Necro Mancer (Twitter)
RT @OSINTua: Unfortunately, that’s true.
We somehow didn’t loose only because of the people who are fighting in the trenches & officers from battalion-brigade level.
Total incompetence of our President and his decisions.
Zero strategy in all spheres. But we are fighting. And will continue.
RT @OSINTua: Unfortunately, that’s true.
We somehow didn’t loose only because of the people who are fighting in the trenches & officers from battalion-brigade level.
Total incompetence of our President and his decisions.
Zero strategy in all spheres. But we are fighting. And will continue.
vxTwitter / fixvx
Tatarigami_UA (@Tatarigami_UA)
Over a year and a half ago, I wrote multiple posts and threads about the persistence of Soviet-style command within the Ukrainian army. At that time, many dismissed my concerns, arguing that war is not the time for change, or outright attacked me for criticism.…
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Necro Mancer (Twitter)
Горловский боевичок Филькин Иван Сергеевич 1981 г.р. по кличке "Фис" боевал ещё с 2014 года и не умер, а просто сдох, как и другие рашисты, за святую обязанность защищать жопку ВэВэ
https://xn--r1a.website/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/38093 https://myrotvorets.center/criminal/filkin-ivan-sergeevich/ #3омсбр #роа #груз200
Горловский боевичок Филькин Иван Сергеевич 1981 г.р. по кличке "Фис" боевал ещё с 2014 года и не умер, а просто сдох, как и другие рашисты, за святую обязанность защищать жопку ВэВэ
https://xn--r1a.website/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/38093 https://myrotvorets.center/criminal/filkin-ivan-sergeevich/ #3омсбр #роа #груз200
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Colby Badhwar 🇨🇦🇬🇧 (Twitter)
RT @Tatarigami_UA: Over a year and a half ago, I wrote multiple posts and threads about the persistence of Soviet-style command within the Ukrainian army. At that time, many dismissed my concerns, arguing that war is not the time for change, or outright attacked me for criticism. Unfortunately, the situation has only worsened since then, and the problem remains systemic. This issue existed before General Zaluzhnyi, continued during his tenure, and has deteriorated further under General Syrskyi. Despite promises to improve the situation, Syrskyi has increased authoritative pressure on commanding officers to hold ground with the same limited resources, and the results are evident.
Earlier this year, I correctly noted with my team that the Kharkiv operation was likely a diversion and that the main focus would remain on Donbas. While our troops have been trying to retake Hlyboke and have spent months holding the Krynki foothold (despite unclear objectives given our limited resources), Russians have systematically exhausted our brigades in Donbas. The Russian approach is not particularly innovative: they send small tactical units against Ukrainian defenses daily until one position falls, then exploit the success. Senior Ukrainian commanders have attempted to adopt similar tactics, forgetting that we have far fewer people and unreliable Western support that may or may not arrive on time, if at all.
Is it better on the Russian side? Absolutely not. My team has recordings of multiple radio communications from the Russian side, revealing threats of execution or denial of medical evacuation if their troops refuse to advance. It is far worse for the Russians, but they have significant advantages in personnel, equipment, vehicles, artillery, and air force. They can afford such tactics—we cannot. Moreover, the Russian army in 2024 is much smarter and more experienced than the disorganized troops we saw in February 2022. The only way to halt their advancement is to outsmart them by being more resourceful and careful, aiming to preserve our personnel when the situation requires it.
It is still possible to break the spine of the Russian army, which has severe logistical problems, dwindling availability of preserved vehicles, reliance on unarmored transportation, unmotivated personnel, and artillery barrel replacement bottlenecks. Additionally, many internal economic problems take time to manifest.
However, the window of opportunity is getting smaller. Unless radical changes are made, we are heading toward the most unfavorable scenario of all: forced negotiations, stalemate, minimization of Western aid, re-armament of the Russian army, and a new round of the war with much more unfavorable outcomes for Ukraine, leading to occupation and forced assimilation.
RT @Tatarigami_UA: Over a year and a half ago, I wrote multiple posts and threads about the persistence of Soviet-style command within the Ukrainian army. At that time, many dismissed my concerns, arguing that war is not the time for change, or outright attacked me for criticism. Unfortunately, the situation has only worsened since then, and the problem remains systemic. This issue existed before General Zaluzhnyi, continued during his tenure, and has deteriorated further under General Syrskyi. Despite promises to improve the situation, Syrskyi has increased authoritative pressure on commanding officers to hold ground with the same limited resources, and the results are evident.
