‼️🚨 BREAKING: US military defense contractor Schemata exposed the personal data of active US military personnel for 150 days.
Schemata holds millions in active DoD contracts and runs sensitive simulations for Army grenadiers, Air Force operators, and naval personnel. The fix should have been simple. Instead, the platform shipped with effectively no authorization layer on its API.
Strix AI self-registered an account. That single session gave them full read access to:
- User lists with names, emails, and the specific military bases where U.S. service members are stationed
- Hundreds of confidential course manuals, served via direct S3 links to operational training modules
- Full write access to mutate or delete courses
The flaw was uncovered by an open-source AI agent, which decomposed the assessment into 20 parallel agents. 37 minutes. 520 tool calls. First validated finding in 11 minutes. The chain ran API recon, JS route mining, cross-tenant validation, auth review, and report generation end-to-end.
Strix reached out for a responsible disclosure channel in December 2025. Schemata stayed silent for 150 days. They finally replied and patched the exposed endpoints on May 1, 2026.
Read: https://www.strix.ai/blog/how-strix-found-zero-auth-vulnerability-dod-backed-startup
Schemata holds millions in active DoD contracts and runs sensitive simulations for Army grenadiers, Air Force operators, and naval personnel. The fix should have been simple. Instead, the platform shipped with effectively no authorization layer on its API.
Strix AI self-registered an account. That single session gave them full read access to:
- User lists with names, emails, and the specific military bases where U.S. service members are stationed
- Hundreds of confidential course manuals, served via direct S3 links to operational training modules
- Full write access to mutate or delete courses
The flaw was uncovered by an open-source AI agent, which decomposed the assessment into 20 parallel agents. 37 minutes. 520 tool calls. First validated finding in 11 minutes. The chain ran API recon, JS route mining, cross-tenant validation, auth review, and report generation end-to-end.
Strix reached out for a responsible disclosure channel in December 2025. Schemata stayed silent for 150 days. They finally replied and patched the exposed endpoints on May 1, 2026.
Read: https://www.strix.ai/blog/how-strix-found-zero-auth-vulnerability-dod-backed-startup
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🚨 The official DAEMON Tools website has been serving backdoored installers since April 8.
Thousands of infections have already taken place across 100+ countries.
The latest versions are still infected. The installers are signed with legitimate developer certificates.
Source: https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/daemon-tools-supply-chain-attack/55691/
Thousands of infections have already taken place across 100+ countries.
The latest versions are still infected. The installers are signed with legitimate developer certificates.
Source: https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/daemon-tools-supply-chain-attack/55691/
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❗️🚨 Meta's AI will analyze users' bone structure and height for age verification, combined with text analysis of profiles, posts, and replies.
Accounts flagged as minors are deactivated. The user is then forced through Meta's age verification process to regain access.
Instagram and Facebook require users to be at least 13. To find accounts that violate this, Meta's AI will sweep entire profiles for "contextual clues" such as birthday mentions, school grades referenced in posts, profile information, and replies.
A visual analysis layer runs alongside it. AI scans photos and videos for visual cues to estimate the user's age.
Meta insists this is not facial recognition. According to the company, the AI looks at general traits and visual indicators (like height or bone structure) to estimate age, without identifying the individual in the image. Meta claims combining these visual signals with text and interaction analysis lets it find and remove far more underage accounts.
Read: https://about.fb.com/news/2026/05/ai-age-assurance-teens/
Accounts flagged as minors are deactivated. The user is then forced through Meta's age verification process to regain access.
Instagram and Facebook require users to be at least 13. To find accounts that violate this, Meta's AI will sweep entire profiles for "contextual clues" such as birthday mentions, school grades referenced in posts, profile information, and replies.
A visual analysis layer runs alongside it. AI scans photos and videos for visual cues to estimate the user's age.
Meta insists this is not facial recognition. According to the company, the AI looks at general traits and visual indicators (like height or bone structure) to estimate age, without identifying the individual in the image. Meta claims combining these visual signals with text and interaction analysis lets it find and remove far more underage accounts.
Read: https://about.fb.com/news/2026/05/ai-age-assurance-teens/
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‼️🚨 Microsoft calls this "intended behaviour," so here we go.
How to dump the credentials of every user stored in Microsoft Edge:
1. Open Edge. Don't browse anywhere, just open it.
2. Flip to Task Manager, find Edge, expand the task.
3. Highlight the "browser" sub-task, right-click, and choose "Create Memory Dump."
4. Open the dump file and look for credentials.
The logged-in Windows user can dump every stored Edge credential with no additional rights. Which means any malware that user executes has those credentials for the asking.
Thanks to Rob VandenBrink at SANS: https://isc.sans.edu/diary/32954
How to dump the credentials of every user stored in Microsoft Edge:
1. Open Edge. Don't browse anywhere, just open it.
2. Flip to Task Manager, find Edge, expand the task.
3. Highlight the "browser" sub-task, right-click, and choose "Create Memory Dump."
4. Open the dump file and look for credentials.
The logged-in Windows user can dump every stored Edge credential with no additional rights. Which means any malware that user executes has those credentials for the asking.
