Ukraine Battle Map (Twitter)
@Howitzer203 @John_A_Ridge: If you are lucky you may hear the blast from where it was supposed to hit
@Howitzer203 @John_A_Ridge: If you are lucky you may hear the blast from where it was supposed to hit
X (formerly Twitter)
(((Howie🌐)))🇺🇸 👍 🇺🇦🇮🇱 (@Howitzer203) / X
War, Politics, History BA, UMD '15, lift heavy things. Opinions are my own. RTs/ likes are not endorsements or confirmation. Contractor Fella #WeAreNAFO
Ukraine Battle Map (Twitter)
@HumansNoContext: This is extremely dangerous, throwing a phone up in the air at hundreds of people could cause it to hit a random persons head or hit them in the eye and cause serious injury
@HumansNoContext: This is extremely dangerous, throwing a phone up in the air at hundreds of people could cause it to hit a random persons head or hit them in the eye and cause serious injury
X (formerly Twitter)
NO CONTEXT HUMANS (@HumansNoContext) on X
humans being humans
🤯1
The Lookout (Twitter)
RT @Forsvarsmin: Danmark bidrager med 100 mio. kr. til fællesindkøb af ammunition til Ukraine.
”Med det her bidrag tager Danmark – i samarbejde med andre EU-lande – ansvar for at forsyne Ukraine med artilleriammunition”, siger forsvarsminister @troelslundp
fmn.dk/da/nyheder/2023/danma…
RT @Forsvarsmin: Danmark bidrager med 100 mio. kr. til fællesindkøb af ammunition til Ukraine.
”Med det her bidrag tager Danmark – i samarbejde med andre EU-lande – ansvar for at forsyne Ukraine med artilleriammunition”, siger forsvarsminister @troelslundp
fmn.dk/da/nyheder/2023/danma…
Ukraine Battle Map (Twitter)
@visegrad24: US needs to increase military aid to Ukraine significantly
x.com/ukraine_map/status/170…
@visegrad24: US needs to increase military aid to Ukraine significantly
x.com/ukraine_map/status/170…
The Lookout (Twitter)
RT @R__Politik: Some remarks concerning the @TheStudyofWar / ISW’s recent thread on #Wagner’s status.
📌 The status of the #WagnerGroup is unequivocally clear from the Kremlin’s perspective - it asserts that the group does not exist. What does exist is a network of militias, compelled to either enter contracts with state entities (they have choices available) or disband.
📌 “There is no clear unified leader for the #WagnerGroup", says ISW. It is pivotal to underscore that there likely won’t be any. The appointment of a replacement for #Prigozhin is strictly off the table.
📌Troshev isn’t the emerging leader of Wagner; he serves as a senior officer at the Defence Ministry, implementing instructions that limit recruits to individuals who have contracted with the military. This approach aims to extinguish any chances of Wagner sustaining its independence.
📌 Pavel Prigozhin, portrayed by some as an alternative leader of Wagner according to ISW, isn’t a negotiable option. He is an heir, groomed by his father to inherit his position, but post-mutiny, this seems unfeasible. The notion of “Wagner Group elements” proposing leadership is unviable; they lack the authority to propose, and the Kremlin isn’t positioned to enter negotiations.
📌 There are no ongoing negotiations with Rosgvardiya concerning Wagner’s combatants. Rosgvardiya can only engage in wishful thinking that incorporating Wagnerites might elevate Zolotov’s political relevance, which is unattainable. However, Zolotov is permitted to recruit former combatants individually as volunteers: the idea is to provide a possibly more acceptable adaptation to the new status quo for some, rather than joining forces led by despised generals. Above all, any military operations executed by Rosgvardiya’s volunteers will strictly adhere to the guidelines of the Ministry of Defence.
📌 The notion that Wagner might maintain its name, symbols, ideology, commanders, administration, and current standard operating principles is merely a pipe dream entertained by “the prominent Wagner-affiliated source.”
📌 The #Kremlin’s stance on the relationship(s) between Wagner elements and the Russian government is explicit: there are no such relationships—Wagner fighters must subordinate to any proposed state entity, be it directly the army, Troshev’s unit, or Rosgvardiya.
📌 Wagner Group will not re-emerge as a substantial, cohesive organisation under the auspices of Rosgvardiya, the Russian MoD, or any equivalent entity. This possibility is non-existent.
📌 Those fighters from Wagner who decline to embrace the new circumstances may choose to stay in Belarus, albeit without prospects and financial support, or they risk being subjected to criminal prosecution.
📌 Some former Wagner’s elements may try to commercialise their activities independently from any other entity, be it #Russian bodies or Prigozhin’s companies.
