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Dan (Twitter)
187. Novoprokopivka🇺🇦46th Airmobile Bde.
More 'Garuda' unit FPV strikes:
- 2 hits on a barn entrance at 47.416884, 35.841771. The same🇷🇺BMP-3 wreck in tweet 186 is visible.
- Then 3 strikes on dug out causes a secondary explosion.
- a bunker hit.
- A quad bike at 47.410371, 35.835894 survives a FPV strike, but then gets bonked by a good old fashioned drone drop.
Side note. I prefer Khorne Group's taste in rock music to that of the 46th.
187. Novoprokopivka🇺🇦46th Airmobile Bde.
More 'Garuda' unit FPV strikes:
- 2 hits on a barn entrance at 47.416884, 35.841771. The same🇷🇺BMP-3 wreck in tweet 186 is visible.
- Then 3 strikes on dug out causes a secondary explosion.
- a bunker hit.
- A quad bike at 47.410371, 35.835894 survives a FPV strike, but then gets bonked by a good old fashioned drone drop.
Side note. I prefer Khorne Group's taste in rock music to that of the 46th.
👍1
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Special Kherson Cat 🐈🇺🇦 (Twitter)
Battles on the Mariinsky Front, near Donetsk. The video shows 4 destroyed Russian tanks and 1 BMP.
-2xT-72B3M obr.2022
-2xT-72B3
-1xBMP-2
By the 79th brigade of Ukraine and “Alkor” air reconnaissance unit.
t.me/alkor_aero/56
t.me/lost_warinua/51442
Battles on the Mariinsky Front, near Donetsk. The video shows 4 destroyed Russian tanks and 1 BMP.
-2xT-72B3M obr.2022
-2xT-72B3
-1xBMP-2
By the 79th brigade of Ukraine and “Alkor” air reconnaissance unit.
t.me/alkor_aero/56
t.me/lost_warinua/51442
❤7🔥1
The Lookout (Twitter)
@riley_mellen @julianbarnes @ckoettl: There is also an ebb and flow to the likey associated maritime activity, probably connected to whatever they are doing on land.
Today it's quiet compared to what's shown in the quoted tweet below.
@riley_mellen @julianbarnes @ckoettl: There is also an ebb and flow to the likey associated maritime activity, probably connected to whatever they are doing on land.
Today it's quiet compared to what's shown in the quoted tweet below.
👍1
The Lookout (Twitter)
RT @JEFnations: Working closely together, @RoyalNavy and @Forsvaret_no have been demonstrating their cohesion during surface search exercises.
🚁🇬🇧⚓️🇳🇴
An opportunity to develop tactics and train in the iconic fjords of western Norway.
#JEFtogether #UKCSG23
RT @JEFnations: Working closely together, @RoyalNavy and @Forsvaret_no have been demonstrating their cohesion during surface search exercises.
🚁🇬🇧⚓️🇳🇴
An opportunity to develop tactics and train in the iconic fjords of western Norway.
#JEFtogether #UKCSG23
The Lookout (Twitter)
NYT on Burevestnik related activities including higher res imagery of the launch pad area on Sept 28th (in addition to previously seen Sept 20th imagery) and of the two Gromov Flight Research Institute / Rosatom linked IL-76s, poss for monitoring, at Rogachevo.
NYT on Burevestnik related activities including higher res imagery of the launch pad area on Sept 28th (in addition to previously seen Sept 20th imagery) and of the two Gromov Flight Research Institute / Rosatom linked IL-76s, poss for monitoring, at Rogachevo.
The Lookout (Twitter)
RT @Drox_Maritime: A Russian Navy Northern Fleet airforce probable Tu-142 MPA conducted a short, routine MARPAT between at least 021200Z-1430Z OCT 23.
Aircraft unlocated throughout patrol but likely operating in the Barents Sea area.
RT @Drox_Maritime: A Russian Navy Northern Fleet airforce probable Tu-142 MPA conducted a short, routine MARPAT between at least 021200Z-1430Z OCT 23.
Aircraft unlocated throughout patrol but likely operating in the Barents Sea area.
The Lookout (Twitter)
RT @Forsvarsmin: Danmark bidrager med 100 mio. kr. til fællesindkøb af ammunition til Ukraine.
”Med det her bidrag tager Danmark – i samarbejde med andre EU-lande – ansvar for at forsyne Ukraine med artilleriammunition”, siger forsvarsminister @troelslundp
fmn.dk/da/nyheder/2023/danma…
RT @Forsvarsmin: Danmark bidrager med 100 mio. kr. til fællesindkøb af ammunition til Ukraine.
