‼️🚨 BREAKING: A new npm supply-chain attack uses a dead-man's switch. The payload plants a watcher on your machine that nukes your home directory the second you revoke the GitHub token it stole from you.
The compromise happened today, across 42 official tanstack npm packages, 84 malicious versions in total. tanstack/react-router alone pulls more than 12 million weekly downloads.
The attacker forked TanStack's repository and pushed a single hidden commit. From there, they tricked TanStack's own release system into signing the malicious packages as if they were the real thing. To npm, and to anyone checking the cryptographic proof of origin (SLSA provenance), the poisoned versions looked 100% legitimate.
Maintainer Tanner Linsley confirmed the whole team had 2FA enabled. It didn't matter. This is the first documented npm worm in history that ships with a valid, signed certificate of authenticity, the same one defenders rely on to know a package wasn't tampered with.
Sources:
https://github.com/TanStack/router/issues/7383#issuecomment-4425225340
https://x.com/tan_stack/status/2053948103766716630
❗️ UPDATE on today's npm supply-chain attack:
• Per Socket Security: 121 more compromised package artifacts found across 84 additional package names. 64 of them are UiPath artifacts.
• Combined with the earlier TanStack hits, the current known total is 205 affected npm package artifacts.
• Reach now spans enterprise automation, AI/MCP, auth, workflow, and dev tooling.
The worm is still propagating.
The compromise happened today, across 42 official tanstack npm packages, 84 malicious versions in total. tanstack/react-router alone pulls more than 12 million weekly downloads.
The attacker forked TanStack's repository and pushed a single hidden commit. From there, they tricked TanStack's own release system into signing the malicious packages as if they were the real thing. To npm, and to anyone checking the cryptographic proof of origin (SLSA provenance), the poisoned versions looked 100% legitimate.
Maintainer Tanner Linsley confirmed the whole team had 2FA enabled. It didn't matter. This is the first documented npm worm in history that ships with a valid, signed certificate of authenticity, the same one defenders rely on to know a package wasn't tampered with.
Sources:
https://github.com/TanStack/router/issues/7383#issuecomment-4425225340
https://x.com/tan_stack/status/2053948103766716630
❗️ UPDATE on today's npm supply-chain attack:
• Per Socket Security: 121 more compromised package artifacts found across 84 additional package names. 64 of them are UiPath artifacts.
• Combined with the earlier TanStack hits, the current known total is 205 affected npm package artifacts.
• Reach now spans enterprise automation, AI/MCP, auth, workflow, and dev tooling.
The worm is still propagating.
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🚨 How the TanStack npm attack actually happened:
1. Attacker opened a normal-looking pull request (#7378) on the TanStack repo.
2. GitHub automatically ran CI tests on that PR.
3. Code inside the PR stole the workflow's GitHub Actions Cache write token during the test run.
4. The attacker used that token to plant poisoned files in the shared build cache. The PR could be closed afterwards. The poisoned cache stays.
5. The official release workflow later pulled from the cache, baked the malicious files into the build, and signed and published 84 malicious package versions to npm.
- The malicious commit that started the chain was forged under the identity claude <claude@users.noreply.github.com>, impersonating Anthropic's Claude.
Full TanStack postmortem now out. The attacker used chained known vulnerabilities.
https://tanstack.com/blog/npm-supply-chain-compromise-postmortem
1. Attacker opened a normal-looking pull request (#7378) on the TanStack repo.
2. GitHub automatically ran CI tests on that PR.
3. Code inside the PR stole the workflow's GitHub Actions Cache write token during the test run.
4. The attacker used that token to plant poisoned files in the shared build cache. The PR could be closed afterwards. The poisoned cache stays.
5. The official release workflow later pulled from the cache, baked the malicious files into the build, and signed and published 84 malicious package versions to npm.
- The malicious commit that started the chain was forged under the identity claude <claude@users.noreply.github.com>, impersonating Anthropic's Claude.
