This is my new Telegram channel, which I created to reflect on political and economic issues related to the Caucasus, Türkiye, and Central Asia. Other platforms (like X or Bluesky) have certain limitations, so I wanted to create a space where I can share my reflections and insights on topics I believe are important or often overlooked. My aim is to highlight nuances and voices—going beyond the noise that divides understanding. From time to time, I’ll also share literary works and book recommendations.
About me: I am a scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. However, this channel represents my personal and professional reflections and is not tied to the institution I work for. You can learn more about my background: https://carnegieendowment.org/people/zaur-shiriyev?lang=en
About me: I am a scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. However, this channel represents my personal and professional reflections and is not tied to the institution I work for. You can learn more about my background: https://carnegieendowment.org/people/zaur-shiriyev?lang=en
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Will the Trump administration push for a peace treaty between Baku and Yerevan? (1)
The previous Biden administration invested considerable diplomatic efforts into Azerbaijan-Armenia peace talks—organizing meetings and encouraging both sides to move toward peace before September 2023. After that, the sides shifted to a bilateral format, with no third-party involvement. However, what was expected, especially from Baku, was that there should be ‘dividends of peace’—a package of financial and other benefits for the conflict sides, particularly Azerbaijan, supported by the US, and possibly in coordination with more EU support later. The Biden administration came to this understanding very late—only in October, a month before the US elections, which was already too late.
Many believe that the Trump administration—unlike Biden—will not have an interest in pushing peace efforts between Baku and Yerevan, as its focus will likely be on ending the war in Ukraine. However, the opposite could be true, which could change things:
The new administration might view an Azerbaijan-Armenia peace agreement as low-hanging fruit—a mostly prepared text—easier to achieve than ending the war in Ukraine. This could boost the new administration’s reputation, especially Trump, who positioned himself as the one who brought peace during his first term. However, one major difference is that the "dividends of peace" presented by the Biden administration to the sides—initial ideas—might not be the same if the Trump administration takes on the Azerbaijan-Armenia portfolio. Unlike Biden, Trump’s main stance is that no American taxpayer money should be spent on foreign assistance. His first order was a "stop-work" directive for all existing foreign aid and a pause on new aid. Therefore, it will be hard to expect the same type of financial support for Azerbaijan, such as rebuilding its territories, demining efforts, and the return of displaced persons. On a political level, however, there could be steps like the removal of Section 907 and other political-economic measures, including offering Baku a strategic partnership agreement, similar to one recently signed with Armenia.
One question people are wondering is who will handle the Azerbaijan-Armenia portfolio in the Trump administration. Key figures with expertise in this area, such as James O'Brien and Michael Carpenter, have already left and not joined the new administration. However, two recent developments suggest that the Trump administration may still retain some knowledgeable people on this issue:
First, although it wasn’t widely reported, US Senior Advisor for Caucasus Negotiations, Louis Bono, has been appointed as acting Director of the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs at the US Department of State. This indicates that a person with knowledge of the Azerbaijan-Armenia file will be serving in the Trump administration. Equally important will be who replaces Michael Carpenter, who was Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Europe at the National Security Council. The person who takes his place will be crucial in determining how much focus the Caucasus and the Azerbaijan-Armenia file will receive, as this position is typically close to the White House and has significant influence on such matters.
Second, an important indication came when Secretary of State Marco Rubio discussed the Azerbaijan-Armenian peace process with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan. This suggests that Turkey's approach to the Azerbaijan-Armenia normalization file remains a topic of discussion between the US and Turkey, signaling the US’s interest in Turkey's role in the process.
The previous Biden administration invested considerable diplomatic efforts into Azerbaijan-Armenia peace talks—organizing meetings and encouraging both sides to move toward peace before September 2023. After that, the sides shifted to a bilateral format, with no third-party involvement. However, what was expected, especially from Baku, was that there should be ‘dividends of peace’—a package of financial and other benefits for the conflict sides, particularly Azerbaijan, supported by the US, and possibly in coordination with more EU support later. The Biden administration came to this understanding very late—only in October, a month before the US elections, which was already too late.
Many believe that the Trump administration—unlike Biden—will not have an interest in pushing peace efforts between Baku and Yerevan, as its focus will likely be on ending the war in Ukraine. However, the opposite could be true, which could change things:
The new administration might view an Azerbaijan-Armenia peace agreement as low-hanging fruit—a mostly prepared text—easier to achieve than ending the war in Ukraine. This could boost the new administration’s reputation, especially Trump, who positioned himself as the one who brought peace during his first term. However, one major difference is that the "dividends of peace" presented by the Biden administration to the sides—initial ideas—might not be the same if the Trump administration takes on the Azerbaijan-Armenia portfolio. Unlike Biden, Trump’s main stance is that no American taxpayer money should be spent on foreign assistance. His first order was a "stop-work" directive for all existing foreign aid and a pause on new aid. Therefore, it will be hard to expect the same type of financial support for Azerbaijan, such as rebuilding its territories, demining efforts, and the return of displaced persons. On a political level, however, there could be steps like the removal of Section 907 and other political-economic measures, including offering Baku a strategic partnership agreement, similar to one recently signed with Armenia.
One question people are wondering is who will handle the Azerbaijan-Armenia portfolio in the Trump administration. Key figures with expertise in this area, such as James O'Brien and Michael Carpenter, have already left and not joined the new administration. However, two recent developments suggest that the Trump administration may still retain some knowledgeable people on this issue:
First, although it wasn’t widely reported, US Senior Advisor for Caucasus Negotiations, Louis Bono, has been appointed as acting Director of the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs at the US Department of State. This indicates that a person with knowledge of the Azerbaijan-Armenia file will be serving in the Trump administration. Equally important will be who replaces Michael Carpenter, who was Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Europe at the National Security Council. The person who takes his place will be crucial in determining how much focus the Caucasus and the Azerbaijan-Armenia file will receive, as this position is typically close to the White House and has significant influence on such matters.
