‼️🚨 ABSURD: A member of France's parliamentary intelligence delegation is openly pushing to add "ghost participants" to your encrypted WhatsApp, Signal, and Telegram chats.
They're calling current encryption "a major obstacle for the work of the justice system and intelligence services."
The literal proposal is: the state silently inserts an invisible third user into every targeted two-person conversation...
The story:
▪️ On December 16, 2025, France's 8-member parliamentary intelligence delegation (DPR) published its 2025 annual report. It formally endorses giving magistrates and intelligence agents access to end-to-end encrypted messages.
▪️ The technical method floated: the "ghost user" approach originally proposed by UK GCHQ in 2018 and rejected by every major cryptographer and privacy organization that reviewed it.
▪️ We have seen similar proposals of 'breaking' encryption in the Netherlands, their intelligence services AIVD recommended against it since it would expose everyone.
▪️ The lead advocate, Senator Cédric Perrin, openly says his goal is to "introduce a ghost participant into a conversation before encryption."
The absurd:
▪️ A system that lets the state silently join "two-person" conversations is, by definition, no longer end-to-end encryption.
▪️ Every major cryptographer who has reviewed ghost-user proposals has said the same thing: there is no such way to add a ghost recipient for "good guys only." It can be exploited by hostile states, criminals, and any insider with access to the platform's signaling layer.
▪️ The French intelligence report acknowledges that intelligence services already have remote device interception. They can already compromise a target's phone and read most on it with judicial authorization.
The legislative status:
▪️ This is a parliamentary recommendation, fortunately not law yet. The member pushing this is named Cédric Perrin, and his first amendment was fortunately passed by the Senate.
▪️ A competing amendment, by another senator, would do the opposite, writing encryption protection into French law and prohibiting backdoors. Adopted by the Senate in March 2025, stalled in the Assembly since September.
▪️ At the EU level, the ProtectEU strategy is publishing a 2026 encryption roadmap to identify how lawful access could be built.
Source: https://docs.reclaimthenet.org/french-parliamentary-intelligence-report-2025.pdf
They're calling current encryption "a major obstacle for the work of the justice system and intelligence services."
The literal proposal is: the state silently inserts an invisible third user into every targeted two-person conversation...
The story:
▪️ On December 16, 2025, France's 8-member parliamentary intelligence delegation (DPR) published its 2025 annual report. It formally endorses giving magistrates and intelligence agents access to end-to-end encrypted messages.
▪️ The technical method floated: the "ghost user" approach originally proposed by UK GCHQ in 2018 and rejected by every major cryptographer and privacy organization that reviewed it.
▪️ We have seen similar proposals of 'breaking' encryption in the Netherlands, their intelligence services AIVD recommended against it since it would expose everyone.
▪️ The lead advocate, Senator Cédric Perrin, openly says his goal is to "introduce a ghost participant into a conversation before encryption."
The absurd:
▪️ A system that lets the state silently join "two-person" conversations is, by definition, no longer end-to-end encryption.
▪️ Every major cryptographer who has reviewed ghost-user proposals has said the same thing: there is no such way to add a ghost recipient for "good guys only." It can be exploited by hostile states, criminals, and any insider with access to the platform's signaling layer.
▪️ The French intelligence report acknowledges that intelligence services already have remote device interception. They can already compromise a target's phone and read most on it with judicial authorization.
The legislative status:
▪️ This is a parliamentary recommendation, fortunately not law yet. The member pushing this is named Cédric Perrin, and his first amendment was fortunately passed by the Senate.
▪️ A competing amendment, by another senator, would do the opposite, writing encryption protection into French law and prohibiting backdoors. Adopted by the Senate in March 2025, stalled in the Assembly since September.
▪️ At the EU level, the ProtectEU strategy is publishing a 2026 encryption roadmap to identify how lawful access could be built.
Source: https://docs.reclaimthenet.org/french-parliamentary-intelligence-report-2025.pdf
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🙀 CONFIRMED: A new analysis strongly suggests feline-assisted axial grooming is what causes Earth's rotation.
The globe is scientifically lickable. Earth is about 71% water-covered, and the oceans contain about 96.5% of all Earth's water, making the planet less of a "rock" and more of a suspended blue hydration sphere.
The biological equipment also checks out. Cat tongues contain hollow, scoop-shaped papillae that wick saliva, and domestic-cat grooming has been measured at about 1.4 licks per second with a tongue speed around 220 mm/s according to Georgia Tech.
Fluid mechanics further supports the hypothesis. MIT researchers found that cats use precise tongue motion and physical forces to move liquid while lapping, which means a water-rich globe passing under a cat's mouth is exactly the kind of object a cat would attempt to interact with.
