CloudSec Wine
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All about cloud security

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🤖 AI Threat Readiness Framework

Wiz proposes a 4-pillar AI Threat Readiness Framework: (1) reduce attack surface and AI-scan all exposures; (2) accelerate CVE patching and zero-day response; (3) perform deep AI-driven code analysis; (4) automate real-time threat detection and containment.

https://www.wiz.io/blog/ai-threat-readiness-framework

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🤖 Comparing AI Application Security Testing Platforms

Doyensec compared Aikido Attack AI Pentest and XBOW Lightspeed for web app vulnerability detection, evaluating true/false positives, configuration, report quality, cost, speed, and impact on tested applications. Full findings available as a PDF.

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🤖 A Security Researcher’s Guide to Understanding Copilot Studio AI Agents

A guide to understanding Copilot Studio AI agents, their deeper architecture on Entra ID and APIM, and key security risks.

https://www.beyondtrust.com/blog/entry/copilot-studio-ai-agents-security-risks

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🤖 ChatGPhish: The Page Is the Payload

Any web page a victim asks ChatGPT to summarize can become a phishing payload. P0 Labs research reveals a Markdown rendering vulnerability in ChatGPT's response UI.

https://permiso.io/blog/chatgpt-markdown-rendering-vulnerability

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🤖 Hermes-USB-Portable

Run a fully self-contained, self-improving AI agent from a single folder or USB drive.

https://github.com/techjarves/hermes-usb-portable

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🤖 Entra Agent ID: The blueprint blast radius

Entra Agent ID is an extension of Entra's application model that provides identities for AI agents. Unlike applications, the agent identity model allows linking a single app registration (blueprint) to multiple identities and their associated privileges, increasing the potential blast radius of a compromised agent.

https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/agent-id-blueprint-blast-radius

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🤖 AI Agent Supply-Chain Malware in Instruction Files

Mitiga Labs scanned 50,000+ AI instruction files across 7,000+ repos, finding prompt-exfiltration malware, ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL MITM overrides, YOLO-mode permission bypasses, and 1,230+ hardcoded API keys. They released Skillgate, a free scanner, to detect these techniques.

https://www.mitiga.io/blog/malware-in-ai-instruction-files-skillgate

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🤖 An Introduction to AI Coding Agent Security

NCC Group whitepaper covering security of AI coding agents (Claude Code, Cursor, Codex) as of May 2026. Analyzes permission models, OS-level sandboxing, agent tool attack surfaces, and common vuln classes: workspace trust bypasses, sandbox escapes, permission prompt bypasses, sensitive file overwrites, and indirect prompt injection.

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🤖 LLMjacking evolved: Attackers are using stolen AI compute to build offensive agentic tools

Sysdig TRT caught a threat actor using a stolen Ollama server to power an autonomous, multi-stage offensive hacking tool.

https://www.sysdig.com/blog/llmjacking-evolved-attackers-are-using-stolen-ai-compute-to-build-offensive-agentic-tools

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🤖 datadog-saist

Unlike traditional SAST tools that rely solely on parsing and analysis rules, this project uses LLM (e.g. Claude from Anthropic, GPT from OpenAI or Gemini from Google) to find vulnerabilities.

https://github.com/DataDog/datadog-saist

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🤖 AI brands as bait: How threat actors are using the AI hype in social engineering

Threat actors impersonate AI brands (ChatGPT, Claude, DeepSeek, Copilot) in phishing, malvertising, and SEO-poisoning campaigns to steal credentials, credit card data, and deliver infostealers like Vidar. Storm-3075 and Fox Tempest are attributed actors using signed malware.

https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/06/08/ai-brands-as-bait-how-threat-actors-are-using-the-ai-hype-in-social-engineering

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🤖 Three Ways to Give an AI Agent an Identity

This post compares three AI agent identity models: acting as the user (simple but single-player), service account tokens (common in production but insecure), and SPIFFE-based workload identity (best but costly to implement). Covers governance plumbing like Okta XAA and cloud-provider managed options.

https://kanenarraway.com/posts/agent-identity-models

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🤖 Solving the Identity Crisis for AI Agents

Uber extended its Zero Trust architecture to assign SPIRE-backed cryptographic identities to AI agents, issuing short-lived, single-hop JWTs via a Security Token Service. Full actor chains (user to agent to tool) propagate across multi-agent MCP calls, enabling end-to-end auditability with sub-40ms P99 token exchange latency.

https://www.uber.com/us/en/blog/solving-the-agent-identity-crisis

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🤖 Zero Trustfor AI Agents

Anthropic eBook applying Zero Trust principles to enterprise autonomous AI agents, covering threat taxonomy (prompt injection, tool/MCP hijacking, memory poisoning, supply chain risks), tiered controls (Foundation/Enterprise/Advanced) for identity, least-privilege, observability, and AI-accelerated defensive operations.

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🤖 GitLost: How We Tricked GitHub’s AI Agent into Leaking Private Repos

Noma Labs found a prompt injection flaw (GitLost) in GitHub Agentic Workflows: posting a crafted issue in a public org repo causes the AI agent to exfiltrate private repository contents as a public comment, bypassing guardrails via the keyword "Additionally.".

https://noma.security/blog/gitlost-how-we-tricked-githubs-ai-agent-into-leaking-private-repos

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🤖 GhostApproval: AI Coding Assistant Trust Boundary Flaw

GhostApproval is a symlink-following vulnerability affecting 6 AI coding assistants (Amazon Q, Claude Code, Augment, Cursor, Google Antigravity, Windsurf). Malicious repos trick agents into writing outside the workspace sandbox, enabling RCE. Critically, agents internally recognize the dangerous target but confirmation prompts hide it from users, nullifying Human-in-the-Loop protections.

https://www.wiz.io/blog/ghostapproval-a-trust-boundary-gap-in-ai-coding-assistants

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🤖 CISO's guide to agentic AI

Anthropic's Deputy CISO shares a four-question framework for assessing agentic AI risk, and walks through controls that keep agent deployments bounded and auditable.

https://claude.com/blog/ciso-guide-to-agentic-ai

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🤖 Delegated authority, running locally: Give an agent on your machine an identity you can trust

A reference architecture for giving a locally-running AI agent a trustworthy, auditable identity, without long-lived credentials on disk, including a structural defense against prompt injection built into the protocol layer.

https://1password.com/blog/ai-agent-identity-delegated-local

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🤖 New Study Identifies 53 Slopsquatting Targets Across 5 Frontier LLMs

A study of ~200,000 LLM responses found 5 frontier models (Claude, GPT, Gemini, DeepSeek) hallucinate nonexistent package names at 4.62-6.10%, with 53 shared fictitious names on PyPI/npm still registrable and exploitable via slopsquatting attacks.

https://socket.dev/blog/slopsquatting-targets-across-frontier-llms

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🤖 Inside the OpenClaw Ecosystem: What Happens When AI Agents Get Credentials to Everything

Permiso researchers deployed an AI agent (Rufio) into the OpenClaw ecosystem and found active malware campaigns in its unvetted skill marketplace (ClawHub), credential-harvesting skills with 377+ downloads, C2 infrastructure, and prompt injection attacks targeting agents holding plaintext credentials to email, Slack, and file systems.

https://permiso.io/blog/inside-the-openclaw-ecosystem-ai-agents-with-privileged-credentials

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