Second, an important indication came when Secretary of State Marco Rubio discussed the Azerbaijan-Armenian peace process with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan. This suggests that Turkey's approach to the Azerbaijan-Armenia normalization file remains a topic of discussion between the US and Turkey, signaling the US’s interest in Turkey's role in the process.
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Will the Trump administration push for a peace treaty between Baku and Yerevan? (2)
These are early indications, but much will depend on how the Trump administration handles the end of the Ukraine war—whether it succeeds or not—and how long it takes. Trump's earlier predictions of ending the war in 24 hours were more talk than realistic assessments. If the administration fails to resolve the Ukraine conflict, pushing for Azerbaijan-Armenian peace could become a priority. However, there is a dilemma: If the Ukraine war ends successfully, and it results in the strengthening of Russia's influence in the Caucasus—or essentially the US accepting Russia’s "sphere of influence"—it could shift the US focus away from the region. This would not be good news for the region. However, if exhaustion from the Ukraine war in the first few months leads to a shift in priorities, the focus could turn back to the South Caucasus. In that case, Azerbaijan-Armenia peace efforts could be pushed to the forefront. Therefore, in the first few months, it will become clearer if Trump (adminstration) views the Azerbaijan-Armenia peace process as low-hanging fruit.
These are early indications, but much will depend on how the Trump administration handles the end of the Ukraine war—whether it succeeds or not—and how long it takes. Trump's earlier predictions of ending the war in 24 hours were more talk than realistic assessments. If the administration fails to resolve the Ukraine conflict, pushing for Azerbaijan-Armenian peace could become a priority. However, there is a dilemma: If the Ukraine war ends successfully, and it results in the strengthening of Russia's influence in the Caucasus—or essentially the US accepting Russia’s "sphere of influence"—it could shift the US focus away from the region. This would not be good news for the region. However, if exhaustion from the Ukraine war in the first few months leads to a shift in priorities, the focus could turn back to the South Caucasus. In that case, Azerbaijan-Armenia peace efforts could be pushed to the forefront. Therefore, in the first few months, it will become clearer if Trump (adminstration) views the Azerbaijan-Armenia peace process as low-hanging fruit.
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Why Azerbaijani Gas Can't Transit Through Ukraine to Eastern Europe
After the end of the gas transit agreement between Russia and Ukraine on January 1, which allowed Russian gas to flow through Ukraine to the EU and Moldova, the deal was not renewed. While there was some discussion about Azerbaijan stepping in to replace this transit role, the termination of the agreement is now a thing of the past. However, countries like Slovakia, Hungary, and Austria, which relied heavily on Russian gas transiting through Ukraine, remain dissatisfied with the situation.
Yesterday, Ukrainian President Zelensky stated that Ukraine is open to using its gas infrastructure to transit Azerbaijani gas to Eastern Europe, including Slovakia and Hungary.
Why This Is Difficult:
There are several key issues that make this proposal unlikely:
1. Pipeline Design:
• Ukraine’s gas network was not designed to transport Azerbaijani gas through its territory to supply Slovakia or Hungary. While it’s technically possible to modify the system, doing so would be inefficient and unnecessary.
2. Azerbaijan’s Existing Supply to Eastern Europe:
Azerbaijan already supplies gas to Eastern Europe and is discussing expanding its role. Here’s how it works:
• Azerbaijani gas flows through the SGC to Bulgaria via the Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria (IGB) pipeline.
• From Bulgaria, it moves through the STRING system, which passes through Romania, Hungary, and Slovakia.
The STRING system currently handles up to 5 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas per year. For capacity to grow, pipelines like the IGB would need to be upgraded. Currently, Bulgaria consumes 1 bcm of Azerbaijani gas annually for its domestic needs. If the IGB pipeline were expanded to its full capacity of 5 bcm, the remaining 4 bcm could be sent to other countries like Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania.
Additionally, Moldova could potentially receive Azerbaijani gas through Romania using the Ungheni-Chișinău pipeline, which can transport 1.5 bcm per year. However, this depends on whether there is enough extra gas available in the STRING system.
3. Facts About Azerbaijani Gas:
• Production: In 2024, Azerbaijan produced 50.3 billion cubic meters (bn cu.m.) of natural gas.
• Exports: Total gas exports reached 25.2 bn cu.m., with the following breakdown:
o 12.9 bn cu.m. delivered to Europe,
o 9.9 bn cu.m. delivered to Türkiye,
o 2.4 bn cu.m. delivered to Georgia.
• Domestic Consumption: While not fully reported, domestic gas consumption is estimated to be around 14.5 bn cu.m. The remaining gas is used for:
o Reinjection into oil fields for enhanced recovery,
o Technical losses during processing and transport,
o Other operational needs.
Azerbaijan’s gas production is sufficient to expand exports. Even if 5 bcm were cut from domestic consumption, there would be enough additional gas to boost exports to the European market.
The Caveat for Eastern Europe:
The issue is not how much gas Azerbaijan produces—it’s about the capacity of the pipelines to deliver that gas. Even with upgrades to the STRING system and the IGB pipeline, the total capacity for Azerbaijani gas exports through this system is capped at 5 bcm per year.
Because of this limitation, Ukraine’s offer to transit Azerbaijani gas is unlikely to happen, especially since Azerbaijan already has direct and more efficient routes to Slovakia and Hungary.
After the end of the gas transit agreement between Russia and Ukraine on January 1, which allowed Russian gas to flow through Ukraine to the EU and Moldova, the deal was not renewed. While there was some discussion about Azerbaijan stepping in to replace this transit role, the termination of the agreement is now a thing of the past. However, countries like Slovakia, Hungary, and Austria, which relied heavily on Russian gas transiting through Ukraine, remain dissatisfied with the situation.
Yesterday, Ukrainian President Zelensky stated that Ukraine is open to using its gas infrastructure to transit Azerbaijani gas to Eastern Europe, including Slovakia and Hungary.