Thanks to Rob VandenBrink at SANS: https://isc.sans.edu/diary/32954
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‼️🚨 CRITICAL: Palo Alto Networks has disclosed CVE-2026-0300, a buffer overflow in PAN-OS that is already being exploited in the wild.
CVSS 4.0 score: 9.3.
Unauthenticated attackers can hit the User-ID Authentication Portal (the Captive Portal service) with crafted packets and pop a root shell on the firewall.
The flaw is an out-of-bounds write (CWE-787) in PA-Series and VM-Series firewalls. Prisma Access, Cloud NGFW, and Panorama are not affected. The vulnerability only triggers when the User-ID Authentication Portal is enabled and reachable from untrusted networks.
Affected branches:
- PAN-OS 10.2 below 10.2.7-h34, 10.2.10-h36, 10.2.13-h21, 10.2.16-h7, 10.2.18-h6
- PAN-OS 11.1 below 11.1.4-h33, 11.1.6-h32, 11.1.7-h6, 11.1.10-h25, 11.1.13-h5, 11.1.15
- PAN-OS 11.2 below 11.2.4-h17, 11.2.7-h13, 11.2.10-h6, 11.2.12
- PAN-OS 12.1 below 12.1.4-h5, 12.1.7
Patches roll out between May 13 and May 28, 2026. A Threat Prevention signature for PAN-OS 11.1 and above shipped on May 5.
Mitigations before patches roll out:
- Restrict Authentication Portal access to trusted internal IPs only
- Disable the User-ID Authentication Portal entirely if not needed
Compromising a perimeter firewall as root opens the door to lateral movement, traffic interception, credential harvesting, and full network takeover. Audit Device > User Identification > Authentication Portal Settings and treat any internet-exposed portal as an emergency.
https://security.paloaltonetworks.com/CVE-2026-0300
CVSS 4.0 score: 9.3.
Unauthenticated attackers can hit the User-ID Authentication Portal (the Captive Portal service) with crafted packets and pop a root shell on the firewall.
The flaw is an out-of-bounds write (CWE-787) in PA-Series and VM-Series firewalls. Prisma Access, Cloud NGFW, and Panorama are not affected. The vulnerability only triggers when the User-ID Authentication Portal is enabled and reachable from untrusted networks.
Affected branches:
- PAN-OS 10.2 below 10.2.7-h34, 10.2.10-h36, 10.2.13-h21, 10.2.16-h7, 10.2.18-h6
- PAN-OS 11.1 below 11.1.4-h33, 11.1.6-h32, 11.1.7-h6, 11.1.10-h25, 11.1.13-h5, 11.1.15
- PAN-OS 11.2 below 11.2.4-h17, 11.2.7-h13, 11.2.10-h6, 11.2.12
- PAN-OS 12.1 below 12.1.4-h5, 12.1.7
Patches roll out between May 13 and May 28, 2026. A Threat Prevention signature for PAN-OS 11.1 and above shipped on May 5.
Mitigations before patches roll out:
- Restrict Authentication Portal access to trusted internal IPs only
- Disable the User-ID Authentication Portal entirely if not needed
Compromising a perimeter firewall as root opens the door to lateral movement, traffic interception, credential harvesting, and full network takeover. Audit Device > User Identification > Authentication Portal Settings and treat any internet-exposed portal as an emergency.
https://security.paloaltonetworks.com/CVE-2026-0300
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🚨 Germany's entire .de namespace went dark overnight. A DNS service failure at DENIC, the registry running .de, broke resolution for every signed DNSSEC-signed domain in the country for hours.
The root cause is still under investigation.
The root cause is still under investigation.
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‼️🇪🇺 BREAKING: Europol ran a shadow IT system stuffed with more than 2 petabytes of sensitive data on people who were never even suspected of a crime, and part of the data was kept outside of formal oversight...
This lands as the European Commission prepares to expand Europol's mandate and double its budget.
"They protect the law while breaking it," according to a former Europol senior official.
A joint investigation by Solomon, Correctiv, and Computer Weekly uncovered that Europol operated for years outside its own legal limits, with no functioning audit logs, no access controls, and admin rights handed out by the dozen.
They call the system the Computer Forensic Network, or CFN. Built in 2012 to triage forensic data, it became Europol's primary analytical platform. By 2019, the CFN held at least 2 petabytes of operational data, roughly 420 times the size of Europol's official non-forensic database. Drewer, the data protection officer, found that 99% of Europol's data sat in the CFN, processed without basic data protection or security safeguards.