”Med det her bidrag tager Danmark – i samarbejde med andre EU-lande – ansvar for at forsyne Ukraine med artilleriammunition”, siger forsvarsminister @troelslundp
fmn.dk/da/nyheder/2023/danma…
Forsvarsministeriet
Danmark bidrager med 100 mio. kroner til fællesindkøb af ammunition til Ukraine
Danmark bidrager med 100 mio. kroner til et fælles europæisk indkøb af artilleriammunition til Ukraine under Det Europæiske Forsvarsagentur. Ammunitionen ventes leveret i løbet af 2024.
The Lookout (Twitter)
RT @R__Politik: Some remarks concerning the @TheStudyofWar / ISW’s recent thread on #Wagner’s status.
📌 The status of the #WagnerGroup is unequivocally clear from the Kremlin’s perspective - it asserts that the group does not exist. What does exist is a network of militias, compelled to either enter contracts with state entities (they have choices available) or disband.
📌 “There is no clear unified leader for the #WagnerGroup", says ISW. It is pivotal to underscore that there likely won’t be any. The appointment of a replacement for #Prigozhin is strictly off the table.
📌Troshev isn’t the emerging leader of Wagner; he serves as a senior officer at the Defence Ministry, implementing instructions that limit recruits to individuals who have contracted with the military. This approach aims to extinguish any chances of Wagner sustaining its independence.
📌 Pavel Prigozhin, portrayed by some as an alternative leader of Wagner according to ISW, isn’t a negotiable option. He is an heir, groomed by his father to inherit his position, but post-mutiny, this seems unfeasible. The notion of “Wagner Group elements” proposing leadership is unviable; they lack the authority to propose, and the Kremlin isn’t positioned to enter negotiations.
📌 There are no ongoing negotiations with Rosgvardiya concerning Wagner’s combatants. Rosgvardiya can only engage in wishful thinking that incorporating Wagnerites might elevate Zolotov’s political relevance, which is unattainable. However, Zolotov is permitted to recruit former combatants individually as volunteers: the idea is to provide a possibly more acceptable adaptation to the new status quo for some, rather than joining forces led by despised generals. Above all, any military operations executed by Rosgvardiya’s volunteers will strictly adhere to the guidelines of the Ministry of Defence.
📌 The notion that Wagner might maintain its name, symbols, ideology, commanders, administration, and current standard operating principles is merely a pipe dream entertained by “the prominent Wagner-affiliated source.”
📌 The #Kremlin’s stance on the relationship(s) between Wagner elements and the Russian government is explicit: there are no such relationships—Wagner fighters must subordinate to any proposed state entity, be it directly the army, Troshev’s unit, or Rosgvardiya.
📌 Wagner Group will not re-emerge as a substantial, cohesive organisation under the auspices of Rosgvardiya, the Russian MoD, or any equivalent entity. This possibility is non-existent.
📌 Those fighters from Wagner who decline to embrace the new circumstances may choose to stay in Belarus, albeit without prospects and financial support, or they risk being subjected to criminal prosecution.
📌 Some former Wagner’s elements may try to commercialise their activities independently from any other entity, be it #Russian bodies or Prigozhin’s companies.
We have covered all of this in detail over the past few months. Anyone wishing to keep abreast of the fluctuations in Wagner would do well to save time and simply subscribe to R.Politik: rpolitik.com/category/bullet…
RT @R__Politik: Some remarks concerning the @TheStudyofWar / ISW’s recent thread on #Wagner’s status.
📌 The status of the #WagnerGroup is unequivocally clear from the Kremlin’s perspective - it asserts that the group does not exist. What does exist is a network of militias, compelled to either enter contracts with state entities (they have choices available) or disband.
📌 “There is no clear unified leader for the #WagnerGroup", says ISW. It is pivotal to underscore that there likely won’t be any. The appointment of a replacement for #Prigozhin is strictly off the table.
📌Troshev isn’t the emerging leader of Wagner; he serves as a senior officer at the Defence Ministry, implementing instructions that limit recruits to individuals who have contracted with the military. This approach aims to extinguish any chances of Wagner sustaining its independence.
📌 Pavel Prigozhin, portrayed by some as an alternative leader of Wagner according to ISW, isn’t a negotiable option. He is an heir, groomed by his father to inherit his position, but post-mutiny, this seems unfeasible. The notion of “Wagner Group elements” proposing leadership is unviable; they lack the authority to propose, and the Kremlin isn’t positioned to enter negotiations.