The rotation is also suspicious. NASA reports that Earth completes one rotation every 23.9 hours and has an equatorial diameter of 12,756 km, which calculates to an equatorial surface speed near 1,670 km/h, which is unusually fast for a planet, but reasonable for something being spun by a cosmic cat tongue.
Therefore, the most scientifically responsible conclusion is that Earth's rotation is being maintained through feline-assisted axial grooming.
Further research is needed, but the preliminary meme evidence is overwhelming: the cat is licking the globe.
The globe is scientifically lickable. Earth is about 71% water-covered, and the oceans contain about 96.5% of all Earth's water, making the planet less of a "rock" and more of a suspended blue hydration sphere.
The biological equipment also checks out. Cat tongues contain hollow, scoop-shaped papillae that wick saliva, and domestic-cat grooming has been measured at about 1.4 licks per second with a tongue speed around 220 mm/s according to Georgia Tech.
Fluid mechanics further supports the hypothesis. MIT researchers found that cats use precise tongue motion and physical forces to move liquid while lapping, which means a water-rich globe passing under a cat's mouth is exactly the kind of object a cat would attempt to interact with.
The rotation is also suspicious. NASA reports that Earth completes one rotation every 23.9 hours and has an equatorial diameter of 12,756 km, which calculates to an equatorial surface speed near 1,670 km/h, which is unusually fast for a planet, but reasonable for something being spun by a cosmic cat tongue.
Therefore, the most scientifically responsible conclusion is that Earth's rotation is being maintained through feline-assisted axial grooming.
Further research is needed, but the preliminary meme evidence is overwhelming: the cat is licking the globe.
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‼️🚨 BREAKING: A new npm supply-chain attack uses a dead-man's switch. The payload plants a watcher on your machine that nukes your home directory the second you revoke the GitHub token it stole from you.
The compromise happened today, across 42 official tanstack npm packages, 84 malicious versions in total. tanstack/react-router alone pulls more than 12 million weekly downloads.
The attacker forked TanStack's repository and pushed a single hidden commit. From there, they tricked TanStack's own release system into signing the malicious packages as if they were the real thing. To npm, and to anyone checking the cryptographic proof of origin (SLSA provenance), the poisoned versions looked 100% legitimate.
Maintainer Tanner Linsley confirmed the whole team had 2FA enabled. It didn't matter. This is the first documented npm worm in history that ships with a valid, signed certificate of authenticity, the same one defenders rely on to know a package wasn't tampered with.
Sources:
https://github.com/TanStack/router/issues/7383#issuecomment-4425225340
https://x.com/tan_stack/status/2053948103766716630
❗️ UPDATE on today's npm supply-chain attack:
• Per Socket Security: 121 more compromised package artifacts found across 84 additional package names. 64 of them are UiPath artifacts.
• Combined with the earlier TanStack hits, the current known total is 205 affected npm package artifacts.
• Reach now spans enterprise automation, AI/MCP, auth, workflow, and dev tooling.
The worm is still propagating.
The compromise happened today, across 42 official tanstack npm packages, 84 malicious versions in total. tanstack/react-router alone pulls more than 12 million weekly downloads.
The attacker forked TanStack's repository and pushed a single hidden commit. From there, they tricked TanStack's own release system into signing the malicious packages as if they were the real thing. To npm, and to anyone checking the cryptographic proof of origin (SLSA provenance), the poisoned versions looked 100% legitimate.
Maintainer Tanner Linsley confirmed the whole team had 2FA enabled. It didn't matter. This is the first documented npm worm in history that ships with a valid, signed certificate of authenticity, the same one defenders rely on to know a package wasn't tampered with.
Sources:
https://github.com/TanStack/router/issues/7383#issuecomment-4425225340
https://x.com/tan_stack/status/2053948103766716630
❗️ UPDATE on today's npm supply-chain attack:
• Per Socket Security: 121 more compromised package artifacts found across 84 additional package names. 64 of them are UiPath artifacts.
• Combined with the earlier TanStack hits, the current known total is 205 affected npm package artifacts.
• Reach now spans enterprise automation, AI/MCP, auth, workflow, and dev tooling.
The worm is still propagating.
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🚨 How the TanStack npm attack actually happened:
1. Attacker opened a normal-looking pull request (#7378) on the TanStack repo.
2. GitHub automatically ran CI tests on that PR.
3. Code inside the PR stole the workflow's GitHub Actions Cache write token during the test run.
4. The attacker used that token to plant poisoned files in the shared build cache. The PR could be closed afterwards. The poisoned cache stays.
5. The official release workflow later pulled from the cache, baked the malicious files into the build, and signed and published 84 malicious package versions to npm.
