This media is not supported in your browser
VIEW IN TELEGRAM
Dan (Twitter)
RT @moklasen: @moklasen @geschlittert: captured pows in kursk oblast,
17th Border Protection Battalion
488th MRR (в/ч 12721), 144th MRD
t.me/poisk_in_ua/70624
RT @moklasen: @moklasen @geschlittert: captured pows in kursk oblast,
17th Border Protection Battalion
488th MRR (в/ч 12721), 144th MRD
t.me/poisk_in_ua/70624
🥴3😁2👎1
This media is not supported in your browser
VIEW IN TELEGRAM
Dan (Twitter)
@Danspiun @john_marquee: 331-333. Pletenivka, 21-30 June.
Whilst up north some odds and ends.
At 50.33991, 36.91905, 'Couriers of the Apostle Peter' of the🇺🇦36th Marine Bde targets a🇷🇺vehicle on the route from Shebekino BCP - 'the road of death' as 🇷🇺blogger Romanov named it.
Unclear result.
Released 01 July. t.me/fpvmp/167
@Danspiun @john_marquee: 331-333. Pletenivka, 21-30 June.
Whilst up north some odds and ends.
At 50.33991, 36.91905, 'Couriers of the Apostle Peter' of the🇺🇦36th Marine Bde targets a🇷🇺vehicle on the route from Shebekino BCP - 'the road of death' as 🇷🇺blogger Romanov named it.
Unclear result.
Released 01 July. t.me/fpvmp/167
The Lookout (Twitter)
RT @AuroraIntel: This is normal. Move along. https://twitter.com/Osint613/status/1820817433810133467#m
RT @AuroraIntel: This is normal. Move along. https://twitter.com/Osint613/status/1820817433810133467#m
This media is not supported in your browser
VIEW IN TELEGRAM
Danvan (Twitter)
RT @blue_eyedKeti: Words can hardly describe the horrors of war. Unbreakable Kharkiv today.
These are the consequences of another Russian crime in Kharkiv.
Eight victims are now known to have suffered acute stress reactions and injuries. According to the regional prosecutor's office, the explosion damaged at least 15 high-rise buildings and 25 cars.
RT @blue_eyedKeti: Words can hardly describe the horrors of war. Unbreakable Kharkiv today.
These are the consequences of another Russian crime in Kharkiv.
Eight victims are now known to have suffered acute stress reactions and injuries. According to the regional prosecutor's office, the explosion damaged at least 15 high-rise buildings and 25 cars.
❤🔥1👍1🤬1
The Lookout (Twitter)
@Rhaescuporis: CIT analysis of Russian recruitment numbers, from a thread: https://twitter.com/Rhaescuporis/status/1820848016473117097#m
@Rhaescuporis: CIT analysis of Russian recruitment numbers, from a thread: https://twitter.com/Rhaescuporis/status/1820848016473117097#m
Belarusian Hajun project (Twitter)
Transport aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces arrived twice at Baranavichy airfield. Another rotation of units of the Russian Armed Forces stationed in Homiel region took place.
The repair of the runway at Machulishchy airfield was completed. In the near future, repair work will also take place at Lida and Baranavichy airfields.
The full report on military activity in Belarus on July 29-August 4:
https://hajun.info/reports/military-activity-on-the-territory-of-belarus-on-july-29-august-4/
Online map of military activity in Belarus: map.hajun.info/
Transport aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces arrived twice at Baranavichy airfield. Another rotation of units of the Russian Armed Forces stationed in Homiel region took place.
The repair of the runway at Machulishchy airfield was completed. In the near future, repair work will also take place at Lida and Baranavichy airfields.
