🚀 Bybit Security Breach Exploited Through Social Engineering Tactics
#Bybit #SecurityBreach #SocialEngineering #Cybersecurity #Blockchain #MultiSignature #AttackMethod #OnChainTransactions #MaliciousContract #DilationEffect
According to Odaily, the security community Dilation Effect reported on the X platform that the recent Bybit incident involved a unique attack method. Unlike previous similar events, this breach required compromising only one signer due to the use of a 'social engineering' technique by the attacker. Analyzing on-chain transactions revealed that the attacker executed a malicious contract's transfer function using delegatecall. This transfer code utilized the SSTORE instruction to alter the value of slot 0, effectively changing the implementation address of Bybit's cold wallet multi-signature contract to the attacker's address. The transfer method was particularly clever, as it only required compromising the person or device initiating the multi-signature transaction. Subsequent reviewers, upon seeing the transfer, would likely lower their guard, assuming it was a standard transaction, unaware that it was actually altering the contract. The attacker's methods have evolved significantly.#Bybit #SecurityBreach #SocialEngineering #Cybersecurity #Blockchain #MultiSignature #AttackMethod #OnChainTransactions #MaliciousContract #DilationEffect
🚀 Security Concerns Arise Over Smart Contract Deployment Vulnerability
#Security #SmartContracts #Vulnerability #BlockchainSecurity #AttackMethod #CREATE #CREATE2 #Authorization #MaliciousContract #DAO #GovernanceRights #CodeHashes #Delegatecall #ContractSelfDestruction #AddressReuse #Mitigation
According to PANews, a recent article by SlowMist highlights a security vulnerability in smart contract deployment that has garnered significant attention. The issue involves an attack method using CREATE and CREATE2 to deploy 'same address, different contract' scenarios. Attackers can initially deploy a secure contract to gain authorization, then self-destruct it and redeploy a malicious contract using the same deployment path. This tactic can lead to the execution of malicious logic through delegatecall, potentially resulting in the hijacking of DAO governance rights.
SlowMist advises developers to record and verify code hashes, exercise caution when using delegatecall, and be aware of the risks associated with contract self-destruction and address reuse. These measures are recommended to mitigate the potential threats posed by this vulnerability.#Security #SmartContracts #Vulnerability #BlockchainSecurity #AttackMethod #CREATE #CREATE2 #Authorization #MaliciousContract #DAO #GovernanceRights #CodeHashes #Delegatecall #ContractSelfDestruction #AddressReuse #Mitigation