- The malicious commit that started the chain was forged under the identity claude <claude@users.noreply.github.com>, impersonating Anthropic's Claude.
Full TanStack postmortem now out. The attacker used chained known vulnerabilities.
https://tanstack.com/blog/npm-supply-chain-compromise-postmortem
1. Attacker opened a normal-looking pull request (#7378) on the TanStack repo.
2. GitHub automatically ran CI tests on that PR.
3. Code inside the PR stole the workflow's GitHub Actions Cache write token during the test run.
4. The attacker used that token to plant poisoned files in the shared build cache. The PR could be closed afterwards. The poisoned cache stays.
5. The official release workflow later pulled from the cache, baked the malicious files into the build, and signed and published 84 malicious package versions to npm.
- The malicious commit that started the chain was forged under the identity claude <claude@users.noreply.github.com>, impersonating Anthropic's Claude.
Full TanStack postmortem now out. The attacker used chained known vulnerabilities.
https://tanstack.com/blog/npm-supply-chain-compromise-postmortem
TanStack
Postmortem: TanStack npm supply-chain compromise | TanStack Blog
On 2026-05-11, an attacker chained a pull_request_target Pwn Request, GitHub Actions cache poisoning across the fork↔base trust boundary, and OIDC token extraction from runner memory to publish 84 malicious versions across 42 @tanstack/* packages on npm.…
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❗️🚨 BREAKING: Microsoft has fired the top leadership of its Israeli subsidiary following an internal investigation into Azure use by Israel's Ministry of Defense. Country General Manager Alon Haimovich is out, along with several managers from the governance department.
The probe found Israeli defense units were using Azure servers in Europe in ways that violated Microsoft's terms and exposed the company to EU legal risk. Microsoft Israel's management withheld this from headquarters.
Microsoft had already cut ties with IDF Unit 8200 in September 2025. The investigation found that was only part of the problem.
Microsoft Israel now reports to Microsoft France. The Ministry of Defense contract renewal is due by the end of 2026.
The probe found Israeli defense units were using Azure servers in Europe in ways that violated Microsoft's terms and exposed the company to EU legal risk. Microsoft Israel's management withheld this from headquarters.
Microsoft had already cut ties with IDF Unit 8200 in September 2025. The investigation found that was only part of the problem.
Microsoft Israel now reports to Microsoft France. The Ministry of Defense contract renewal is due by the end of 2026.
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‼️🚨 BREAKING: NHS England has confirmed Palantir has access to identifiable UK patient data through a new "admin" role on the Federated Data Platform, the central data-sharing system the US spy-tech firm has run for the NHS since 2023 under a £330M contract.
Internal NHS documents admit the change risks "loss of public confidence" in patient data safeguards.
Internal NHS documents admit the change risks "loss of public confidence" in patient data safeguards.
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POV: you are downloading npm packages in 2026
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❗️🚨 BREAKING: Chaotic Eclipse just published two more public Windows disclosures today and is also threatening Microsoft: "Next patch tuesday will have a big surprise for you Microsoft. And remember, I never failed to deliver a promise."
- YellowKey: claimed BitLocker bypass
- GreenPlasma: claimed CTFMON-based EoP
Source: https://deadeclipse666.blogspot.com/2026/05/two-more-public-disclosures-it-will.html
GH:
https://github.com/Nightmare-Eclipse/YellowKey
https://github.com/Nightmare-Eclipse/GreenPlasma
- YellowKey: claimed BitLocker bypass
- GreenPlasma: claimed CTFMON-based EoP
Source: https://deadeclipse666.blogspot.com/2026/05/two-more-public-disclosures-it-will.html
GH:
https://github.com/Nightmare-Eclipse/YellowKey
https://github.com/Nightmare-Eclipse/GreenPlasma
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🚨 Odido CEO Søren Abildgaard says he will NOT compensate the 6.2 million customers exposed in February's ShinyHunters breach. Instead, he "promises to learn from this experience." (how nice of him)
Abildgaard claims no investigation has shown Odido broke any rules. Which is weird, since there are a lot of preventive measures they could've taken so their Salesforce didn't get drained of data. Salesforce has also been proactively contacting customers to help them harden and prevent attacks like the one Odido fell victim to.
Abildgaard also sent a video of himself to every customer today, where he is clearly reading text he got from the judicial department off a teleprompter. No empathy at all.