The full report on military activity in Belarus on July 29-August 4:
https://hajun.info/reports/military-activity-on-the-territory-of-belarus-on-july-29-august-4/
Online map of military activity in Belarus: map.hajun.info/
Necro Mancer (Twitter)
Воспитанник детдома, липецкий дятел Ролдугин Алексей Васильевич 1991 г.р. из села Долгуша всю свою сознательную жизнь мечтал стать летчиком, но наделал долгов и рядовым членом экипажа РСЗО 05/05/22 загнулся в СВОВУ
vk.com/wall-212657241_3392 #всрф #потерьнет #груз200
Воспитанник детдома, липецкий дятел Ролдугин Алексей Васильевич 1991 г.р. из села Долгуша всю свою сознательную жизнь мечтал стать летчиком, но наделал долгов и рядовым членом экипажа РСЗО 05/05/22 загнулся в СВОВУ
vk.com/wall-212657241_3392 #всрф #потерьнет #груз200
😁12👍5🍾5🐳2❤1
Colby Badhwar 🇨🇦🇬🇧 (Twitter)
Really interesting piece of research & analysis here. https://twitter.com/ItsJohnJacobs/status/1820868352715452714#m
Really interesting piece of research & analysis here. https://twitter.com/ItsJohnJacobs/status/1820868352715452714#m
👍1
Rob Lee (Twitter)
Some early thoughts about this operation. The most important factor in the war right now is Russia's manpower and force availability advantage, in particular with infantry. That is the primary reason why Ukraine is struggling to hold back Russian advances in Donetsk oblast. Russia's Kharkiv offensive further stretched Ukraine's reserves, which means Ukrainian commanders have limited forces to reinforce units that are under pressure or to stop breakthroughs. https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1820857236387704932#m
Some early thoughts about this operation. The most important factor in the war right now is Russia's manpower and force availability advantage, in particular with infantry. That is the primary reason why Ukraine is struggling to hold back Russian advances in Donetsk oblast. Russia's Kharkiv offensive further stretched Ukraine's reserves, which means Ukrainian commanders have limited forces to reinforce units that are under pressure or to stop breakthroughs. https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1820857236387704932#m
👍3😢1
Rob Lee (Twitter)
The situation on the Pokrovsk and Toretsk fronts is serious. The war has not seen large swings of the front line since 2022, but Russia's advances on the Pokrovsk front over the past three weeks have been relatively rapid for the 2023-2024 period. So the question is how this operation will affect the fighting elsewhere and whether these forces could have been employed more effectively in Donetsk oblast. 2/
The situation on the Pokrovsk and Toretsk fronts is serious. The war has not seen large swings of the front line since 2022, but Russia's advances on the Pokrovsk front over the past three weeks have been relatively rapid for the 2023-2024 period. So the question is how this operation will affect the fighting elsewhere and whether these forces could have been employed more effectively in Donetsk oblast. 2/
Rob Lee (Twitter)
Compared to previous crossborder operations, this one is notable in that it appears to involve Ukrainian conventional forces and not just from GUR. Ukraine likely also is not able to employ HIMARS in support of the operation because the US only authorized strikes in Belgorod oblast relevant to Russia's Kharkiv offensive. 3/
Compared to previous crossborder operations, this one is notable in that it appears to involve Ukrainian conventional forces and not just from GUR. Ukraine likely also is not able to employ HIMARS in support of the operation because the US only authorized strikes in Belgorod oblast relevant to Russia's Kharkiv offensive. 3/
Rob Lee (Twitter)
Ultimately, the two previous large crossborder operations in May-June 2023 and March 2024 had little effect on the fighting on the priority axes. The 2023 operation caught Russia by surprise and may have been a relatively effective economy of force mission (though it did not force Russia to redeploy significant forces from priority areas) but the March 2024 operation was far less successful. 4/
Ultimately, the two previous large crossborder operations in May-June 2023 and March 2024 had little effect on the fighting on the priority axes. The 2023 operation caught Russia by surprise and may have been a relatively effective economy of force mission (though it did not force Russia to redeploy significant forces from priority areas) but the March 2024 operation was far less successful. 4/
Rob Lee (Twitter)
Since then, Russia stood up a Northern Group of Forces leading the Kharkiv offensive, and has strengthened its forces on the border. So Russia already has greater forces/conventional capabilities in the area, better command and control, and it has conscript units that can be deployed, which are not used in Ukraine. It is unlikely this operation will force Russia to pull significant forces from Ukraine. 5/
Since then, Russia stood up a Northern Group of Forces leading the Kharkiv offensive, and has strengthened its forces on the border. So Russia already has greater forces/conventional capabilities in the area, better command and control, and it has conscript units that can be deployed, which are not used in Ukraine. It is unlikely this operation will force Russia to pull significant forces from Ukraine. 5/
Rob Lee (Twitter)
Russia has improved its dynamic targeting with persistent ISR coverage from UAVs behind Ukrainian lines, which are used to locate targets for Lancets, Krasnopol, Iskander-M, and other PGMs. Russian UAV footage of Ukrainian units moving across the border suggests this problem has not been solved, which can make it dangerous to mass armor. 6/
Russia has improved its dynamic targeting with persistent ISR coverage from UAVs behind Ukrainian lines, which are used to locate targets for Lancets, Krasnopol, Iskander-M, and other PGMs. Russian UAV footage of Ukrainian units moving across the border suggests this problem has not been solved, which can make it dangerous to mass armor. 6/
Rob Lee (Twitter)
A limited operation might be able to achieve limited goals, but a more ambitious operation carries greater risks. It is unlikely this operation will have a significant effect on the course of the war, and previous crossborder operations did not have serious domestic political ramifications for Putin. 7/
A limited operation might be able to achieve limited goals, but a more ambitious operation carries greater risks. It is unlikely this operation will have a significant effect on the course of the war, and previous crossborder operations did not have serious domestic political ramifications for Putin. 7/