Full TanStack postmortem now out. The attacker used chained known vulnerabilities.
https://tanstack.com/blog/npm-supply-chain-compromise-postmortem
TanStack
Postmortem: TanStack npm supply-chain compromise | TanStack Blog
On 2026-05-11, an attacker chained a pull_request_target Pwn Request, GitHub Actions cache poisoning across the fork↔base trust boundary, and OIDC token extraction from runner memory to publish 84 malicious versions across 42 @tanstack/* packages on npm.…
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❗️🚨 BREAKING: Microsoft has fired the top leadership of its Israeli subsidiary following an internal investigation into Azure use by Israel's Ministry of Defense. Country General Manager Alon Haimovich is out, along with several managers from the governance department.
The probe found Israeli defense units were using Azure servers in Europe in ways that violated Microsoft's terms and exposed the company to EU legal risk. Microsoft Israel's management withheld this from headquarters.
Microsoft had already cut ties with IDF Unit 8200 in September 2025. The investigation found that was only part of the problem.
Microsoft Israel now reports to Microsoft France. The Ministry of Defense contract renewal is due by the end of 2026.
The probe found Israeli defense units were using Azure servers in Europe in ways that violated Microsoft's terms and exposed the company to EU legal risk. Microsoft Israel's management withheld this from headquarters.
Microsoft had already cut ties with IDF Unit 8200 in September 2025. The investigation found that was only part of the problem.
Microsoft Israel now reports to Microsoft France. The Ministry of Defense contract renewal is due by the end of 2026.
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‼️🚨 BREAKING: NHS England has confirmed Palantir has access to identifiable UK patient data through a new "admin" role on the Federated Data Platform, the central data-sharing system the US spy-tech firm has run for the NHS since 2023 under a £330M contract.
Internal NHS documents admit the change risks "loss of public confidence" in patient data safeguards.
Internal NHS documents admit the change risks "loss of public confidence" in patient data safeguards.
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POV: you are downloading npm packages in 2026
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❗️🚨 BREAKING: Chaotic Eclipse just published two more public Windows disclosures today and is also threatening Microsoft: "Next patch tuesday will have a big surprise for you Microsoft. And remember, I never failed to deliver a promise."
- YellowKey: claimed BitLocker bypass
- GreenPlasma: claimed CTFMON-based EoP
Source: https://deadeclipse666.blogspot.com/2026/05/two-more-public-disclosures-it-will.html
GH:
https://github.com/Nightmare-Eclipse/YellowKey
https://github.com/Nightmare-Eclipse/GreenPlasma
- YellowKey: claimed BitLocker bypass
- GreenPlasma: claimed CTFMON-based EoP
Source: https://deadeclipse666.blogspot.com/2026/05/two-more-public-disclosures-it-will.html
GH:
https://github.com/Nightmare-Eclipse/YellowKey
https://github.com/Nightmare-Eclipse/GreenPlasma
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🚨 Odido CEO Søren Abildgaard says he will NOT compensate the 6.2 million customers exposed in February's ShinyHunters breach. Instead, he "promises to learn from this experience." (how nice of him)
Abildgaard claims no investigation has shown Odido broke any rules. Which is weird, since there are a lot of preventive measures they could've taken so their Salesforce didn't get drained of data. Salesforce has also been proactively contacting customers to help them harden and prevent attacks like the one Odido fell victim to.
Abildgaard also sent a video of himself to every customer today, where he is clearly reading text he got from the judicial department off a teleprompter. No empathy at all.
Context:
- ShinyHunters breached Odido on Feb 5 and 6 via voice phishing, impersonating internal IT staff
- ShinyHunters then accessed Odido's Salesforce, which they were able to DRAIN to the last drop
- Names, addresses, phone numbers, bank accounts, ID numbers, IBANs and DOBs of 6.2M current and former customers were stolen
- Odido refused to pay the ransom. The data was then dumped on the dark web
- Odido customers are now actively being targeted by criminals using the leaked data
- A class action by CUIC and a criminal investigation by the Dutch Public Prosecution Service are already running
Abildgaard claims no investigation has shown Odido broke any rules. Which is weird, since there are a lot of preventive measures they could've taken so their Salesforce didn't get drained of data. Salesforce has also been proactively contacting customers to help them harden and prevent attacks like the one Odido fell victim to.
Abildgaard also sent a video of himself to every customer today, where he is clearly reading text he got from the judicial department off a teleprompter. No empathy at all.