Why This Is Difficult:
There are several key issues that make this proposal unlikely:
1. Pipeline Design:
• Ukraine’s gas network was not designed to transport Azerbaijani gas through its territory to supply Slovakia or Hungary. While it’s technically possible to modify the system, doing so would be inefficient and unnecessary.
2. Azerbaijan’s Existing Supply to Eastern Europe:
Azerbaijan already supplies gas to Eastern Europe and is discussing expanding its role. Here’s how it works:
• Azerbaijani gas flows through the SGC to Bulgaria via the Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria (IGB) pipeline.
• From Bulgaria, it moves through the STRING system, which passes through Romania, Hungary, and Slovakia.
The STRING system currently handles up to 5 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas per year. For capacity to grow, pipelines like the IGB would need to be upgraded. Currently, Bulgaria consumes 1 bcm of Azerbaijani gas annually for its domestic needs. If the IGB pipeline were expanded to its full capacity of 5 bcm, the remaining 4 bcm could be sent to other countries like Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania.
Additionally, Moldova could potentially receive Azerbaijani gas through Romania using the Ungheni-Chișinău pipeline, which can transport 1.5 bcm per year. However, this depends on whether there is enough extra gas available in the STRING system.
3. Facts About Azerbaijani Gas:
• Production: In 2024, Azerbaijan produced 50.3 billion cubic meters (bn cu.m.) of natural gas.
• Exports: Total gas exports reached 25.2 bn cu.m., with the following breakdown:
o 12.9 bn cu.m. delivered to Europe,
o 9.9 bn cu.m. delivered to Türkiye,
o 2.4 bn cu.m. delivered to Georgia.
• Domestic Consumption: While not fully reported, domestic gas consumption is estimated to be around 14.5 bn cu.m. The remaining gas is used for:
o Reinjection into oil fields for enhanced recovery,
o Technical losses during processing and transport,
o Other operational needs.
Azerbaijan’s gas production is sufficient to expand exports. Even if 5 bcm were cut from domestic consumption, there would be enough additional gas to boost exports to the European market.
The Caveat for Eastern Europe:
The issue is not how much gas Azerbaijan produces—it’s about the capacity of the pipelines to deliver that gas. Even with upgrades to the STRING system and the IGB pipeline, the total capacity for Azerbaijani gas exports through this system is capped at 5 bcm per year.
Because of this limitation, Ukraine’s offer to transit Azerbaijani gas is unlikely to happen, especially since Azerbaijan already has direct and more efficient routes to Slovakia and Hungary.
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Oil Prices, Pressure on Russia, and Possible Impact on Azerbaijan
There has been heated debate and global reactions to US President Trump’s speech last week in Davos, where he stated, “I’m going to ask Saudi Arabia and OPEC to bring down the cost of oil.” His rationale is that lower oil prices would undermine Russia’s ability to sustain its war efforts, potentially forcing Moscow to compromise or sit at the negotiation table to end the war in Ukraine.
But is this realistic?
President Trump’s stance is neither new nor surprising. He has previously hinted at leveraging the US’s position as the largest oil producer to strip Russia of the oil revenues funding its war in Ukraine. As my colleague Sergey Vakulenko argued in his piece in the Financial Times, referencing the Dallas Fed, oil producers, on average, require a forecasted price of $64 per barrel to justify drilling a new wells. Even if the US and Saudi Arabia were to agree to lower oil prices to $50 per barrel, it is unlikely that this alone would force Russia to significantly curtail oil production.
Let’s Look at the Figures:
According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), Russia's crude oil and oil products export revenues amounted to $192 billion in 2024. However, other reports present differing figures. For example, Russia's federal budget proceeds from oil and gas sales in 2024 were reported at 11.13 trillion rubles (approximately $108 billion), reflecting a 26% increase from the previous year. The main buyers of Russian crude were China (47% of exports), India (37%), the EU (7%), and Turkey (6%). This distribution suggests that while a drop in oil prices would reduce revenue, it might not significantly affect production or Russia’s ability to generate income.
Detailed analysis by Vaibhav Raghunandan and Petras Katinas have shown that even with a lower price cap of $30 per barrel (close to Russia’s average production cost of $15 per barrel), Russia’s oil export revenue would have decreased by 25%, or €76 billion, between December 2022 and December 2024.
In realistic terms, an oil price of $50 per barrel would still allow Russia to generate substantial revenue, making it unlikely that such a price drop alone would force Moscow to immediately enter negotiations. A sustained period of low prices might hit the Russian economy hard, but the real impact would likely be felt only by 2026. For more insights, Alexandra Prokopenko’s recent article on the subject provides valuable nuances.
What About Azerbaijan?
A decline in oil prices would have a more immediate and significant impact on economies like Azerbaijan’s compared to Russia. In 2024, Azerbaijan exported 23.596 million tonnes of crude oil, generating $14.437 billion in revenue, with an average price of $83.47 per barrel. Oil accounted for 54.37% of Azerbaijan’s total exports in 2024, up from 47.91% in 2023.
Let’s consider the revenue losses for Azerbaijan under different price scenarios while maintaining the same production levels:
• $60 per barrel: Revenue would fall to $10.38 billion, a 28.12% decrease from 2024.
• $50 per barrel: Revenue would fall to $8.65 billion, a 40.10% decrease.
• $30 per barrel: Revenue would drop to $5.19 billion, a 64.06% decrease.
These figures clearly show that if President Trump were to achieve an agreement with OPEC to lower oil prices to $50 per barrel, the impact on Azerbaijan in 2025 would be far more severe than on Russia. Even a few months of such low prices would have a devastating effect on Azerbaijan’s economy, whereas Russia would likely weather the storm more effectively.
