Dan (Twitter)
@NotWoofers Two possiblities: one they were trying to cross back but why didn't they use their snorkels or the try the bridge to reduce swimming distance? Another possibility they realised they couldnt cross and this was an orderly disabling of vehicles to stop them falling into UAF hands?
@NotWoofers Two possiblities: one they were trying to cross back but why didn't they use their snorkels or the try the bridge to reduce swimming distance? Another possibility they realised they couldnt cross and this was an orderly disabling of vehicles to stop them falling into UAF hands?
Rob Lee (Twitter)
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@GuyPlopsky:
Stills from an April 27 TV Zvezda video about air operations against Ukraine being conducted out of what is likely Baltimor AB in Voronezh Oblast showing a KAB-1500LG-series 1,500kg-class laser-guided bomb on the inboard port wing station of a VKS #Su34 (likely from 47th BAP). https://t.co/CXikDkZ6Bf
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@GuyPlopsky:
Stills from an April 27 TV Zvezda video about air operations against Ukraine being conducted out of what is likely Baltimor AB in Voronezh Oblast showing a KAB-1500LG-series 1,500kg-class laser-guided bomb on the inboard port wing station of a VKS #Su34 (likely from 47th BAP). https://t.co/CXikDkZ6Bf
Dan (Twitter)
18. Some Russian commentary on this week's failed pontoon bridge crossings over the Siverskyi Donets River at Bilohorivka and its surroundings. Note it is acknowledged by some Russian commentators. Some fervent international supporters on twitter do not🔜.
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@RALee85:
Some prominent Russian defense commentators on Telegram are criticizing the “military genius” Russian officer responsible for the failed river crossing on the Severskyi Donets, specifically for bunching up so many vehicles in a small area by the river.
https://t.co/tedAT47Wqs https://t.co/bXHuw8vysu
18. Some Russian commentary on this week's failed pontoon bridge crossings over the Siverskyi Donets River at Bilohorivka and its surroundings. Note it is acknowledged by some Russian commentators. Some fervent international supporters on twitter do not🔜.
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@RALee85:
Some prominent Russian defense commentators on Telegram are criticizing the “military genius” Russian officer responsible for the failed river crossing on the Severskyi Donets, specifically for bunching up so many vehicles in a small area by the river.
https://t.co/tedAT47Wqs https://t.co/bXHuw8vysu
Dan (Twitter)
19. Reaction of some Ru supporters to clear signs that something went badly wrong at Bilohorvika is interesting: "Its old, there's algae on the bridge! UAF painted circles on their tanks! RuAF doesn't have BMP-1!" Some are so invested in the lies that they only want to be lied to
19. Reaction of some Ru supporters to clear signs that something went badly wrong at Bilohorvika is interesting: "Its old, there's algae on the bridge! UAF painted circles on their tanks! RuAF doesn't have BMP-1!" Some are so invested in the lies that they only want to be lied to
Rob Lee (Twitter)
I'm very interested in looking at force ratios from this war, but Russia's invasion force was far smaller than the numbers here suggest (probably 80k troops in the 125 BTGs) and Russia's strategy didn't mass its forces at critical points. So it often did not achieve 3:1 or 2:1.
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@WSJ:
Early in their invasion of Ukraine, Russians had numbers on their side: the 3:1 rule, the ratio by which attackers must outnumber defenders in order to prevail. They may have placed too much faith in “force ratios,” @JoshZumbrun explains. https://t.co/1kMeiQ2Lq2
I'm very interested in looking at force ratios from this war, but Russia's invasion force was far smaller than the numbers here suggest (probably 80k troops in the 125 BTGs) and Russia's strategy didn't mass its forces at critical points. So it often did not achieve 3:1 or 2:1.
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@WSJ:
Early in their invasion of Ukraine, Russians had numbers on their side: the 3:1 rule, the ratio by which attackers must outnumber defenders in order to prevail. They may have placed too much faith in “force ratios,” @JoshZumbrun explains. https://t.co/1kMeiQ2Lq2
Twitter
The Wall Street Journal
Early in their invasion of Ukraine, Russians had numbers on their side: the 3:1 rule, the ratio by which attackers must outnumber defenders in order to prevail. They may have placed too much faith in “force ratios,” @JoshZumbrun explains. on.wsj.com/3FGYqwz
Dan (Twitter)
RT @DarthPutinKGB: Sechin sent me an updated map of Europe. https://twitter.com/DarthPutinKGB/status/1525160190177329152/photo/1
RT @DarthPutinKGB: Sechin sent me an updated map of Europe. https://twitter.com/DarthPutinKGB/status/1525160190177329152/photo/1
Rob Lee (Twitter)
Ukrainian forces smartly retreated back to more defensible terrain and cities during the opening stage of the war. Once Russian forces progressed farther into Ukraine, its forces became more dispersed and less supported, and they couldn't achieve numerical superiority. 2/
Ukrainian forces smartly retreated back to more defensible terrain and cities during the opening stage of the war. Once Russian forces progressed farther into Ukraine, its forces became more dispersed and less supported, and they couldn't achieve numerical superiority. 2/
Rob Lee (Twitter)
In some ways, we're only seeing a useful force ratio comparison in the fighting in the Donbas where Ukrainian forces are defending and Russian forces are conducting a deliberate, and better supported, offensive. But Russia doesn't appear to have a numerical advantage there. 3/
In some ways, we're only seeing a useful force ratio comparison in the fighting in the Donbas where Ukrainian forces are defending and Russian forces are conducting a deliberate, and better supported, offensive. But Russia doesn't appear to have a numerical advantage there. 3/
Rob Lee (Twitter)
Russia has an artillery advantage in some parts of the front and its air force is conducting more air strikes that Ukraine (though they are less effective because of Ukrainian air defenses). Russian forces had varying degrees of success breaking out from the Donbas in Feb-March.
Russia has an artillery advantage in some parts of the front and its air force is conducting more air strikes that Ukraine (though they are less effective because of Ukrainian air defenses). Russian forces had varying degrees of success breaking out from the Donbas in Feb-March.
Rob Lee (Twitter)
One of the biggest failures of Russia's strategy in Ukraine is that it failed to achieve favorable force ratios for the key objectives in this war (e.g. Kyiv).
One of the biggest failures of Russia's strategy in Ukraine is that it failed to achieve favorable force ratios for the key objectives in this war (e.g. Kyiv).
Rob Lee (Twitter)
Technology has changed but you still have to protect tanks from infantry with AT weapons, artillery, and aviation just like in WWII. If tanks don't have enough infantry, air defenses, reconnaissance, and artillery to suppress/defeat those threats, they'll be vulnerable.
Technology has changed but you still have to protect tanks from infantry with AT weapons, artillery, and aviation just like in WWII. If tanks don't have enough infantry, air defenses, reconnaissance, and artillery to suppress/defeat those threats, they'll be vulnerable.
Rob Lee (Twitter)
@ColeFPetersen @dupuyinstitute Agreed, force ratios by themselves miss many key aspects of combat power and certainly aren’t determinant. My main point is that I don’t think it is clear that Russia has actually achieved favorable ratios that often during this war.
@ColeFPetersen @dupuyinstitute Agreed, force ratios by themselves miss many key aspects of combat power and certainly aren’t determinant. My main point is that I don’t think it is clear that Russia has actually achieved favorable ratios that often during this war.