The Lookout (Twitter)
RT @wilco_faber: BNS Louise Marie #F931 en ZrMs Van Amstel gezusterlijk naast elkaar afgemeerd in het pittoreske Bergen (Noorwegen).
RT @wilco_faber: BNS Louise Marie #F931 en ZrMs Van Amstel gezusterlijk naast elkaar afgemeerd in het pittoreske Bergen (Noorwegen).
The Lookout (Twitter)
RT @Drox_Maritime: A Russian Navy Northern Fleet airforce probable Tu-142 MPA conducted a short, routine MARPAT between at least 021200Z-1430Z OCT 23.
Aircraft unlocated throughout patrol but likely operating in the Barents Sea area.
RT @Drox_Maritime: A Russian Navy Northern Fleet airforce probable Tu-142 MPA conducted a short, routine MARPAT between at least 021200Z-1430Z OCT 23.
Aircraft unlocated throughout patrol but likely operating in the Barents Sea area.
The Lookout (Twitter)
@riley_mellen @julianbarnes @ckoettl: The associated PRIP/NAVWARN now runs to Oct 31st.
I expect an extension through November, possibly even longer.
@riley_mellen @julianbarnes @ckoettl: The associated PRIP/NAVWARN now runs to Oct 31st.
I expect an extension through November, possibly even longer.
The Lookout (Twitter)
It's been a long time since I've checked this but the war-NOTAM in southern Belarus is still there.
It's been a long time since I've checked this but the war-NOTAM in southern Belarus is still there.
👍1
The Lookout (Twitter)
RT @MT_Anderson: 🇺🇸CARRIER STRIKE GROUP 12🇺🇸 + 🇷🇺SHADOW
Spotted 76 KM NE of 🇮🇹Bari (1 Oct 2023). CVN-78, 2x Arleigh Burke Class Destroyers, 1x Ticonderoga Class Cruiser & 11 KM NE of that could be 🇷🇺Moma Class Intelligence Ship Kildin (last seen in Tartus on 13 Sep)
h/t @d_viekass
RT @MT_Anderson: 🇺🇸CARRIER STRIKE GROUP 12🇺🇸 + 🇷🇺SHADOW
Spotted 76 KM NE of 🇮🇹Bari (1 Oct 2023). CVN-78, 2x Arleigh Burke Class Destroyers, 1x Ticonderoga Class Cruiser & 11 KM NE of that could be 🇷🇺Moma Class Intelligence Ship Kildin (last seen in Tartus on 13 Sep)
h/t @d_viekass
The Lookout (Twitter)
RT @Kalla_Kriget: En Mustang flyger under Västerbron i Stockholm, bilden tagen under Vattenfestivalen 1991
#svfm #militärhistoria #kallakriget
RT @Kalla_Kriget: En Mustang flyger under Västerbron i Stockholm, bilden tagen under Vattenfestivalen 1991
#svfm #militärhistoria #kallakriget
The Lookout (Twitter)
Short Novaya Zemlya / Burevestnik update.
There is a NOTAM active through to the 6th and a PRIP/NAVWARN running to the 31st. Expect the latter could be extended through November, possibly longer.
There currently seems to be a lull in Pankovo associated maritime activity.
Short Novaya Zemlya / Burevestnik update.
There is a NOTAM active through to the 6th and a PRIP/NAVWARN running to the 31st. Expect the latter could be extended through November, possibly longer.
There currently seems to be a lull in Pankovo associated maritime activity.
The Lookout (Twitter)
RT @TheInsiderPaper: BREAKING 🚨 UK explosion — Biogas ignited due to lightning strike at waste facility in Yarnton, England, causing large explosion seen in Oxford
RT @TheInsiderPaper: BREAKING 🚨 UK explosion — Biogas ignited due to lightning strike at waste facility in Yarnton, England, causing large explosion seen in Oxford
😢1
The Lookout (Twitter)
RT @MT_Anderson: 🇷🇺BSF: FEODOSIA🇷🇺
0.5M📷 from 2 Oct 2023. While the new Karakurt Class corvette has departed, we see 2x Alexandrit Class, 1x Buyan-M, 1x Ropucha, 1x Tarantul Class and 1x Pr. 22160 (1st time I've seen that class here). Also, grain thief GOLDEN YARA is still loading her plunder.
RT @MT_Anderson: 🇷🇺BSF: FEODOSIA🇷🇺
0.5M📷 from 2 Oct 2023. While the new Karakurt Class corvette has departed, we see 2x Alexandrit Class, 1x Buyan-M, 1x Ropucha, 1x Tarantul Class and 1x Pr. 22160 (1st time I've seen that class here). Also, grain thief GOLDEN YARA is still loading her plunder.