There has been heated debate and global reactions to US President Trump’s speech last week in Davos, where he stated, “I’m going to ask Saudi Arabia and OPEC to bring down the cost of oil.” His rationale is that lower oil prices would undermine Russia’s ability to sustain its war efforts, potentially forcing Moscow to compromise or sit at the negotiation table to end the war in Ukraine.
But is this realistic?
President Trump’s stance is neither new nor surprising. He has previously hinted at leveraging the US’s position as the largest oil producer to strip Russia of the oil revenues funding its war in Ukraine. As my colleague Sergey Vakulenko argued in his piece in the Financial Times, referencing the Dallas Fed, oil producers, on average, require a forecasted price of $64 per barrel to justify drilling a new wells. Even if the US and Saudi Arabia were to agree to lower oil prices to $50 per barrel, it is unlikely that this alone would force Russia to significantly curtail oil production.
Let’s Look at the Figures:
According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), Russia's crude oil and oil products export revenues amounted to $192 billion in 2024. However, other reports present differing figures. For example, Russia's federal budget proceeds from oil and gas sales in 2024 were reported at 11.13 trillion rubles (approximately $108 billion), reflecting a 26% increase from the previous year. The main buyers of Russian crude were China (47% of exports), India (37%), the EU (7%), and Turkey (6%). This distribution suggests that while a drop in oil prices would reduce revenue, it might not significantly affect production or Russia’s ability to generate income.
Detailed analysis by Vaibhav Raghunandan and Petras Katinas have shown that even with a lower price cap of $30 per barrel (close to Russia’s average production cost of $15 per barrel), Russia’s oil export revenue would have decreased by 25%, or €76 billion, between December 2022 and December 2024.
In realistic terms, an oil price of $50 per barrel would still allow Russia to generate substantial revenue, making it unlikely that such a price drop alone would force Moscow to immediately enter negotiations. A sustained period of low prices might hit the Russian economy hard, but the real impact would likely be felt only by 2026. For more insights, Alexandra Prokopenko’s recent article on the subject provides valuable nuances.
What About Azerbaijan?
A decline in oil prices would have a more immediate and significant impact on economies like Azerbaijan’s compared to Russia. In 2024, Azerbaijan exported 23.596 million tonnes of crude oil, generating $14.437 billion in revenue, with an average price of $83.47 per barrel. Oil accounted for 54.37% of Azerbaijan’s total exports in 2024, up from 47.91% in 2023.
Let’s consider the revenue losses for Azerbaijan under different price scenarios while maintaining the same production levels:
• $60 per barrel: Revenue would fall to $10.38 billion, a 28.12% decrease from 2024.
• $50 per barrel: Revenue would fall to $8.65 billion, a 40.10% decrease.
• $30 per barrel: Revenue would drop to $5.19 billion, a 64.06% decrease.
These figures clearly show that if President Trump were to achieve an agreement with OPEC to lower oil prices to $50 per barrel, the impact on Azerbaijan in 2025 would be far more severe than on Russia. Even a few months of such low prices would have a devastating effect on Azerbaijan’s economy, whereas Russia would likely weather the storm more effectively.
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Beyond the Divide
Oil Prices, Pressure on Russia, and Possible Impact on Azerbaijan There has been heated debate and global reactions to US President Trump’s speech last week in Davos, where he stated, “I’m going to ask Saudi Arabia and OPEC to bring down the cost of oil.”…
Для тех, кто читает на русском, вот перевод моего недавнего поста — заранее извиняюсь за любые грамматические ошибки.
Цены на нефть, давление на Россию и возможное влияние на Азербайджан
На прошлой неделе в Давосе выступление президента США Дональда Трампа вызвало бурные дебаты и мировую реакцию. Он заявил: «Я собираюсь попросить Саудовскую Аравию и ОПЕК снизить стоимость нефти». Его аргумент заключается в том, что более низкие цены на нефть подорвут способность России финансировать свои военные усилия, что потенциально может заставить Москву пойти на компромисс или сесть за стол переговоров, чтобы завершить войну в Украине.
Но реалистично ли это?
Подход президента Трампа не является ни новым, ни удивительным. Ранее он уже намекал на использование позиции США как крупнейшего производителя нефти, чтобы лишить Россию нефтяных доходов, финансирующих войну в Украине. Как отметил мой коллега Сергей Вакуленко в своей статье в Financial Times, ссылаясь на данные Федерального резервного банка Далласа, нефтепроизводителям в среднем требуется прогнозируемая цена в $64 за баррель, чтобы оправдать бурение новых скважин. Даже если США и Саудовская Аравия договорятся о снижении цен на нефть до $50 за баррель, маловероятно, что это заставит Россию существенно сократить объемы добычи нефти.
Посмотрим на цифры:
Согласно данным Международного энергетического агентства (МЭА), доходы России от экспорта сырой нефти и нефтепродуктов в 2024 году составили 192 миллиарда долларов. Однако другие источники предоставляют противоречивую информацию. Например, доходы федерального бюджета России от продажи нефти и газа в 2024 году были оценены в 11,13 триллиона рублей (примерно 108 миллиардов долларов), что на 26% больше по сравнению с предыдущим годом. Основными покупателями российской нефти стали Китай (47% экспорта), Индия (37%), ЕС (7%) и Турция (6%). Эти данные свидетельствуют о том, что снижение цен на нефть уменьшит доходы России, но, возможно, не окажет значительного влияния на объемы производства или способность страны генерировать доход.
Детализированный анализ, проведенный Вайбхавом Рагхунанданом и Петрасом Катинасом, показал, что даже при снижении потолка цен до $30 за баррель (близко к средним затратам на производство в России, составляющим $15 за баррель), доходы России от экспорта нефти сократились бы на 25% (или €76 млрд) в период с декабря 2022 года по декабрь 2024 года.
В реальных цифрах цена на нефть в $50 за баррель все равно позволит России генерировать существенные доходы, что делает маловероятным, что такое снижение цен сразу заставит Москву пойти на переговоры. Длительный период низких цен может нанести серьезный удар по российской экономике, но реальный эффект, скорее всего, станет ощутим только к 2026 году. Более подробный анализ на эту тему можно найти в недавней статье Александры Прокопенко.
