6 (Twitter)

- A jakie są główne problemy po stronie Ukraińców?

- Let me start with what has changed for the better in recent months. It's about training. Ukrainian soldiers do indeed undergo 30-day, sometimes six-week, training, and additionally receive so-called assimilation training in their units, which is meant to prepare them for what awaits them.

However, when it comes to Ukrainian soldiers, the biggest problem is that they simply... don't exist. This is related to the very high rate of desertion and leaving units without consent. This creates a dangerous situation: if we consider soldier losses on the front line, as well as desertions and leaving units without consent, the number of soldiers on the Ukrainian side is decreasing month by month. Although Ukrainians officially mobilize 20,000-30,000 people per month, a large portion of them do not end up on the front lines.

This is a very significant structural problem that has remained unresolved for a long time, and there is no indication that this will change anytime soon. Other problems include the quality of command, the personal equipment these soldiers receive, the characteristics of the Ukrainian high-ranking commanders, and also the phase of the war.

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Status-6 (Twitter)

- In what sense?

- It's a completely different experience joining the military when it's winning and there's a good chance, or at least hope, that the war will end soon, than joining an army whose morale is sinking and which retreats daily and weekly under the onslaught of Russian forces. This can also probably be explained the other way around. Russians are more inclined to join the military because they expect this war to finally end because the Russian army is winning.

This is, of course, somewhat exaggerated, as Russians don't really realize what stage the war is at. But the overall mood among the Russian people, and the Russian Ministry of Defense's portrayal of the situation, is that this war won't last much longer.

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Status-6 (Twitter)

- The Russians have no shortage of men, and this is a pressing problem in the Ukrainian army. What else can be seen on the front?

- A significant change we've observed over the past few months is the appearance of drone teams on the front lines, belonging to Rubikon. This is the Russian Center for Advanced Unmanned Systems. It trains drone operators, tests new technologies, and implements them on the front lines. Their actions are highly coordinated and methodical, and their appearance in any part of the front heralds an increase in the intensity of drone attacks and the systematic weakening of Ukrainian positions.

The entire Ukrainian defense over the past year has relied on drones. When there was a lack of artillery ammunition, the Ukrainians used drones. When they lacked manpower, they used drones to fill gaps. Now, this Ukrainian advantage, not only in terms of quality but also in the training of drone pilots, has been nullified, and there are situations where the Russians are gaining a local advantage in the use of drones. What's more, they're using so much of it that it's impacting Ukrainian joint operations.

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Status-6 (Twitter)

- What does that mean?

- Over the past year, Ukrainians have defended their positions using drones, artillery, and infantry. However, the number of Russian drones is currently so high that Ukrainian units often forgo the use of artillery, as drones constantly hover around their deployment areas. In areas of the front where artillery does open fire, Russian counter-battery fire is responded to within one or two minutes, and within a few minutes, swarms of FPV drones appear in the area, targeting and destroying detected artillery.

Furthermore, the Russians are conducting exceptionally effective counter-drone operations, focusing on countering both Ukrainian reconnaissance and attack drones. Because most Ukrainian logistics currently rely on drones, systematically eliminating them poses a significant challenge. At the battalion level, 70-80 percent of Ukrainian logistical effort is allocated to supplying drone units, and only 20-30 percent to infantry support. Maintaining drone capabilities is a higher priority for Ukrainians than securing the operations of front-line units.

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Status-6 (Twitter)

- Does this mean that artillery, tanks and armored vehicles become of little value on the battlefield?

- The so-called "dronosis" is a result of neither side being able to achieve a breakthrough early in the war. Significant offensive operations were halted, primarily through the rapid deployment of unmanned reconnaissance vehicles and their use to conduct effective artillery fire. Later, FPV drones entered the scene. This led to a situation where any armored attack was quickly destroyed. However, the Russians will continue to expand their armored forces. They currently produce 250–300 T-90M tanks per year, and this production will likely increase year by year.

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Status-6 (Twitter)

- What about the deliveries of equipment to Ukraine?

- Armored equipment is still in use, but both the Ukrainian and Russian sides believe its use is currently pointless, as these vehicles quickly become easy targets and are destroyed. In the case of artillery, there are currently no reports of drastic ammunition shortages that would significantly limit firepower.

Although drones function very well and these capabilities are well-developed on the Ukrainian side, Ukrainian commanders say they will never replace artillery – it will remain crucial.

On the Ukrainian side, despite a steady increase in production to several million drones annually, quality remains a problem. There are significant differences between the equipment supplied by state-owned and private industries – in the former, the certification process at the Ministry of Defense takes several months, while private manufacturers respond much more quickly to the need for modifications. In the case of private companies, a single phone call informing them about changes in Russian electronic warfare assets or the need to increase transmitter power or drone speed is often enough to implement the appropriate corrections within a few days.

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