Earlier this year, I correctly noted with my team that the Kharkiv operation was likely a diversion and that the main focus would remain on Donbas. While our troops have been trying to retake Hlyboke and have spent months holding the Krynki foothold (despite unclear objectives given our limited resources), Russians have systematically exhausted our brigades in Donbas. The Russian approach is not particularly innovative: they send small tactical units against Ukrainian defenses daily until one position falls, then exploit the success. Senior Ukrainian commanders have attempted to adopt similar tactics, forgetting that we have far fewer people and unreliable Western support that may or may not arrive on time, if at all.
Is it better on the Russian side? Absolutely not. My team has recordings of multiple radio communications from the Russian side, revealing threats of execution or denial of medical evacuation if their troops refuse to advance. It is far worse for the Russians, but they have significant advantages in personnel, equipment, vehicles, artillery, and air force. They can afford such tactics—we cannot. Moreover, the Russian army in 2024 is much smarter and more experienced than the disorganized troops we saw in February 2022. The only way to halt their advancement is to outsmart them by being more resourceful and careful, aiming to preserve our personnel when the situation requires it.
It is still possible to break the spine of the Russian army, which has severe logistical problems, dwindling availability of preserved vehicles, reliance on unarmored transportation, unmotivated personnel, and artillery barrel replacement bottlenecks. Additionally, many internal economic problems take time to manifest.
However, the window of opportunity is getting smaller. Unless radical changes are made, we are heading toward the most unfavorable scenario of all: forced negotiations, stalemate, minimization of Western aid, re-armament of the Russian army, and a new round of the war with much more unfavorable outcomes for Ukraine, leading to occupation and forced assimilation.
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Colby Badhwar 🇨🇦🇬🇧 (Twitter)
RT @OSINTua: Unfortunately, that’s true.
We somehow didn’t loose only because of the people who are fighting in the trenches & officers from battalion-brigade level.
Total incompetence of our President and his decisions.
Zero strategy in all spheres. But we are fighting. And will continue.
RT @OSINTua: Unfortunately, that’s true.
We somehow didn’t loose only because of the people who are fighting in the trenches & officers from battalion-brigade level.
Total incompetence of our President and his decisions.
Zero strategy in all spheres. But we are fighting. And will continue.
vxTwitter / fixvx
Tatarigami_UA (@Tatarigami_UA)
Over a year and a half ago, I wrote multiple posts and threads about the persistence of Soviet-style command within the Ukrainian army. At that time, many dismissed my concerns, arguing that war is not the time for change, or outright attacked me for criticism.…
Colby Badhwar 🇨🇦🇬🇧 (Twitter)
@BrookingsFP Q for the Undersecretary: Is there a planned replacement for JSOW aside from JASSM-ER? Has JSOW been declared as excess to requirement or will it be in the near future? #AirSpacePower
@BrookingsFP Q for the Undersecretary: Is there a planned replacement for JSOW aside from JASSM-ER? Has JSOW been declared as excess to requirement or will it be in the near future? #AirSpacePower
Danvan (Twitter)
RT @marybezuhla: Сирський змусив Командування Десантно-штурмових військ Збройних Сил України (КДШВ) збрехати про зняття командира 80-ї бригади ДШВ Ішкулова. В офіційному коментарі КДШВ стверджується, що його начебто не звільнили через незгоду з нереалістичним завданням Сирського, а "підвищили" в КДШВ. Насправді, після розголосу та звернення колективу бригади, що правда військовому керівництву не до вподоби, і тому він знімає Ішкулова, інцидент таким способом намагаються зам'яти. На жаль, ситуація саме така, як це описали в бригаді. Для десантників вийти публічно — це вперше. Дуже допекло. Скажу більше: Сирський настільки не сприймає ДШВ і намагається їх нівелювати, що майже не спілкується зі своїм же командувачем ДШВ Скибюком. Але це ще не все. У Сирського постійно, а особливо зараз, коли стілець захитався, з'являються спроби пообіцяти якийсь новий контрнаступ, і наразі він вже так далеко від реальності, що це мож...
Перейти на оригинальный пост
RT @marybezuhla: Сирський змусив Командування Десантно-штурмових військ Збройних Сил України (КДШВ) збрехати про зняття командира 80-ї бригади ДШВ Ішкулова. В офіційному коментарі КДШВ стверджується, що його начебто не звільнили через незгоду з нереалістичним завданням Сирського, а "підвищили" в КДШВ. Насправді, після розголосу та звернення колективу бригади, що правда військовому керівництву не до вподоби, і тому він знімає Ішкулова, інцидент таким способом намагаються зам'яти. На жаль, ситуація саме така, як це описали в бригаді. Для десантників вийти публічно — це вперше. Дуже допекло. Скажу більше: Сирський настільки не сприймає ДШВ і намагається їх нівелювати, що майже не спілкується зі своїм же командувачем ДШВ Скибюком. Але це ще не все. У Сирського постійно, а особливо зараз, коли стілець захитався, з'являються спроби пообіцяти якийсь новий контрнаступ, і наразі він вже так далеко від реальності, що це мож...