А что с Азербайджаном?
Снижение цен на нефть окажет более немедленное и значительное влияние на такие экономики, как азербайджанская, по сравнению с Россией. В 2024 году Азербайджан экспортировал 23,596 млн тонн сырой нефти, что принесло $14,437 млрд дохода при средней цене $83,47 за баррель. Доля нефти в общем экспорте Азербайджана в 2024 году составила 54,37%, увеличившись с 47,91% в 2023 году.
Рассмотрим потери доходов Азербайджана при различных сценариях цен на нефть, сохраняя тот же объем производства:
• $60 за баррель: Доходы сократятся до $10,38 млрд, что на 28,12% меньше, чем в 2024 году.
• $50 за баррель: Доходы упадут до $8,65 млрд, что на 40,10% меньше.
• $30 за баррель: Доходы составят всего $5,19 млрд, что на 64,06% меньше.
Эти цифры ясно показывают, что если президент Трамп добьется соглашения с ОПЕК о снижении цен на нефть до $50 за баррель, влияние на экономику Азербайджана в 2025 году будет гораздо более значительным, чем на Россию. Даже несколько месяцев таких низких цен окажут разрушительное воздействие на экономику Азербайджана, в то время как Россия, вероятно, сможет справиться с этим ударом более эффективно.
Цены на нефть, давление на Россию и возможное влияние на Азербайджан
На прошлой неделе в Давосе выступление президента США Дональда Трампа вызвало бурные дебаты и мировую реакцию. Он заявил: «Я собираюсь попросить Саудовскую Аравию и ОПЕК снизить стоимость нефти». Его аргумент заключается в том, что более низкие цены на нефть подорвут способность России финансировать свои военные усилия, что потенциально может заставить Москву пойти на компромисс или сесть за стол переговоров, чтобы завершить войну в Украине.
Но реалистично ли это?
Подход президента Трампа не является ни новым, ни удивительным. Ранее он уже намекал на использование позиции США как крупнейшего производителя нефти, чтобы лишить Россию нефтяных доходов, финансирующих войну в Украине. Как отметил мой коллега Сергей Вакуленко в своей статье в Financial Times, ссылаясь на данные Федерального резервного банка Далласа, нефтепроизводителям в среднем требуется прогнозируемая цена в $64 за баррель, чтобы оправдать бурение новых скважин. Даже если США и Саудовская Аравия договорятся о снижении цен на нефть до $50 за баррель, маловероятно, что это заставит Россию существенно сократить объемы добычи нефти.
Посмотрим на цифры:
Согласно данным Международного энергетического агентства (МЭА), доходы России от экспорта сырой нефти и нефтепродуктов в 2024 году составили 192 миллиарда долларов. Однако другие источники предоставляют противоречивую информацию. Например, доходы федерального бюджета России от продажи нефти и газа в 2024 году были оценены в 11,13 триллиона рублей (примерно 108 миллиардов долларов), что на 26% больше по сравнению с предыдущим годом. Основными покупателями российской нефти стали Китай (47% экспорта), Индия (37%), ЕС (7%) и Турция (6%). Эти данные свидетельствуют о том, что снижение цен на нефть уменьшит доходы России, но, возможно, не окажет значительного влияния на объемы производства или способность страны генерировать доход.
Детализированный анализ, проведенный Вайбхавом Рагхунанданом и Петрасом Катинасом, показал, что даже при снижении потолка цен до $30 за баррель (близко к средним затратам на производство в России, составляющим $15 за баррель), доходы России от экспорта нефти сократились бы на 25% (или €76 млрд) в период с декабря 2022 года по декабрь 2024 года.
В реальных цифрах цена на нефть в $50 за баррель все равно позволит России генерировать существенные доходы, что делает маловероятным, что такое снижение цен сразу заставит Москву пойти на переговоры. Длительный период низких цен может нанести серьезный удар по российской экономике, но реальный эффект, скорее всего, станет ощутим только к 2026 году. Более подробный анализ на эту тему можно найти в недавней статье Александры Прокопенко.
А что с Азербайджаном?
Снижение цен на нефть окажет более немедленное и значительное влияние на такие экономики, как азербайджанская, по сравнению с Россией. В 2024 году Азербайджан экспортировал 23,596 млн тонн сырой нефти, что принесло $14,437 млрд дохода при средней цене $83,47 за баррель. Доля нефти в общем экспорте Азербайджана в 2024 году составила 54,37%, увеличившись с 47,91% в 2023 году.
Рассмотрим потери доходов Азербайджана при различных сценариях цен на нефть, сохраняя тот же объем производства:
• $60 за баррель: Доходы сократятся до $10,38 млрд, что на 28,12% меньше, чем в 2024 году.
• $50 за баррель: Доходы упадут до $8,65 млрд, что на 40,10% меньше.
• $30 за баррель: Доходы составят всего $5,19 млрд, что на 64,06% меньше.
Эти цифры ясно показывают, что если президент Трамп добьется соглашения с ОПЕК о снижении цен на нефть до $50 за баррель, влияние на экономику Азербайджана в 2025 году будет гораздо более значительным, чем на Россию. Даже несколько месяцев таких низких цен окажут разрушительное воздействие на экономику Азербайджана, в то время как Россия, вероятно, сможет справиться с этим ударом более эффективно.
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Insightful Analysis on the Azerbaijan-Armenia Peace Process and the U.S. Role
I just came across Seymur Kazimov's latest piece on the U.S. and its potential role in the Azerbaijani-Armenian peace process. It’s a well-detailed analysis, and I highly recommend reading it. The article is available only in Azerbaijani and Russian.