We have covered all of this in detail over the past few months. Anyone wishing to keep abreast of the fluctuations in Wagner would do well to save time and simply subscribe to R.Politik: rpolitik.com/category/bullet…
RT @R__Politik: Some remarks concerning the @TheStudyofWar / ISW’s recent thread on #Wagner’s status.
📌 The status of the #WagnerGroup is unequivocally clear from the Kremlin’s perspective - it asserts that the group does not exist. What does exist is a network of militias, compelled to either enter contracts with state entities (they have choices available) or disband.
📌 “There is no clear unified leader for the #WagnerGroup", says ISW. It is pivotal to underscore that there likely won’t be any. The appointment of a replacement for #Prigozhin is strictly off the table.
📌Troshev isn’t the emerging leader of Wagner; he serves as a senior officer at the Defence Ministry, implementing instructions that limit recruits to individuals who have contracted with the military. This approach aims to extinguish any chances of Wagner sustaining its independence.
📌 Pavel Prigozhin, portrayed by some as an alternative leader of Wagner according to ISW, isn’t a negotiable option. He is an heir, groomed by his father to inherit his position, but post-mutiny, this seems unfeasible. The notion of “Wagner Group elements” proposing leadership is unviable; they lack the authority to propose, and the Kremlin isn’t positioned to enter negotiations.
📌 There are no ongoing negotiations with Rosgvardiya concerning Wagner’s combatants. Rosgvardiya can only engage in wishful thinking that incorporating Wagnerites might elevate Zolotov’s political relevance, which is unattainable. However, Zolotov is permitted to recruit former combatants individually as volunteers: the idea is to provide a possibly more acceptable adaptation to the new status quo for some, rather than joining forces led by despised generals. Above all, any military operations executed by Rosgvardiya’s volunteers will strictly adhere to the guidelines of the Ministry of Defence.
📌 The notion that Wagner might maintain its name, symbols, ideology, commanders, administration, and current standard operating principles is merely a pipe dream entertained by “the prominent Wagner-affiliated source.”
📌 The #Kremlin’s stance on the relationship(s) between Wagner elements and the Russian government is explicit: there are no such relationships—Wagner fighters must subordinate to any proposed state entity, be it directly the army, Troshev’s unit, or Rosgvardiya.
📌 Wagner Group will not re-emerge as a substantial, cohesive organisation under the auspices of Rosgvardiya, the Russian MoD, or any equivalent entity. This possibility is non-existent.
📌 Those fighters from Wagner who decline to embrace the new circumstances may choose to stay in Belarus, albeit without prospects and financial support, or they risk being subjected to criminal prosecution.
📌 Some former Wagner’s elements may try to commercialise their activities independently from any other entity, be it #Russian bodies or Prigozhin’s companies.
We have covered all of this in detail over the past few months. Anyone wishing to keep abreast of the fluctuations in Wagner would do well to save time and simply subscribe to R.Politik: rpolitik.com/category/bullet…
X (formerly Twitter)
R.Politik (@R__Politik) / X
R. Politik provides independent analysis on contemporary Russian politics. News and analysis as it happens with Tatiana Stanovaya. See our bi-weekly bulletin.
Ukraine Battle Map (Twitter)
In the past 2 months, US 🇺🇸 military aid to Ukraine 🇺🇦 has decreased by 74% of what it was in the 1st half of 2023 and 63% less than it was in 2022
Military aid for Ukraine is more crucial now than ever. A decrease in military aid only prolongs this war and costs Ukrainian lives
In the past 2 months, US 🇺🇸 military aid to Ukraine 🇺🇦 has decreased by 74% of what it was in the 1st half of 2023 and 63% less than it was in 2022
Military aid for Ukraine is more crucial now than ever. A decrease in military aid only prolongs this war and costs Ukrainian lives
🤬3
Ukraine Battle Map (Twitter)
@apebrain1481203 @Maks_NAFO_FELLA: Both could be prioritized at once, the corruption happens mainly in the government and big businesses. The military should be excluded from this, and military aid must be increased as much as possible
The people who are stealing money are hurting Ukraine 🇺🇦 from winning this war
@apebrain1481203 @Maks_NAFO_FELLA: Both could be prioritized at once, the corruption happens mainly in the government and big businesses. The military should be excluded from this, and military aid must be increased as much as possible
The people who are stealing money are hurting Ukraine 🇺🇦 from winning this war
X (formerly Twitter)
apebrain1 (@apebrain1481203) / X
👍1
Ukraine Battle Map (Twitter)
@GeromanAT: Stop lying, you are a terrorist supporter, your whole life is spent on X aka Twitter spreading Russian Propaganda
@GeromanAT: Stop lying, you are a terrorist supporter, your whole life is spent on X aka Twitter spreading Russian Propaganda
X (formerly Twitter)
-- GEROMAN -- time will tell - 👀 -- (@GeromanAT) on X
trying to understand that crazy world - and the universe if there is time left...
