Status-6 (Twitter)
DeepState confirms the beginning of Russian counter-offensive on the Ukrainian left flank in Kursk Oblast.
They say that the Russians were able to move their armored equipment across the Seym river and other smaller rivers before the attack commenced.
t.me/DeepStateUA/20316 https://twitter.com/Archer83Able/status/1833582935741694354#m
DeepState confirms the beginning of Russian counter-offensive on the Ukrainian left flank in Kursk Oblast.
They say that the Russians were able to move their armored equipment across the Seym river and other smaller rivers before the attack commenced.
t.me/DeepStateUA/20316 https://twitter.com/Archer83Able/status/1833582935741694354#m
Rob Lee (Twitter)
Updated map showing further Russian advances on the Pokrovsk front. Russian forces have advanced into Ukrainsk from the south and to the north of the town and west of Marynivka.
https://deepstatemap.live/en#11/48.1560090/37.4551392 https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1833330600297517450#m
Updated map showing further Russian advances on the Pokrovsk front. Russian forces have advanced into Ukrainsk from the south and to the north of the town and west of Marynivka.
https://deepstatemap.live/en#11/48.1560090/37.4551392 https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1833330600297517450#m
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Rob Lee (Twitter)
@groversmith1: I think they are trying to hold and are only retreating when forced. They may fall back from some pockets to shore up their lines.
@groversmith1: I think they are trying to hold and are only retreating when forced. They may fall back from some pockets to shore up their lines.
Dan (Twitter)
RT @Tatarigami_UA: The path to victory, as I see it, is not reliant on any single new weapon system or platform, whether it’s the F-16 or ATACMS. The key to victory, as I see it, lies in the qualitative improvement, an incremental buildup of the Ukrainian army and its economic adaptation, combined with the delivery of long-range systems
New capabilities have made an impact, but with few exceptions, their overall effect has been limited compared to the substantial diplomatic efforts and public pressure that sought them, especially when these platforms are delivered in small numbers. What Ukraine really needs is a systematic buildup and replacement of core combat assets and an improved operational-strategic planning level.
For instance, while the addition of Bradley IFVs might seem minor and tactical, having mechanized brigades equipped with only about 10% of the required armored vehicles creates a severe operational disadvantage, even with new long-range capabilities. In such a situation, delivering IFVs and other armored fighting vehicles restores the capabilities of mechanized brigades to a level where they can effectively perform maneuvers. A good symptom of the problem is the repeated deployment of the same famous brigades to the most problematic areas of the frontline over and over as if Ukraine has no other capable units at all.
Here’s another example: When did Ukraine last receive a major batch of artillery systems, a key weapon in this theater of war? Are Ukraine’s ammunition needs being met in the third year of the invasion? You can always compare delivery numbers with documented losses from sources like Oryx, to see the scale of the problem. Just because something was delivered in 2022 doesn’t mean it remains functional: likely, it's not anymore
Manpower issues persist, primarily due to internal factors. However, they are exacerbated by a shortage of properly armed and trained units, which leads to higher casualties and negatively affects recruitment.
Ukraine needs comprehensive and constant support across the entire spectrum: field hospital equipment, medical evacuation vehicles, mortars, artillery, IFVs, counter-battery systems, electronic warfare and communication devices, anti-tank and anti-aircraft weaponry, landmines, and drones. New weapon platforms like ATACMS or F-16s can offer valuable capabilities, such as striking logistical hubs or command centers. However, these strikes will have limited impact unless followed by a maneuver from mechanized or airmobile units to capitalize on the opportunity created
Another key aspect of this war is domestic production, where Ukraine has made significant progress compared to 2022. Back then, the idea of weekly strikes deep inside Russia, reaching as far as Novorossiysk, Moscow, or Pskov seemed unrealistic.
Additionally, initiatives like Zbroyari, launched by the Ukrainian Ministry of Strategic Industries to boost domestic military production, have not yet gained the necessary traction or international backing. This effort should have received more attention and resources than the provision of ATACMS, which, while important, is less critical from a strategic perspective than a well-developed and protected Ukrainian production. After all, it was Ukrainian-produced drones that began to change the game with a highly successful campaign against oil refineries, as this did not require any permission from the West.
Last but not least, we need significant improvements in both operational-tactical and operational-strategic command levels. Unfortunately, the existing command system has led to serious problems on the frontlines, specifically in Donetsk oblast. This is one of the most challenging problems to tackle, as it's based on personal connections, politics, and loyalties rather than merit and result-based systems. Changes at this level cannot be addressed with simple advice or training from the West, it requires a commitment from political and top military leadership, beginning with a recognition of the problem.
RT @Tatarigami_UA: The path to victory, as I see it, is not reliant on any single new weapon system or platform, whether it’s the F-16 or ATACMS. The key to victory, as I see it, lies in the qualitative improvement, an incremental buildup of the Ukrainian army and its economic adaptation, combined with the delivery of long-range systems
New capabilities have made an impact, but with few exceptions, their overall effect has been limited compared to the substantial diplomatic efforts and public pressure that sought them, especially when these platforms are delivered in small numbers. What Ukraine really needs is a systematic buildup and replacement of core combat assets and an improved operational-strategic planning level.