The Lookout (Twitter)
RT @JEFnations: Working closely together, @RoyalNavy and @Forsvaret_no have been demonstrating their cohesion during surface search exercises.
🚁🇬🇧⚓️🇳🇴
An opportunity to develop tactics and train in the iconic fjords of western Norway.
#JEFtogether #UKCSG23
RT @JEFnations: Working closely together, @RoyalNavy and @Forsvaret_no have been demonstrating their cohesion during surface search exercises.
🚁🇬🇧⚓️🇳🇴
An opportunity to develop tactics and train in the iconic fjords of western Norway.
#JEFtogether #UKCSG23
Ukraine Battle Map (Twitter)
@CheshireKot52 @SpaghettiKozak: The Baltics should definitely have ATACMS and all other capabilities, but that being said US should also send ATACMS to Ukraine 🇺🇦
Because the more Ukraine degrades the Russian Military, the less likely it will be that the Baltics will use ATACMS against Russia and be in a war.
@CheshireKot52 @SpaghettiKozak: The Baltics should definitely have ATACMS and all other capabilities, but that being said US should also send ATACMS to Ukraine 🇺🇦
Because the more Ukraine degrades the Russian Military, the less likely it will be that the Baltics will use ATACMS against Russia and be in a war.
👍1
Ukraine Battle Map (Twitter)
@clashreport: It's very important that corruption in Ukraine is dealt with. It should be a priority for US as well as the priority for winning the war
However, this should not stop military aid flowing, in fact military aid should be significantly increased, and economic aid seriously tracked
@clashreport: It's very important that corruption in Ukraine is dealt with. It should be a priority for US as well as the priority for winning the war
However, this should not stop military aid flowing, in fact military aid should be significantly increased, and economic aid seriously tracked
👍1
Ukraine Battle Map (Twitter)
@Howitzer203 @John_A_Ridge: If you are lucky you may hear the blast from where it was supposed to hit
@Howitzer203 @John_A_Ridge: If you are lucky you may hear the blast from where it was supposed to hit
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(((Howie🌐)))🇺🇸 👍 🇺🇦🇮🇱 (@Howitzer203) / X
War, Politics, History BA, UMD '15, lift heavy things. Opinions are my own. RTs/ likes are not endorsements or confirmation. Contractor Fella #WeAreNAFO
Ukraine Battle Map (Twitter)
@HumansNoContext: This is extremely dangerous, throwing a phone up in the air at hundreds of people could cause it to hit a random persons head or hit them in the eye and cause serious injury
@HumansNoContext: This is extremely dangerous, throwing a phone up in the air at hundreds of people could cause it to hit a random persons head or hit them in the eye and cause serious injury
X (formerly Twitter)
NO CONTEXT HUMANS (@HumansNoContext) on X
humans being humans
🤯1
The Lookout (Twitter)
RT @Forsvarsmin: Danmark bidrager med 100 mio. kr. til fællesindkøb af ammunition til Ukraine.
”Med det her bidrag tager Danmark – i samarbejde med andre EU-lande – ansvar for at forsyne Ukraine med artilleriammunition”, siger forsvarsminister @troelslundp
fmn.dk/da/nyheder/2023/danma…
RT @Forsvarsmin: Danmark bidrager med 100 mio. kr. til fællesindkøb af ammunition til Ukraine.
”Med det her bidrag tager Danmark – i samarbejde med andre EU-lande – ansvar for at forsyne Ukraine med artilleriammunition”, siger forsvarsminister @troelslundp
fmn.dk/da/nyheder/2023/danma…
Ukraine Battle Map (Twitter)
@visegrad24: US needs to increase military aid to Ukraine significantly
x.com/ukraine_map/status/170…
@visegrad24: US needs to increase military aid to Ukraine significantly
x.com/ukraine_map/status/170…
The Lookout (Twitter)
RT @R__Politik: Some remarks concerning the @TheStudyofWar / ISW’s recent thread on #Wagner’s status.
📌 The status of the #WagnerGroup is unequivocally clear from the Kremlin’s perspective - it asserts that the group does not exist. What does exist is a network of militias, compelled to either enter contracts with state entities (they have choices available) or disband.
📌 “There is no clear unified leader for the #WagnerGroup", says ISW. It is pivotal to underscore that there likely won’t be any. The appointment of a replacement for #Prigozhin is strictly off the table.
📌Troshev isn’t the emerging leader of Wagner; he serves as a senior officer at the Defence Ministry, implementing instructions that limit recruits to individuals who have contracted with the military. This approach aims to extinguish any chances of Wagner sustaining its independence.
📌 Pavel Prigozhin, portrayed by some as an alternative leader of Wagner according to ISW, isn’t a negotiable option. He is an heir, groomed by his father to inherit his position, but post-mutiny, this seems unfeasible. The notion of “Wagner Group elements” proposing leadership is unviable; they lack the authority to propose, and the Kremlin isn’t positioned to enter negotiations.