Перейти на оригинальный пост
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The Lookout (Twitter)
Vladimir Rusanov got underway at 1700z and is currently doing 11 knots, NoCGV Bison proceeding south.
Clear indication that this was a case of engine troubles.
Fortunately it was summer and nice enough weather. This area can be very rough. https://twitter.com/The_Lookout_N/status/1817945260586058105#m
Vladimir Rusanov got underway at 1700z and is currently doing 11 knots, NoCGV Bison proceeding south.
Clear indication that this was a case of engine troubles.
Fortunately it was summer and nice enough weather. This area can be very rough. https://twitter.com/The_Lookout_N/status/1817945260586058105#m
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Rob Lee (Twitter)
Video of FPV and likely mine (possibly remote detonated) strikes on Russian tanks and BMPs in Krasnohorivka by Ukraine’s Shadow unit and 59th Motorized Brigade.
https://xn--r1a.website/pidrozdilshadowoficial/583
Video of FPV and likely mine (possibly remote detonated) strikes on Russian tanks and BMPs in Krasnohorivka by Ukraine’s Shadow unit and 59th Motorized Brigade.
https://xn--r1a.website/pidrozdilshadowoficial/583
Rob Lee (Twitter)
@mpdimino: Yes, I agree, and that is my sense from the Ukrainian Air Force as well. I don’t think US officials were ever that keen either. I think Ukraine needed to move to a NATO fighter but this is more of a long-term change.
@mpdimino: Yes, I agree, and that is my sense from the Ukrainian Air Force as well. I don’t think US officials were ever that keen either. I think Ukraine needed to move to a NATO fighter but this is more of a long-term change.
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Def Mon (Twitter)
RT @Archer83Able: The commanders from the Ukrainian 80th Air Assault Brigade made a public statement in support of their brigade commander, Colonel Emil Ishkulov, who is reportedly going to be removed from his post.
According to Ukrainska Pravda sources, Colonel Emil Ishkulov refused to perform the combat task which was "disproportionate to the forces of the brigade" and would likely result in heavy losses.
https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2024/07/29/7467914/
RT @Archer83Able: The commanders from the Ukrainian 80th Air Assault Brigade made a public statement in support of their brigade commander, Colonel Emil Ishkulov, who is reportedly going to be removed from his post.
According to Ukrainska Pravda sources, Colonel Emil Ishkulov refused to perform the combat task which was "disproportionate to the forces of the brigade" and would likely result in heavy losses.
https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2024/07/29/7467914/
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Colby Badhwar 🇨🇦🇬🇧 (Twitter)
RT @GuyPlopsky: Shoot the archer, not the arrow: Ukraine’s missile defense dilemma
RT @GuyPlopsky: Shoot the archer, not the arrow: Ukraine’s missile defense dilemma
The Insider
Shoot the archer, not the arrow – Ukraine’s missile defense dilemma
Several days ago, Kyiv confirmed the arrival of an additional Patriot air defense system from Germany. These systems, provided by Kyiv's Western partners, form the backbone of Ukraine's long- and medium-range air defense network. Despite their extensive range…
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The Lookout (Twitter)
RT @koskela_antti: Successful NATO deployment to 🇹🇩 ends. Being under the direction of NATO's command structure required some minor changes in the planning of flight operations, but we adapted well, and also gained some lessons for developing our operations at home.
RT @koskela_antti: Successful NATO deployment to 🇹🇩 ends. Being under the direction of NATO's command structure required some minor changes in the planning of flight operations, but we adapted well, and also gained some lessons for developing our operations at home.
Ilmavoimat
Successful NATO deployment to Romania ends -
The Lookout (Twitter)
RT @MrFrantarelli: Vympel shipyard launched Project 12418 Molniya/Tarantul-class missile corvette Stupinets(705) .
Details:
https://www.vympel-rybinsk.ru/na-sudostroitelnom-zavode-vympel-spustili-na-vodu-modernizirovannuju-molniju.html
RT @MrFrantarelli: Vympel shipyard launched Project 12418 Molniya/Tarantul-class missile corvette Stupinets(705) .
Details:
https://www.vympel-rybinsk.ru/na-sudostroitelnom-zavode-vympel-spustili-na-vodu-modernizirovannuju-molniju.html