For instance, while the addition of Bradley IFVs might seem minor and tactical, having mechanized brigades equipped with only about 10% of the required armored vehicles creates a severe operational disadvantage, even with new long-range capabilities. In such a situation, delivering IFVs and other armored fighting vehicles restores the capabilities of mechanized brigades to a level where they can effectively perform maneuvers. A good symptom of the problem is the repeated deployment of the same famous brigades to the most problematic areas of the frontline over and over as if Ukraine has no other capable units at all.
Here’s another example: When did Ukraine last receive a major batch of artillery systems, a key weapon in this theater of war? Are Ukraine’s ammunition needs being met in the third year of the invasion? You can always compare delivery numbers with documented losses from sources like Oryx, to see the scale of the problem. Just because something was delivered in 2022 doesn’t mean it remains functional: likely, it's not anymore
Manpower issues persist, primarily due to internal factors. However, they are exacerbated by a shortage of properly armed and trained units, which leads to higher casualties and negatively affects recruitment.
Ukraine needs comprehensive and constant support across the entire spectrum: field hospital equipment, medical evacuation vehicles, mortars, artillery, IFVs, counter-battery systems, electronic warfare and communication devices, anti-tank and anti-aircraft weaponry, landmines, and drones. New weapon platforms like ATACMS or F-16s can offer valuable capabilities, such as striking logistical hubs or command centers. However, these strikes will have limited impact unless followed by a maneuver from mechanized or airmobile units to capitalize on the opportunity created
Another key aspect of this war is domestic production, where Ukraine has made significant progress compared to 2022. Back then, the idea of weekly strikes deep inside Russia, reaching as far as Novorossiysk, Moscow, or Pskov seemed unrealistic.
Additionally, initiatives like Zbroyari, launched by the Ukrainian Ministry of Strategic Industries to boost domestic military production, have not yet gained the necessary traction or international backing. This effort should have received more attention and resources than the provision of ATACMS, which, while important, is less critical from a strategic perspective than a well-developed and protected Ukrainian production. After all, it was Ukrainian-produced drones that began to change the game with a highly successful campaign against oil refineries, as this did not require any permission from the West.
Last but not least, we need significant improvements in both operational-tactical and operational-strategic command levels. Unfortunately, the existing command system has led to serious problems on the frontlines, specifically in Donetsk oblast. This is one of the most challenging problems to tackle, as it's based on personal connections, politics, and loyalties rather than merit and result-based systems. Changes at this level cannot be addressed with simple advice or training from the West, it requires a commitment from political and top military leadership, beginning with a recognition of the problem.
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IgorGirkin (Twitter)
RT @MT_Anderson: 🇷🇺Olenya Air Base🇷🇺
50cm📷 from 10 September 2024
Airbus is no longer allowing the sharing of satellite imagery over 🇷🇺
Instead of the actual📷, I have overlaid aircraft type & locations on Google Maps
9x Tu-95
5x Tu-22 flight line + 5x not
5x Rotary Wing
4x An-12
RT @MT_Anderson: 🇷🇺Olenya Air Base🇷🇺
50cm📷 from 10 September 2024
Airbus is no longer allowing the sharing of satellite imagery over 🇷🇺
Instead of the actual📷, I have overlaid aircraft type & locations on Google Maps
9x Tu-95
5x Tu-22 flight line + 5x not
5x Rotary Wing
4x An-12
Rob Lee (Twitter)
RT @wartranslated: Description of the situation in the Kursk region from a Russian source, noting the ongoing fierce fighting and the significant presence of Ukrainian drones (despite some claims that their number has decreased)
RT @wartranslated: Description of the situation in the Kursk region from a Russian source, noting the ongoing fierce fighting and the significant presence of Ukrainian drones (despite some claims that their number has decreased)
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Colby Badhwar 🇨🇦🇬🇧 (Twitter)
RT @juliegraceb: McCaul in a statement says: “I want to clarify that the Secretary told me ATACMS would be a key topic of conversation in his meetings in the UK and Ukraine, but did not confirm that the Biden-Harris administration would finally allow Ukraine to target Russian military sites inside of Russia with ATACMS. However, I took the opportunity to remind him that Congress specifically directed the administration to send Ukraine ATACMS in the supplemental, and that placing arbitrary limitations on those weapons violates the intent of the law. I hope they reverse this damaging policy as soon as possible.”
RT @juliegraceb: McCaul in a statement says: “I want to clarify that the Secretary told me ATACMS would be a key topic of conversation in his meetings in the UK and Ukraine, but did not confirm that the Biden-Harris administration would finally allow Ukraine to target Russian military sites inside of Russia with ATACMS. However, I took the opportunity to remind him that Congress specifically directed the administration to send Ukraine ATACMS in the supplemental, and that placing arbitrary limitations on those weapons violates the intent of the law. I hope they reverse this damaging policy as soon as possible.”
vxTwitter / fixvx
Juliegrace Brufke (@juliegraceb)
House Foreign Affairs Chairman Michael McCaul said “I talked to Blinken two days ago, and he is traveling with his counterpart from the UK to Kyiv to basically tell them that they will allow them [to hit Russia with ATACMS]” during an interview with me at…