📌 There are no ongoing negotiations with Rosgvardiya concerning Wagner’s combatants. Rosgvardiya can only engage in wishful thinking that incorporating Wagnerites might elevate Zolotov’s political relevance, which is unattainable. However, Zolotov is permitted to recruit former combatants individually as volunteers: the idea is to provide a possibly more acceptable adaptation to the new status quo for some, rather than joining forces led by despised generals. Above all, any military operations executed by Rosgvardiya’s volunteers will strictly adhere to the guidelines of the Ministry of Defence.
📌 The notion that Wagner might maintain its name, symbols, ideology, commanders, administration, and current standard operating principles is merely a pipe dream entertained by “the prominent Wagner-affiliated source.”
📌 The #Kremlin’s stance on the relationship(s) between Wagner elements and the Russian government is explicit: there are no such relationships—Wagner fighters must subordinate to any proposed state entity, be it directly the army, Troshev’s unit, or Rosgvardiya.
📌 Wagner Group will not re-emerge as a substantial, cohesive organisation under the auspices of Rosgvardiya, the Russian MoD, or any equivalent entity. This possibility is non-existent.
📌 Those fighters from Wagner who decline to embrace the new circumstances may choose to stay in Belarus, albeit without prospects and financial support, or they risk being subjected to criminal prosecution.
📌 Some former Wagner’s elements may try to commercialise their activities independently from any other entity, be it #Russian bodies or Prigozhin’s companies.
We have covered all of this in detail over the past few months. Anyone wishing to keep abreast of the fluctuations in Wagner would do well to save time and simply subscribe to R.Politik: rpolitik.com/category/bullet…
X (formerly Twitter)
R.Politik on X
Some remarks concerning the @TheStudyofWar / ISW’s recent thread on #Wagner’s status.
📌 The status of the #WagnerGroup is unequivocally clear from the Kremlin’s perspective - it asserts that the group does not exist. What does exist is a network of militias…
📌 The status of the #WagnerGroup is unequivocally clear from the Kremlin’s perspective - it asserts that the group does not exist. What does exist is a network of militias…
👍1
The Lookout (Twitter)
RT @thelostcomms: Ukrainian soldiers train in Norway - now even more are coming for coursing.
This is good training. We work in the forest lines, so this teaching is one of the best you could give us Ukrainians, says the Ukrainian sharpshooter.
nrk.no/trondelag/heimevernet…
RT @thelostcomms: Ukrainian soldiers train in Norway - now even more are coming for coursing.
This is good training. We work in the forest lines, so this teaching is one of the best you could give us Ukrainians, says the Ukrainian sharpshooter.
nrk.no/trondelag/heimevernet…
NRK
Har trent opp ukrainske soldater i Norge – nå kommer enda flere
The Lookout (Twitter)
RT @tonyingesson: I'm currently revisiting some of my old literature and cases for a book chapter I'm working on, so I thought I'd share a particularly interesting case involving the Stasi, Swedish intelligence and a double agent with you all.
Thread time!
1/13
RT @tonyingesson: I'm currently revisiting some of my old literature and cases for a book chapter I'm working on, so I thought I'd share a particularly interesting case involving the Stasi, Swedish intelligence and a double agent with you all.
Thread time!
1/13
The Lookout (Twitter)
@riley_mellen @julianbarnes @ckoettl: The associated PRIP/NAVWARN now runs to Oct 31st.
I expect an extension through November, possibly even longer.
@riley_mellen @julianbarnes @ckoettl: The associated PRIP/NAVWARN now runs to Oct 31st.
I expect an extension through November, possibly even longer.
The Lookout (Twitter)
RT @MT_Anderson: 🇺🇸CARRIER STRIKE GROUP 12🇺🇸 + 🇷🇺SHADOW
Spotted 76 KM NE of 🇮🇹Bari (1 Oct 2023). CVN-78, 2x Arleigh Burke Class Destroyers, 1x Ticonderoga Class Cruiser & 11 KM NE of that could be 🇷🇺Moma Class Intelligence Ship Kildin (last seen in Tartus on 13 Sep)
h/t @d_viekass
RT @MT_Anderson: 🇺🇸CARRIER STRIKE GROUP 12🇺🇸 + 🇷🇺SHADOW
Spotted 76 KM NE of 🇮🇹Bari (1 Oct 2023). CVN-78, 2x Arleigh Burke Class Destroyers, 1x Ticonderoga Class Cruiser & 11 KM NE of that could be 🇷🇺Moma Class Intelligence Ship Kildin (last seen in Tartus on 13 Sep)
h/t @d_viekass