He makes an excellent point that many expect Trump to turn his attention to the Azerbaijan-Armenia issue. However, as Seymur rightly notes:
"In the case of Armenia-Azerbaijan relations, the situation is different. The process continues even without Trump—slowly, with fluctuations, but it does not remain at a standstill."
The Azerbaijan-Armenia peace agreement—now in its final stages, with most of the text already agreed upon—is often described as a "low-hanging fruit" for international actors seeking to play a role in the process. More recently, some experts have suggested that the Trump administration might view it in the same way.
However, Seymur raises a compelling argument that I plan to explore further: Who exactly considers this a "low-hanging fruit"? This phrase implies that the agreement cannot be finalized or signed without third-party intervention—an assumption I disagree with. The reality of the Azerbaijan-Armenia peace process is far more nuanced. Labeling it as an easy diplomatic win oversimplifies the complexities of regional dynamics, local agency, and the progress made independently of external mediation.
A deeper, more conceptual analysis is needed to unpack what this term really means in the context of Azerbaijan-Armenia relations—whether it reflects an external narrative that underestimates the agency of regional actors or a genuine assessment of the current stage of negotiations.
You can read Seymur's article here:
📌 In Azerbaijani:
Cəbhə xəttindən Sülh dördbucağına qədər – Cənubi Qafqaz ABŞ-dan necə görünə bilər?
📌 In Russian:
От линии фронта до «четырехугольника» мира – Новые дипломатические подходы США и динамикарегионального сотрудничества на Южном Кавказе
I just came across Seymur Kazimov's latest piece on the U.S. and its potential role in the Azerbaijani-Armenian peace process. It’s a well-detailed analysis, and I highly recommend reading it. The article is available only in Azerbaijani and Russian.
He makes an excellent point that many expect Trump to turn his attention to the Azerbaijan-Armenia issue. However, as Seymur rightly notes:
"In the case of Armenia-Azerbaijan relations, the situation is different. The process continues even without Trump—slowly, with fluctuations, but it does not remain at a standstill."
The Azerbaijan-Armenia peace agreement—now in its final stages, with most of the text already agreed upon—is often described as a "low-hanging fruit" for international actors seeking to play a role in the process. More recently, some experts have suggested that the Trump administration might view it in the same way.
However, Seymur raises a compelling argument that I plan to explore further: Who exactly considers this a "low-hanging fruit"? This phrase implies that the agreement cannot be finalized or signed without third-party intervention—an assumption I disagree with. The reality of the Azerbaijan-Armenia peace process is far more nuanced. Labeling it as an easy diplomatic win oversimplifies the complexities of regional dynamics, local agency, and the progress made independently of external mediation.
A deeper, more conceptual analysis is needed to unpack what this term really means in the context of Azerbaijan-Armenia relations—whether it reflects an external narrative that underestimates the agency of regional actors or a genuine assessment of the current stage of negotiations.
You can read Seymur's article here:
📌 In Azerbaijani:
Cəbhə xəttindən Sülh dördbucağına qədər – Cənubi Qafqaz ABŞ-dan necə görünə bilər?
📌 In Russian:
От линии фронта до «четырехугольника» мира – Новые дипломатические подходы США и динамикарегионального сотрудничества на Южном Кавказе
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Kazakh Oil Transit via BTC: A 'Historic' Shift or Just Business as Usual? (1)
We are living in a time when almost any effort to reduce reliance on Russia—whether by criticizing it or diverting resources—is labeled as “historic.” In some respects, this characterization makes sense, but it can also create a misleading impression.
I often see media coverage describing Kazakh oil shipments to Azerbaijan as “historic” and presenting them as if they are an entirely new development. However, this portrayal can create two misleading impressions.First, it suggests that Kazakhstan is transporting its oil for the first time. Second, it implies that Kazakhstan is completely diverting its oil shipments to bypass Russia. Let’s examine the facts.
Is this the first time Kazakh oil has been pumped through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline?
The short and definitive answer is no. Back in 2008, Kazakhstan’s President, Nursultan Nazarbayev, signed a law allowing oil exports from Kazakhstan "to international markets through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan system," thereby approving oil shipments that bypass Russia. As a result, Azerbaijan provided transit for part of the crude from Kazakhstan's Tengiz field between 2008 and 2016. However, since 2017, oil from this major field has been transported primarily via the CPC (Caspian Pipeline Consortium) through Russia.
When Was Kazakh Oil Transit Through Azerbaijan Restored?
The short answer: March 2023.
In 2022, Kazakhstan’s national oil company, KMG, and the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) signed a general agreement on the transit of Kazakh oil. Under this agreement, Kazakhstan was set to begin supplying oil through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline starting on January 1, 2023, with an annual volume of 1.5 million tonnes.
However, the transportation of oil from the Tengiz field via the BTC pipeline was delayed due to damage to the Ceyhan terminal in Turkey caused by the earthquakes in February 2023. As a result, the transit only began in March 2023.
In addition to the Tengiz oil field, both sides have been testing exports from the Kashagan field. The first test shipment—7,000 tonnes of oil from Kashagan—was transported via Azerbaijan in March 2023, with Inpex North Caspian Sea Ltd. acting as the shipper.
Later, in March 2024, KMG and SOCAR formalized an agreement to gradually increase oil transit volumes through Azerbaijan. Under this new agreement, oil supplies are expected to rise to 2.2 million tonnes annually.
What is the Prospect of Increasing the Volume of Kazakh Oil, and What Are the Challenges?
In 2024, Kazakhstan shipped 1.419 million tonnes of oil through the Aktau port to Baku, marking a slight increase from 1.392 million tonnes transported in 2023.
But what are the prospects for increasing this volume?
There are a few challenges.
First, Azerbaijan has stated that it can only receive 2.2 million metric tons of Kazakhstan's oil per year in its pipeline due to the high sulfur content of Kazakh crude. Elshad Nasirov, SOCAR's Vice President, pointed out that buyers prefer the low sulfur content of Azeri Light oil at the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) outlet, and any increase in Kazakh oil volumes could alter this quality. To allow for higher transit volumes, Azerbaijan would require guaranteed oil shipments for at least 10 years under a "ship-or-pay" agreement, ensuring a consistent flow despite quality concerns.