If you want to support my work - subscribe or
https://t.co/IoKyEpWSbF
If you want to support my work - subscribe or
https://t.co/IoKyEpWSbF
This media is not supported in your browser
VIEW IN TELEGRAM
The Lookout (Twitter)
RT @kromark: The route of a new highway, intended to connect Rostov-on-Don with occupied Mariupol, is visible in the @planet satellite image captured on Oct. 1st. These images confirm previous reports that the road will be 4-lane and bypass big cities and villages. h/t @auditor_ya.
RT @kromark: The route of a new highway, intended to connect Rostov-on-Don with occupied Mariupol, is visible in the @planet satellite image captured on Oct. 1st. These images confirm previous reports that the road will be 4-lane and bypass big cities and villages. h/t @auditor_ya.
This media is not supported in your browser
VIEW IN TELEGRAM
The Lookout (Twitter)
RT @DefenceGeek: Suggestions that a lightning strike has hit the Severn Trent Green Power Cassington AD Facility... awaiting confirmation from local Fire/Rescue services
RT @DefenceGeek: Suggestions that a lightning strike has hit the Severn Trent Green Power Cassington AD Facility... awaiting confirmation from local Fire/Rescue services
The Lookout (Twitter)
RT @tonyingesson: I'm currently revisiting some of my old literature and cases for a book chapter I'm working on, so I thought I'd share a particularly interesting case involving the Stasi, Swedish intelligence and a double agent with you all.
Thread time!
1/13
RT @tonyingesson: I'm currently revisiting some of my old literature and cases for a book chapter I'm working on, so I thought I'd share a particularly interesting case involving the Stasi, Swedish intelligence and a double agent with you all.
Thread time!
1/13
X (formerly Twitter)
Tony Ingesson (@tonyingesson) / X
Assistant Professor of Intelligence Analysis, Lund University. Mad (social) scientist. Likes suits, old tech & obscure video games. Prev. Swedish Armed Forces.
👍1
Ukraine Battle Map (Twitter)
@klauskinski79: Armored Vehicles alone can’t take back Southern Ukraine
Ukraine needs many more Tanks not just 80 of them, a lot more IFVs, MLRS Cluster Munitions which we never sent, they need more Cluster Munitions, more than a handful of air defense systems, and many more long-range missiles
@klauskinski79: Armored Vehicles alone can’t take back Southern Ukraine
Ukraine needs many more Tanks not just 80 of them, a lot more IFVs, MLRS Cluster Munitions which we never sent, they need more Cluster Munitions, more than a handful of air defense systems, and many more long-range missiles
X (formerly Twitter)
Klauskinski79 (@klauskinski79) / X
Ukraine Battle Map (Twitter)
@Maks_NAFO_FELLA: Corruption in Ukraine is a big problem
Military aid must continue and be significantly increased, while Economic aid should be tracked as much as possible and decreased where it is more likely corruption is taking place, and people who are doing must be arrested and prosecuted
@Maks_NAFO_FELLA: Corruption in Ukraine is a big problem
Military aid must continue and be significantly increased, while Economic aid should be tracked as much as possible and decreased where it is more likely corruption is taking place, and people who are doing must be arrested and prosecuted
X (formerly Twitter)
MAKS 25 🇺🇦👀 (@Maks_NAFO_FELLA) on X
☕️ https://t.co/lxtbRwTMwv 🇺🇦PayPal: maksmu24@ukr.net 👀 https://t.co/rMYZMXe53H
👍1
This media is not supported in your browser
VIEW IN TELEGRAM
4emberlen (Twitter)
RT @666_mancer: Луганская обл., минус российский "Гиацинт-С" (что с разбежавшимися заранее ребятками, неясно) #RussianUkrainianWar #всрф #потерьнет
RT @666_mancer: Луганская обл., минус российский "Гиацинт-С" (что с разбежавшимися заранее ребятками, неясно) #RussianUkrainianWar #всрф #потерьнет
The Lookout (Twitter)
NYT on Burevestnik related activities including higher res imagery of the launch pad area on Sept 28th (in addition to previously seen Sept 20th imagery) and of the two Gromov Flight Research Institute / Rosatom linked IL-76s, poss for monitoring, at Rogachevo.
NYT on Burevestnik related activities including higher res imagery of the launch pad area on Sept 28th (in addition to previously seen Sept 20th imagery) and of the two Gromov Flight Research Institute / Rosatom linked IL-76s, poss for monitoring, at Rogachevo.