Colby Badhwar 🇨🇦🇬🇧 (Twitter)
@ryanscottborman: Sidewinder will be at 2500 next year. I'd be surprised if Israel is assembling more than that.
@ryanscottborman: Sidewinder will be at 2500 next year. I'd be surprised if Israel is assembling more than that.
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Status-6 (Twitter)
RT @zriboua: On the situation in Mali:
It's important to first of all define the terms. Tuaregs are a large semi-nomad Berber group that adopted Islam in the 7th century. They adhere mostly to Sunni Maliki Madhhab, which explains their visits to Morocco to pay homage to Saints. They are present in Niger, Mali, Libya, Algeria, Mauritania, Nigeria, and Burkina Faso. Those in Mali speak Arabic and a Berber dialect, Tamashek.
They have historically controlled the caravan roads that stretch from North Africa to Central Africa.
RT @zriboua: On the situation in Mali:
It's important to first of all define the terms. Tuaregs are a large semi-nomad Berber group that adopted Islam in the 7th century. They adhere mostly to Sunni Maliki Madhhab, which explains their visits to Morocco to pay homage to Saints. They are present in Niger, Mali, Libya, Algeria, Mauritania, Nigeria, and Burkina Faso. Those in Mali speak Arabic and a Berber dialect, Tamashek.
They have historically controlled the caravan roads that stretch from North Africa to Central Africa.
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Necro Mancer (Twitter)
Локация: Сокол (https://maps.app.goo.gl/HDKL6vtjjPUvXfPb7), Ясиноватский район, Донецкая обл. via @BautinDima
Локация: Сокол (https://maps.app.goo.gl/HDKL6vtjjPUvXfPb7), Ясиноватский район, Донецкая обл. via @BautinDima
X (formerly Twitter)
Necro Mancer (@666_mancer) on X
Локация: Сокол (https://t.co/rOAenJqYcx), Ясиноватский район, Донецкая обл. via @BautinDima
Dan (Twitter)
RT @Tatarigami_UA: In today's speech, Zelensky, after talking to Commander in Chief General Syrskyi, reported that Ukraine has the strength to achieve its goals. While he is correct that Ukraine has the strengths and resources to take the worsening situation under control, the situation in the Pokrovsk direction remains critical, and some areas of defense have started to collapse.
Feedback from officers and soldiers on the ground, the rapid progress of Russian forces, and the unacceptable attitude towards regular soldiers from higher command indicate that the situation is not "under control." It is not a total disaster only due to the actions of people on the ground who are trying their best to prevent advances and showing examples of individual heroism and leadership.
Of course, deliveries of F-16s, permission to strike deeper into Russia, and supplements of vehicles would have helped the situation, but resources alone can't fix the problem of continuous command mistakes, including unrealistic tasks disproportionate to available human resources, combined with demands to retake lost positions.
Unsurprisingly, for the past few months, following the events in Kharkiv, there have been circulating rumors about the administration's dissatisfaction with Syrskyi and his potential replacement. The decision to remove the 80th Brigade commander, followed by the public demand from the officers of the 80th Brigade to reinstate the commander, might accelerate this process. That being said, while Syrskyi might be responsible for many problems on the frontline, he is also executing the vision and will of the President in many cases, and it was his decision to appoint him.
My team has been working on a comprehensive update on that area, but the Russians have progressed so quickly multiple times that we had to postpone the report to include the latest updates, redo the maps, and add new details. Hopefully, tomorrow we will be able to address most of the questions regarding the situation in the Pokrovsk direction and cover the problematic situation
RT @Tatarigami_UA: In today's speech, Zelensky, after talking to Commander in Chief General Syrskyi, reported that Ukraine has the strength to achieve its goals. While he is correct that Ukraine has the strengths and resources to take the worsening situation under control, the situation in the Pokrovsk direction remains critical, and some areas of defense have started to collapse.
Feedback from officers and soldiers on the ground, the rapid progress of Russian forces, and the unacceptable attitude towards regular soldiers from higher command indicate that the situation is not "under control." It is not a total disaster only due to the actions of people on the ground who are trying their best to prevent advances and showing examples of individual heroism and leadership.