Context:
- ShinyHunters breached Odido on Feb 5 and 6 via voice phishing, impersonating internal IT staff
- ShinyHunters then accessed Odido's Salesforce, which they were able to DRAIN to the last drop
- Names, addresses, phone numbers, bank accounts, ID numbers, IBANs and DOBs of 6.2M current and former customers were stolen
- Odido refused to pay the ransom. The data was then dumped on the dark web
- Odido customers are now actively being targeted by criminals using the leaked data
- A class action by CUIC and a criminal investigation by the Dutch Public Prosecution Service are already running
Abildgaard claims no investigation has shown Odido broke any rules. Which is weird, since there are a lot of preventive measures they could've taken so their Salesforce didn't get drained of data. Salesforce has also been proactively contacting customers to help them harden and prevent attacks like the one Odido fell victim to.
Abildgaard also sent a video of himself to every customer today, where he is clearly reading text he got from the judicial department off a teleprompter. No empathy at all.
Context:
- ShinyHunters breached Odido on Feb 5 and 6 via voice phishing, impersonating internal IT staff
- ShinyHunters then accessed Odido's Salesforce, which they were able to DRAIN to the last drop
- Names, addresses, phone numbers, bank accounts, ID numbers, IBANs and DOBs of 6.2M current and former customers were stolen
- Odido refused to pay the ransom. The data was then dumped on the dark web
- Odido customers are now actively being targeted by criminals using the leaked data
- A class action by CUIC and a criminal investigation by the Dutch Public Prosecution Service are already running
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🚨 Signal shipped new in-app confirmations and educational prompts to help users spot scammers impersonating "Signal Support."
The change follows the March takeover of Arndt Freytag von Loringhoven, former Vice President of Germany's foreign intelligence service (BND), Bundestag President and Christian Democrat (CDU) Julia Klöckner, and roughly 300 other German officials.
The campaign has been attributed to Russia by German and Dutch intelligence.
The change follows the March takeover of Arndt Freytag von Loringhoven, former Vice President of Germany's foreign intelligence service (BND), Bundestag President and Christian Democrat (CDU) Julia Klöckner, and roughly 300 other German officials.
The campaign has been attributed to Russia by German and Dutch intelligence.
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‼️🚨 Microsoft has patched a critical Windows DNS Client remote code execution vulnerability that allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. All it takes is a malicious DNS response.
The vulnerability is tracked as CVE-2026-41096 with a CVSS score of 9.8. It is a heap-based buffer overflow in dnsapi.dll, the Windows component that processes DNS answers on every machine.
To trigger it, an attacker needs a position where they can influence DNS responses: a rogue DNS server, a poisoned resolver, a compromised router, hostile WiFi, or a man-in-the-middle placement.
That puts ordinary Windows DNS activity in the blast radius. Browsers, VPN clients, enterprise apps, update checks, and background services constantly ask DNS where to connect. The vulnerable processing sits in the Windows DNS Client path, not an edge-facing server product.
Microsoft assessed exploitation as "less likely," and Rapid7 lists the issue as not publicly disclosed and not known to be exploited at release.
On the contrary, a 9.8 unauthenticated network RCE in DNS client handling is exactly the kind of bug defenders should assume will be reverse-engineered quickly.
Defenders should:
- Deploy the May 2026 cumulative updates and confirm coverage across endpoints and servers
- Restrict DNS traffic to trusted resolvers where possible
- Monitor Dnscache and svchost.exe for abnormal child processes or unexpected outbound activity
- Treat public WiFi and untrusted resolver paths as higher-risk until patching is complete
Source: https://hackingpassion.com/windows-dns-rce-2026/
The vulnerability is tracked as CVE-2026-41096 with a CVSS score of 9.8. It is a heap-based buffer overflow in dnsapi.dll, the Windows component that processes DNS answers on every machine.
To trigger it, an attacker needs a position where they can influence DNS responses: a rogue DNS server, a poisoned resolver, a compromised router, hostile WiFi, or a man-in-the-middle placement.
That puts ordinary Windows DNS activity in the blast radius. Browsers, VPN clients, enterprise apps, update checks, and background services constantly ask DNS where to connect. The vulnerable processing sits in the Windows DNS Client path, not an edge-facing server product.
Microsoft assessed exploitation as "less likely," and Rapid7 lists the issue as not publicly disclosed and not known to be exploited at release.
On the contrary, a 9.8 unauthenticated network RCE in DNS client handling is exactly the kind of bug defenders should assume will be reverse-engineered quickly.
Defenders should:
- Deploy the May 2026 cumulative updates and confirm coverage across endpoints and servers
- Restrict DNS traffic to trusted resolvers where possible
- Monitor Dnscache and svchost.exe for abnormal child processes or unexpected outbound activity
- Treat public WiFi and untrusted resolver paths as higher-risk until patching is complete
Source: https://hackingpassion.com/windows-dns-rce-2026/
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