Context:
- ShinyHunters breached Odido on Feb 5 and 6 via voice phishing, impersonating internal IT staff
- ShinyHunters then accessed Odido's Salesforce, which they were able to DRAIN to the last drop
- Names, addresses, phone numbers, bank accounts, ID numbers, IBANs and DOBs of 6.2M current and former customers were stolen
- Odido refused to pay the ransom. The data was then dumped on the dark web
- Odido customers are now actively being targeted by criminals using the leaked data
- A class action by CUIC and a criminal investigation by the Dutch Public Prosecution Service are already running
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🚨 Signal shipped new in-app confirmations and educational prompts to help users spot scammers impersonating "Signal Support."
The change follows the March takeover of Arndt Freytag von Loringhoven, former Vice President of Germany's foreign intelligence service (BND), Bundestag President and Christian Democrat (CDU) Julia Klöckner, and roughly 300 other German officials.
The campaign has been attributed to Russia by German and Dutch intelligence.
The change follows the March takeover of Arndt Freytag von Loringhoven, former Vice President of Germany's foreign intelligence service (BND), Bundestag President and Christian Democrat (CDU) Julia Klöckner, and roughly 300 other German officials.
The campaign has been attributed to Russia by German and Dutch intelligence.
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‼️🚨 Microsoft has patched a critical Windows DNS Client remote code execution vulnerability that allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. All it takes is a malicious DNS response.
The vulnerability is tracked as CVE-2026-41096 with a CVSS score of 9.8. It is a heap-based buffer overflow in dnsapi.dll, the Windows component that processes DNS answers on every machine.
To trigger it, an attacker needs a position where they can influence DNS responses: a rogue DNS server, a poisoned resolver, a compromised router, hostile WiFi, or a man-in-the-middle placement.
That puts ordinary Windows DNS activity in the blast radius. Browsers, VPN clients, enterprise apps, update checks, and background services constantly ask DNS where to connect. The vulnerable processing sits in the Windows DNS Client path, not an edge-facing server product.
Microsoft assessed exploitation as "less likely," and Rapid7 lists the issue as not publicly disclosed and not known to be exploited at release.
On the contrary, a 9.8 unauthenticated network RCE in DNS client handling is exactly the kind of bug defenders should assume will be reverse-engineered quickly.
Defenders should:
- Deploy the May 2026 cumulative updates and confirm coverage across endpoints and servers
- Restrict DNS traffic to trusted resolvers where possible
- Monitor Dnscache and svchost.exe for abnormal child processes or unexpected outbound activity
- Treat public WiFi and untrusted resolver paths as higher-risk until patching is complete
Source: https://hackingpassion.com/windows-dns-rce-2026/
The vulnerability is tracked as CVE-2026-41096 with a CVSS score of 9.8. It is a heap-based buffer overflow in dnsapi.dll, the Windows component that processes DNS answers on every machine.
To trigger it, an attacker needs a position where they can influence DNS responses: a rogue DNS server, a poisoned resolver, a compromised router, hostile WiFi, or a man-in-the-middle placement.
That puts ordinary Windows DNS activity in the blast radius. Browsers, VPN clients, enterprise apps, update checks, and background services constantly ask DNS where to connect. The vulnerable processing sits in the Windows DNS Client path, not an edge-facing server product.
Microsoft assessed exploitation as "less likely," and Rapid7 lists the issue as not publicly disclosed and not known to be exploited at release.
On the contrary, a 9.8 unauthenticated network RCE in DNS client handling is exactly the kind of bug defenders should assume will be reverse-engineered quickly.
Defenders should:
- Deploy the May 2026 cumulative updates and confirm coverage across endpoints and servers
- Restrict DNS traffic to trusted resolvers where possible
- Monitor Dnscache and svchost.exe for abnormal child processes or unexpected outbound activity
- Treat public WiFi and untrusted resolver paths as higher-risk until patching is complete
Source: https://hackingpassion.com/windows-dns-rce-2026/
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❗️ Love this new YouTube genre where a randomly laid-off Atlassian engineer with 8 years at the company just dropped a full technical breakdown of the entire place.
The video: youtu.be/55pTFVoclvE
The video: youtu.be/55pTFVoclvE
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