Second, transporting oil through BTC is costly for Kazakhstan. According to a report by Astana Times, based on interviews with experts, "oil transportation via the BTC pipeline costs approximately $120 per ton, compared to $38 per ton through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), which routes oil through Russia." To reduce costs and make BTC a more viable option, "Kazakhstan would need to invest in infrastructure expansion at its Aktau port."
We are living in a time when almost any effort to reduce reliance on Russia—whether by criticizing it or diverting resources—is labeled as “historic.” In some respects, this characterization makes sense, but it can also create a misleading impression.
I often see media coverage describing Kazakh oil shipments to Azerbaijan as “historic” and presenting them as if they are an entirely new development. However, this portrayal can create two misleading impressions.First, it suggests that Kazakhstan is transporting its oil for the first time. Second, it implies that Kazakhstan is completely diverting its oil shipments to bypass Russia. Let’s examine the facts.
Is this the first time Kazakh oil has been pumped through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline?
The short and definitive answer is no. Back in 2008, Kazakhstan’s President, Nursultan Nazarbayev, signed a law allowing oil exports from Kazakhstan "to international markets through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan system," thereby approving oil shipments that bypass Russia. As a result, Azerbaijan provided transit for part of the crude from Kazakhstan's Tengiz field between 2008 and 2016. However, since 2017, oil from this major field has been transported primarily via the CPC (Caspian Pipeline Consortium) through Russia.
When Was Kazakh Oil Transit Through Azerbaijan Restored?
The short answer: March 2023.
In 2022, Kazakhstan’s national oil company, KMG, and the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) signed a general agreement on the transit of Kazakh oil. Under this agreement, Kazakhstan was set to begin supplying oil through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline starting on January 1, 2023, with an annual volume of 1.5 million tonnes.
However, the transportation of oil from the Tengiz field via the BTC pipeline was delayed due to damage to the Ceyhan terminal in Turkey caused by the earthquakes in February 2023. As a result, the transit only began in March 2023.
In addition to the Tengiz oil field, both sides have been testing exports from the Kashagan field. The first test shipment—7,000 tonnes of oil from Kashagan—was transported via Azerbaijan in March 2023, with Inpex North Caspian Sea Ltd. acting as the shipper.
Later, in March 2024, KMG and SOCAR formalized an agreement to gradually increase oil transit volumes through Azerbaijan. Under this new agreement, oil supplies are expected to rise to 2.2 million tonnes annually.
What is the Prospect of Increasing the Volume of Kazakh Oil, and What Are the Challenges?
In 2024, Kazakhstan shipped 1.419 million tonnes of oil through the Aktau port to Baku, marking a slight increase from 1.392 million tonnes transported in 2023.
But what are the prospects for increasing this volume?
There are a few challenges.
First, Azerbaijan has stated that it can only receive 2.2 million metric tons of Kazakhstan's oil per year in its pipeline due to the high sulfur content of Kazakh crude. Elshad Nasirov, SOCAR's Vice President, pointed out that buyers prefer the low sulfur content of Azeri Light oil at the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) outlet, and any increase in Kazakh oil volumes could alter this quality. To allow for higher transit volumes, Azerbaijan would require guaranteed oil shipments for at least 10 years under a "ship-or-pay" agreement, ensuring a consistent flow despite quality concerns.
Second, transporting oil through BTC is costly for Kazakhstan. According to a report by Astana Times, based on interviews with experts, "oil transportation via the BTC pipeline costs approximately $120 per ton, compared to $38 per ton through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), which routes oil through Russia." To reduce costs and make BTC a more viable option, "Kazakhstan would need to invest in infrastructure expansion at its Aktau port."
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Kazakh Oil Transit via BTC: A 'Historic' Shift or Just Business as Usual? (2)
Third, there is a need for infrastructure upgrades. The current process is challenging, as oil from Kazakh fields is transported by pipeline to Aktau, then shipped across the Caspian Sea by tankers—a time-consuming and costly method due to storage and waiting costs. Aktau port has a capacity of only five to six million tons of oil per year. To significantly increase volumes, port capacity would need to triple, and additional storage and loading terminals would have to be built. Kazakhstan’s Energy Minister, Almasadam Satkaliyev, has stated that transit volumes could rise to 20 million metric tons per year, but no specific timeline has been provided for the necessary upgrades.
How Much Kazakh Oil Could Be Pumped Through BTC, and How Much Is Needed?
First, it is important to note that Kazakhstan is not the only country using the BTC pipeline—Turkmenistan also pumps its oil through BTC. Turkmenistan has been transporting oil via BTC since 2010 and holds an advantage over Kazakh oil in one key aspect: quality. The quality of Turkmen oil is almost identical to Azerbaijan’s Azeri Light crude, meaning their mixture does not affect the overall quality of oil running through the BTC pipeline.
Now, let’s examine the 2024 statistics.
In 2024, a total of 29.47 million tons of oil were transported through the BTC pipeline. Of this, 82% (24.17 million tons)was oil produced in Azerbaijan, while 18% (5.3 million tons) was imported from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. Kazakh oil accounted for only about 4.8% of the total BTC pipeline transportation.
Now, let’s analyze the BTC pipeline’s capacity and assess how much third-party oil it can handle if Azerbaijan continues transporting similar volumes in the near future.
BTC’s nominal throughput capacity is 1.2 million barrels per day (b/d). Azerbaijan’s crude oil (24.17 million tons per year) utilizes approximately 485,000 b/d, leaving about 715,000 b/d (or 60% of the total capacity) still available.
If we factor in the 2024 statistics—where 18% of BTC oil flow came from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan—about 49% of BTC’s total capacity was utilized, meaning 51% of its capacity remains available.