Of course, deliveries of F-16s, permission to strike deeper into Russia, and supplements of vehicles would have helped the situation, but resources alone can't fix the problem of continuous command mistakes, including unrealistic tasks disproportionate to available human resources, combined with demands to retake lost positions.
Unsurprisingly, for the past few months, following the events in Kharkiv, there have been circulating rumors about the administration's dissatisfaction with Syrskyi and his potential replacement. The decision to remove the 80th Brigade commander, followed by the public demand from the officers of the 80th Brigade to reinstate the commander, might accelerate this process. That being said, while Syrskyi might be responsible for many problems on the frontline, he is also executing the vision and will of the President in many cases, and it was his decision to appoint him.
My team has been working on a comprehensive update on that area, but the Russians have progressed so quickly multiple times that we had to postpone the report to include the latest updates, redo the maps, and add new details. Hopefully, tomorrow we will be able to address most of the questions regarding the situation in the Pokrovsk direction and cover the problematic situation
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Dan (Twitter)
RT @Tatarigami_UA: Over a year and a half ago, I wrote multiple posts and threads about the persistence of Soviet-style command within the Ukrainian army. At that time, many dismissed my concerns, arguing that war is not the time for change, or outright attacked me for criticism. Unfortunately, the situation has only worsened since then, and the problem remains systemic. This issue existed before General Zaluzhnyi, continued during his tenure, and has deteriorated further under General Syrskyi. Despite promises to improve the situation, Syrskyi has increased authoritative pressure on commanding officers to hold ground with the same limited resources, and the results are evident.
Earlier this year, I correctly noted with my team that the Kharkiv operation was likely a diversion and that the main focus would remain on Donbas. While our troops have been trying to retake Hlyboke and have spent months holding the Krynki foothold (despite unclear objectives given our limited resources), Russians have systematically exhausted our brigades in Donbas. The Russian approach is not particularly innovative: they send small tactical units against Ukrainian defenses daily until one position falls, then exploit the success. Senior Ukrainian commanders have attempted to adopt similar tactics, forgetting that we have far fewer people and unreliable Western support that may or may not arrive on time, if at all.
Is it better on the Russian side? Absolutely not. My team has recordings of multiple radio communications from the Russian side, revealing threats of execution or denial of medical evacuation if their troops refuse to advance. It is far worse for the Russians, but they have significant advantages in personnel, equipment, vehicles, artillery, and air force. They can afford such tactics—we cannot. Moreover, the Russian army in 2024 is much smarter and more experienced than the disorganized troops we saw in February 2022. The only way to halt their advancement is to outsmart them by being more resourceful and careful, aiming to preserve our personnel when the situation requires it.
It is still possible to break the spine of the Russian army, which has severe logistical problems, dwindling availability of preserved vehicles, reliance on unarmored transportation, unmotivated personnel, and artillery barrel replacement bottlenecks. Additionally, many internal economic problems take time to manifest.
However, the window of opportunity is getting smaller. Unless radical changes are made, we are heading toward the most unfavorable scenario of all: forced negotiations, stalemate, minimization of Western aid, re-armament of the Russian army, and a new round of the war with much more unfavorable outcomes for Ukraine, leading to occupation and forced assimilation.
RT @Tatarigami_UA: Over a year and a half ago, I wrote multiple posts and threads about the persistence of Soviet-style command within the Ukrainian army. At that time, many dismissed my concerns, arguing that war is not the time for change, or outright attacked me for criticism. Unfortunately, the situation has only worsened since then, and the problem remains systemic. This issue existed before General Zaluzhnyi, continued during his tenure, and has deteriorated further under General Syrskyi. Despite promises to improve the situation, Syrskyi has increased authoritative pressure on commanding officers to hold ground with the same limited resources, and the results are evident.
Earlier this year, I correctly noted with my team that the Kharkiv operation was likely a diversion and that the main focus would remain on Donbas. While our troops have been trying to retake Hlyboke and have spent months holding the Krynki foothold (despite unclear objectives given our limited resources), Russians have systematically exhausted our brigades in Donbas. The Russian approach is not particularly innovative: they send small tactical units against Ukrainian defenses daily until one position falls, then exploit the success. Senior Ukrainian commanders have attempted to adopt similar tactics, forgetting that we have far fewer people and unreliable Western support that may or may not arrive on time, if at all.