📌 There are no ongoing negotiations with Rosgvardiya concerning Wagner’s combatants. Rosgvardiya can only engage in wishful thinking that incorporating Wagnerites might elevate Zolotov’s political relevance, which is unattainable. However, Zolotov is permitted to recruit former combatants individually as volunteers: the idea is to provide a possibly more acceptable adaptation to the new status quo for some, rather than joining forces led by despised generals. Above all, any military operations executed by Rosgvardiya’s volunteers will strictly adhere to the guidelines of the Ministry of Defence.
📌 The notion that Wagner might maintain its name, symbols, ideology, commanders, administration, and current standard operating principles is merely a pipe dream entertained by “the prominent Wagner-affiliated source.”
📌 The #Kremlin’s stance on the relationship(s) between Wagner elements and the Russian government is explicit: there are no such relationships—Wagner fighters must subordinate to any proposed state entity, be it directly the army, Troshev’s unit, or Rosgvardiya.
📌 Wagner Group will not re-emerge as a substantial, cohesive organisation under the auspices of Rosgvardiya, the Russian MoD, or any equivalent entity. This possibility is non-existent.
📌 Those fighters from Wagner who decline to embrace the new circumstances may choose to stay in Belarus, albeit without prospects and financial support, or they risk being subjected to criminal prosecution.
📌 Some former Wagner’s elements may try to commercialise their activities independently from any other entity, be it #Russian bodies or Prigozhin’s companies.
We have covered all of this in detail over the past few months. Anyone wishing to keep abreast of the fluctuations in Wagner would do well to save time and simply subscribe to R.Politik: rpolitik.com/category/bullet…
RT @R__Politik: Some remarks concerning the @TheStudyofWar / ISW’s recent thread on #Wagner’s status.
📌 The status of the #WagnerGroup is unequivocally clear from the Kremlin’s perspective - it asserts that the group does not exist. What does exist is a network of militias, compelled to either enter contracts with state entities (they have choices available) or disband.
📌 “There is no clear unified leader for the #WagnerGroup", says ISW. It is pivotal to underscore that there likely won’t be any. The appointment of a replacement for #Prigozhin is strictly off the table.
📌Troshev isn’t the emerging leader of Wagner; he serves as a senior officer at the Defence Ministry, implementing instructions that limit recruits to individuals who have contracted with the military. This approach aims to extinguish any chances of Wagner sustaining its independence.
📌 Pavel Prigozhin, portrayed by some as an alternative leader of Wagner according to ISW, isn’t a negotiable option. He is an heir, groomed by his father to inherit his position, but post-mutiny, this seems unfeasible. The notion of “Wagner Group elements” proposing leadership is unviable; they lack the authority to propose, and the Kremlin isn’t positioned to enter negotiations.
📌 There are no ongoing negotiations with Rosgvardiya concerning Wagner’s combatants. Rosgvardiya can only engage in wishful thinking that incorporating Wagnerites might elevate Zolotov’s political relevance, which is unattainable. However, Zolotov is permitted to recruit former combatants individually as volunteers: the idea is to provide a possibly more acceptable adaptation to the new status quo for some, rather than joining forces led by despised generals. Above all, any military operations executed by Rosgvardiya’s volunteers will strictly adhere to the guidelines of the Ministry of Defence.
📌 The notion that Wagner might maintain its name, symbols, ideology, commanders, administration, and current standard operating principles is merely a pipe dream entertained by “the prominent Wagner-affiliated source.”
📌 The #Kremlin’s stance on the relationship(s) between Wagner elements and the Russian government is explicit: there are no such relationships—Wagner fighters must subordinate to any proposed state entity, be it directly the army, Troshev’s unit, or Rosgvardiya.
📌 Wagner Group will not re-emerge as a substantial, cohesive organisation under the auspices of Rosgvardiya, the Russian MoD, or any equivalent entity. This possibility is non-existent.
📌 Those fighters from Wagner who decline to embrace the new circumstances may choose to stay in Belarus, albeit without prospects and financial support, or they risk being subjected to criminal prosecution.
📌 Some former Wagner’s elements may try to commercialise their activities independently from any other entity, be it #Russian bodies or Prigozhin’s companies.
We have covered all of this in detail over the past few months. Anyone wishing to keep abreast of the fluctuations in Wagner would do well to save time and simply subscribe to R.Politik: rpolitik.com/category/bullet…
X (formerly Twitter)
R.Politik (@R__Politik) / X
R. Politik provides independent analysis on contemporary Russian politics. News and analysis as it happens with Tatiana Stanovaya. See our bi-weekly bulletin.