Given Kazakhstan’s stated ambition to increase oil exports via BTC to 20 million tons per year in the future, is there sufficient capacity in BTC for such an increase? The answer is yes.
From a pure capacity standpoint, increasing Kazakh oil shipments through BTC from 1.4 million tons to 20 million tonsper year is feasible because even with this rise, the pipeline would still operate below its maximum capacity (at about 80% utilization). If this increase materializes, BTC would still have some spare capacity—approximately 86 million barrels per year (or about 20% of its total capacity).
While increasing Kazakh oil transit through Azerbaijan is possible, it requires long-term agreements, cost reductions, and major infrastructure investments to compete with alternative routes.
Third, there is a need for infrastructure upgrades. The current process is challenging, as oil from Kazakh fields is transported by pipeline to Aktau, then shipped across the Caspian Sea by tankers—a time-consuming and costly method due to storage and waiting costs. Aktau port has a capacity of only five to six million tons of oil per year. To significantly increase volumes, port capacity would need to triple, and additional storage and loading terminals would have to be built. Kazakhstan’s Energy Minister, Almasadam Satkaliyev, has stated that transit volumes could rise to 20 million metric tons per year, but no specific timeline has been provided for the necessary upgrades.
How Much Kazakh Oil Could Be Pumped Through BTC, and How Much Is Needed?
First, it is important to note that Kazakhstan is not the only country using the BTC pipeline—Turkmenistan also pumps its oil through BTC. Turkmenistan has been transporting oil via BTC since 2010 and holds an advantage over Kazakh oil in one key aspect: quality. The quality of Turkmen oil is almost identical to Azerbaijan’s Azeri Light crude, meaning their mixture does not affect the overall quality of oil running through the BTC pipeline.
Now, let’s examine the 2024 statistics.
In 2024, a total of 29.47 million tons of oil were transported through the BTC pipeline. Of this, 82% (24.17 million tons)was oil produced in Azerbaijan, while 18% (5.3 million tons) was imported from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. Kazakh oil accounted for only about 4.8% of the total BTC pipeline transportation.
Now, let’s analyze the BTC pipeline’s capacity and assess how much third-party oil it can handle if Azerbaijan continues transporting similar volumes in the near future.
BTC’s nominal throughput capacity is 1.2 million barrels per day (b/d). Azerbaijan’s crude oil (24.17 million tons per year) utilizes approximately 485,000 b/d, leaving about 715,000 b/d (or 60% of the total capacity) still available.
If we factor in the 2024 statistics—where 18% of BTC oil flow came from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan—about 49% of BTC’s total capacity was utilized, meaning 51% of its capacity remains available.
Given Kazakhstan’s stated ambition to increase oil exports via BTC to 20 million tons per year in the future, is there sufficient capacity in BTC for such an increase? The answer is yes.
From a pure capacity standpoint, increasing Kazakh oil shipments through BTC from 1.4 million tons to 20 million tonsper year is feasible because even with this rise, the pipeline would still operate below its maximum capacity (at about 80% utilization). If this increase materializes, BTC would still have some spare capacity—approximately 86 million barrels per year (or about 20% of its total capacity).
While increasing Kazakh oil transit through Azerbaijan is possible, it requires long-term agreements, cost reductions, and major infrastructure investments to compete with alternative routes.
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Azerbaijan-Russia Relations
Some argue Azerbaijan-Russia ties are strengthening, while others see cracks forming. I shared my thoughts on this topic—full interview here:
https://caucasuswatch.de/en/interviews/zaur-shiriyev-the-lasting-effect-of-flight-8243-on-bakus-relationship-to-moscow.html
Some argue Azerbaijan-Russia ties are strengthening, while others see cracks forming. I shared my thoughts on this topic—full interview here:
https://caucasuswatch.de/en/interviews/zaur-shiriyev-the-lasting-effect-of-flight-8243-on-bakus-relationship-to-moscow.html
Caucasus Watch
Zaur Shiriyev: The Lasting Effect of Flight 8243 on Baku’s Relationship to Moscow
To understand the implications of the Azerbaijani Airlines airplane crash on December 25, 2024, for Russian-Azerbaijani relations, we turn to Dr. Zaur Shiriyev, a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, part of the Carnegie Endowment for…
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"Əkinçi" layihəsi çərçivəsində milli kimliyin formalaşması mövzusunda fikirlərimi bölüşmüşəm. Layihə çərçivəsində müxtəlif maraqlı mövzuları əhatə edən müsahibələri onların YouTube kanalından izləyə bilərsiniz.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S9_a8NPjoGo
I have shared my thoughts on the formation of national identity in an interview for the "Əkinçi" YouTube channel. You can also watch other interviews on their channel, covering a variety of interesting topics.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S9_a8NPjoGo
I have shared my thoughts on the formation of national identity in an interview for the "Əkinçi" YouTube channel. You can also watch other interviews on their channel, covering a variety of interesting topics.
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My long essay on how Azerbaijan reclaimed its territories—what others shouldn’t try to copy, and what comes next for the South Caucasus.
Not a “recipe”—just the outcome of a long game.
Link:https://gfsis.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/228-expert-opinion-eng.pdf
Not a “recipe”—just the outcome of a long game.
Link:https://gfsis.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/228-expert-opinion-eng.pdf
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Rewarding Russian aggression in Ukraine would send shockwaves across Eurasia. For three years, many countries in its former periphery have benefited from Moscow’s weakness. A bad deal now could reverse that—and embolden Russia.
My latest:
🔗 https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2025/04/russia-influence-future?lang=en¢er=russia-eurasia
My latest:
🔗 https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2025/04/russia-influence-future?lang=en¢er=russia-eurasia
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Rewarding Russian Aggression Would Send Shockwaves Across Eurasia
From Georgia to Kazakhstan, all eyes are on the negotiations to end the war in Ukraine—and the outcome will determine Moscow’s capacity to project influence.
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