Is it better on the Russian side? Absolutely not. My team has recordings of multiple radio communications from the Russian side, revealing threats of execution or denial of medical evacuation if their troops refuse to advance. It is far worse for the Russians, but they have significant advantages in personnel, equipment, vehicles, artillery, and air force. They can afford such tactics—we cannot. Moreover, the Russian army in 2024 is much smarter and more experienced than the disorganized troops we saw in February 2022. The only way to halt their advancement is to outsmart them by being more resourceful and careful, aiming to preserve our personnel when the situation requires it.
It is still possible to break the spine of the Russian army, which has severe logistical problems, dwindling availability of preserved vehicles, reliance on unarmored transportation, unmotivated personnel, and artillery barrel replacement bottlenecks. Additionally, many internal economic problems take time to manifest.
However, the window of opportunity is getting smaller. Unless radical changes are made, we are heading toward the most unfavorable scenario of all: forced negotiations, stalemate, minimization of Western aid, re-armament of the Russian army, and a new round of the war with much more unfavorable outcomes for Ukraine, leading to occupation and forced assimilation.
The Lookout (Twitter)
@auonsson: It is normal to see these active in the warmer half of the year though the pre invasion routine of the amphibious training cycle has been interrupted since the 336th Naval Infantry Brigade is mostly occupied with the war.
@auonsson: It is normal to see these active in the warmer half of the year though the pre invasion routine of the amphibious training cycle has been interrupted since the 336th Naval Infantry Brigade is mostly occupied with the war.
Rob Lee (Twitter)
Updated map showing Russian advances on the Pokrovsk, Toretsk, Vuhledar, and Siversk fronts.
https://deepstatemap.live/en#11/48.1898946/37.5533295 https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1817666717788611005#m
Updated map showing Russian advances on the Pokrovsk, Toretsk, Vuhledar, and Siversk fronts.
https://deepstatemap.live/en#11/48.1898946/37.5533295 https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1817666717788611005#m
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Def Mon (Twitter)
RT @SarahAshtonLV: “Russian forces advanced north of Robotyne, controlling the entire village.” - CDS
RT @SarahAshtonLV: “Russian forces advanced north of Robotyne, controlling the entire village.” - CDS
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Def Mon (Twitter)
RT @OSINTua: Seems like NK delivered to Russia not only millions of artillery rounds but also some quite specific vehicles.
I hope that SK will respond.🧐
RT @OSINTua: Seems like NK delivered to Russia not only millions of artillery rounds but also some quite specific vehicles.
I hope that SK will respond.🧐
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Special Kherson Cat 🐈🇺🇦 (Twitter)
33rd Brigade repels Russian attack on eastern front today.
“Today, around 04:40, the Russians left for the breakthrough. About 8 units of equipment and landing groups were used.
As a result, the Russians lost: 48 killed. 2 BMP, 3 APCs, 1 motorcycle - were damaged; 1 BMP destroyed; 8 UAVs were downed.”
t.me/mechanized33/224
33rd Brigade repels Russian attack on eastern front today.
“Today, around 04:40, the Russians left for the breakthrough. About 8 units of equipment and landing groups were used.
As a result, the Russians lost: 48 killed. 2 BMP, 3 APCs, 1 motorcycle - were damaged; 1 BMP destroyed; 8 UAVs were downed.”
t.me/mechanized33/224
Necro Mancer (Twitter)
Выращиватель фруктово-ягодных культур, гитарист-строитель Дмитрий Геннадьевич Ягодин 1969 г.р. из свердловского села Городище трудолюбиво шёл по пути от коммунизма к юбилею, но свернул на кривую дорожку и демилитаризовался напрочь
vk.com/wall-19947255_1574 #всрф #груз200 #потерьнет
Выращиватель фруктово-ягодных культур, гитарист-строитель Дмитрий Геннадьевич Ягодин 1969 г.р. из свердловского села Городище трудолюбиво шёл по пути от коммунизма к юбилею, но свернул на кривую дорожку и демилитаризовался напрочь
vk.com/wall-19947255_1574 #всрф #груз200 #потерьнет
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