Rob Lee (Twitter)
Ultimately, the two previous large crossborder operations in May-June 2023 and March 2024 had little effect on the fighting on the priority axes. The 2023 operation caught Russia by surprise and may have been a relatively effective economy of force mission (though it did not force Russia to redeploy significant forces from priority areas) but the March 2024 operation was far less successful. 4/
Ultimately, the two previous large crossborder operations in May-June 2023 and March 2024 had little effect on the fighting on the priority axes. The 2023 operation caught Russia by surprise and may have been a relatively effective economy of force mission (though it did not force Russia to redeploy significant forces from priority areas) but the March 2024 operation was far less successful. 4/
Rob Lee (Twitter)
Since then, Russia stood up a Northern Group of Forces leading the Kharkiv offensive, and has strengthened its forces on the border. So Russia already has greater forces/conventional capabilities in the area, better command and control, and it has conscript units that can be deployed, which are not used in Ukraine. It is unlikely this operation will force Russia to pull significant forces from Ukraine. 5/
Since then, Russia stood up a Northern Group of Forces leading the Kharkiv offensive, and has strengthened its forces on the border. So Russia already has greater forces/conventional capabilities in the area, better command and control, and it has conscript units that can be deployed, which are not used in Ukraine. It is unlikely this operation will force Russia to pull significant forces from Ukraine. 5/
Rob Lee (Twitter)
Russia has improved its dynamic targeting with persistent ISR coverage from UAVs behind Ukrainian lines, which are used to locate targets for Lancets, Krasnopol, Iskander-M, and other PGMs. Russian UAV footage of Ukrainian units moving across the border suggests this problem has not been solved, which can make it dangerous to mass armor. 6/
Russia has improved its dynamic targeting with persistent ISR coverage from UAVs behind Ukrainian lines, which are used to locate targets for Lancets, Krasnopol, Iskander-M, and other PGMs. Russian UAV footage of Ukrainian units moving across the border suggests this problem has not been solved, which can make it dangerous to mass armor. 6/
Rob Lee (Twitter)
A limited operation might be able to achieve limited goals, but a more ambitious operation carries greater risks. It is unlikely this operation will have a significant effect on the course of the war, and previous crossborder operations did not have serious domestic political ramifications for Putin. 7/
A limited operation might be able to achieve limited goals, but a more ambitious operation carries greater risks. It is unlikely this operation will have a significant effect on the course of the war, and previous crossborder operations did not have serious domestic political ramifications for Putin. 7/
Rob Lee (Twitter)
We only have limited information right now and the size and scope of the operation isn't clear, but largescale crossborder operations are more difficult now than they were in 2023 and Russia continues to advance in the Donbas. 8/ https://twitter.com/J_JHelin/status/1820864139100877285#m
We only have limited information right now and the size and scope of the operation isn't clear, but largescale crossborder operations are more difficult now than they were in 2023 and Russia continues to advance in the Donbas. 8/ https://twitter.com/J_JHelin/status/1820864139100877285#m
Rob Lee (Twitter)
Offensive operations also risk taking higher casualties than in defense at a time when Ukrainian forces are stretched thin. Ukraine needs to maintain a favorable attrition ratio given the manpower situation, so taking heavy losses in this operation could make it more difficult for Ukraine to hold back future Russian assaults if it saps Ukraine's limited reserves. 9/
Offensive operations also risk taking higher casualties than in defense at a time when Ukrainian forces are stretched thin. Ukraine needs to maintain a favorable attrition ratio given the manpower situation, so taking heavy losses in this operation could make it more difficult for Ukraine to hold back future Russian assaults if it saps Ukraine's limited reserves. 9/
This media is not supported in your browser
VIEW IN TELEGRAM
Rob Lee (Twitter)
Footage reportedly of Russian soldiers captured in Kursk oblast. 3/ https://twitter.com/censor_net/status/1820853524579668445#m
Footage reportedly of Russian soldiers captured in Kursk oblast. 3/ https://twitter.com/censor_net/status/1820853524579668445#m
🔥7😱1
This media is not supported in your browser
VIEW IN TELEGRAM
Rob Lee (Twitter)
Video of Chasiv Yar from Ukraine’s 225th Assault Battalion.
t.me/black_swan_ukraine/158
Video of Chasiv Yar from Ukraine’s 225th Assault Battalion.
t.me/black_swan_ukraine/158
This media is not supported in your browser
VIEW IN TELEGRAM
Rob Lee (Twitter)
Video of a pair of tanks from Ukraine’s 3rd Assault Brigade firing at Russian positions and employing smoke.
t.me/ab3army/4425
Video of a pair of tanks from Ukraine’s 3rd Assault Brigade firing at Russian positions and employing smoke.
t.me/ab3army/4425
Rob Lee (Twitter)
Footage of a destroyed Russia Su-34 at Russia’s Morozovsk airbase.
t.me/russianocontext/4229 https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1820366664833114301#m
Footage of a destroyed Russia Su-34 at Russia’s Morozovsk airbase.
t.me/russianocontext/4229 https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1820366664833114301#m
This media is not supported in your browser
VIEW IN TELEGRAM
Rob Lee (Twitter)
Two more videos of Russian soldiers using Discord.
t.me/russianocontext/4183 https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1816978111759790510#m
Two more videos of Russian soldiers using Discord.
t.me/russianocontext/4183 https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1816978111759790510#m
🤬2
Rob Lee (Twitter)
A Russian Ural truck with a counter-UAV roof screen, rubber pads, and an EW jammer.
t.me/russianocontext/4176
A Russian Ural truck with a counter-UAV roof screen, rubber pads, and an EW jammer.
t.me/russianocontext/4176
This media is not supported in your browser
VIEW IN TELEGRAM
Dan (Twitter)
332-333. South of Pletenivka.
2.1 km south of tweet 331 on same 'the road of death',🇺🇦82nd Air Assault Bde FPV strike a Russian at 50.322642, 36.930542.
@GeoConfirmed @UAControlMap
Also via @OSINTua the same🇷🇺Desertcross wreck from the film destroyed in mid May at 50.3226, 36.93043.
At 0:15 in film released 08 July. t.me/wilddivision82/205
332-333. South of Pletenivka.
2.1 km south of tweet 331 on same 'the road of death',🇺🇦82nd Air Assault Bde FPV strike a Russian at 50.322642, 36.930542.
@GeoConfirmed @UAControlMap
Also via @OSINTua the same🇷🇺Desertcross wreck from the film destroyed in mid May at 50.3226, 36.93043.
At 0:15 in film released 08 July. t.me/wilddivision82/205
👍1
Ukraine Battle Map (Twitter)
@USA_Polling: When Tim Walz was in Congress, he was as much of a Republican as Paul Ryan, the Republican Speaker of the House in 2018, according to Govtrack.Us
@USA_Polling: When Tim Walz was in Congress, he was as much of a Republican as Paul Ryan, the Republican Speaker of the House in 2018, according to Govtrack.Us