The 2019 internal security assessment listed 32 separate failures. Among them:
- Ineffective assignment of security roles
- Insufficient management of privileged access rights
- Unrestricted software installation
- Lack of password management
- Lack of administrative usage logs
- Insufficient event logging and monitoring
- Insufficient network access control
Independent experts who reviewed the findings called the volume of admin accounts a textbook breach of confidentiality and an open door for both rogue insiders and external attackers. Logs could be modified or deleted by anyone with admin rights, meaning data tampering and unauthorised access could not be reliably traced.
Then there is the Pressure Cooker. A separate clandestine environment run by Europol's Internet Referral Unit, used to pull open-source data without ICT involvement and outside formal oversight. Internal staff flagged it as an "irregular situation" in October 2022. The EU's privacy watchdog, the EDPS, says it was never told about it during the original 2019 investigation.
After almost a decade of negotiation, the EDPS closed its monitoring of the CFN in February 2026. 15 of 150 recommendations remained unimplemented, including ones the watchdog flagged as concerning "issues of particular importance," covering core security safeguards.
Source:
https://www.computerweekly.com/news/366642525/They-protect-the-law-while-breaking-it-Inside-Europols-shadow-IT-system
This lands as the European Commission prepares to expand Europol's mandate and double its budget.
"They protect the law while breaking it," according to a former Europol senior official.
A joint investigation by Solomon, Correctiv, and Computer Weekly uncovered that Europol operated for years outside its own legal limits, with no functioning audit logs, no access controls, and admin rights handed out by the dozen.
They call the system the Computer Forensic Network, or CFN. Built in 2012 to triage forensic data, it became Europol's primary analytical platform. By 2019, the CFN held at least 2 petabytes of operational data, roughly 420 times the size of Europol's official non-forensic database. Drewer, the data protection officer, found that 99% of Europol's data sat in the CFN, processed without basic data protection or security safeguards.
The 2019 internal security assessment listed 32 separate failures. Among them:
- Ineffective assignment of security roles
- Insufficient management of privileged access rights
- Unrestricted software installation
- Lack of password management
- Lack of administrative usage logs
- Insufficient event logging and monitoring
- Insufficient network access control
Independent experts who reviewed the findings called the volume of admin accounts a textbook breach of confidentiality and an open door for both rogue insiders and external attackers. Logs could be modified or deleted by anyone with admin rights, meaning data tampering and unauthorised access could not be reliably traced.
Then there is the Pressure Cooker. A separate clandestine environment run by Europol's Internet Referral Unit, used to pull open-source data without ICT involvement and outside formal oversight. Internal staff flagged it as an "irregular situation" in October 2022. The EU's privacy watchdog, the EDPS, says it was never told about it during the original 2019 investigation.
After almost a decade of negotiation, the EDPS closed its monitoring of the CFN in February 2026. 15 of 150 recommendations remained unimplemented, including ones the watchdog flagged as concerning "issues of particular importance," covering core security safeguards.
Source:
https://www.computerweekly.com/news/366642525/They-protect-the-law-while-breaking-it-Inside-Europols-shadow-IT-system
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‼️🚨 One of the world's largest Certificate Authorities, DigiCert, was compromised by a malicious screensaver file sent through a customer support chat. Their antivirus blocked the malware four times. The agent kept clicking. The fifth try got through.
27 code signing certificates were stolen and used to sign malware.
DigiCert ultimately revoked 60 certificates.
Per DigiCert's incident report, filed in Mozilla's CA compliance tracker as Bug 2033170, here is how it unfolded:
April 2: an attacker contacted a DigiCert helpdesk agent through the company's customer support chat channel, posing as a customer. The lure was a zip file pitched as a screenshot. Inside the zip was a .scr file. On Windows, .scr files are executables, and this one carried a malicious payload.
Opening a file a customer sent through the official support channel is what an agent is supposed to do. Support staff are the one role designed to accept files from strangers.
DigiCert's endpoint security blocked four infection attempts. On the fifth, the support analyst's machine was infected.
DigiCert detected the infection, ran an investigation, and concluded the incident was contained.
Eleven days later, an external researcher tipped DigiCert off about misuse of DigiCert-issued code signing certificates in the wild. That tip led to the discovery of a second compromised machine, belonging to a different support analyst, infected through the same vector. The EDR on that machine had not been functioning correctly, so the original investigation missed it.
The second machine gave the attacker access to DigiCert's internal support portal. That portal lets support staff reach limited views of customer accounts, including initialization codes for ordered but not-yet-issued code signing certificates. Combining a stolen initialization code with an approved order let the attacker pull a real, validly issued code signing certificate. They did this 27 times.
DigiCert's own list of what went wrong:
- File-type filtering on the customer support chat channel did not catch the .scr
- EDR coverage was inconsistent and incomplete, creating a blind spot
- Initialization codes for code signing certificates were not adequately protected
DigiCert says it got lucky. An outside researcher found the malware abuse before DigiCert did. Without that tip, the second machine and the active certificate theft might still be running today.
Source: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2033170
27 code signing certificates were stolen and used to sign malware.
DigiCert ultimately revoked 60 certificates.
Per DigiCert's incident report, filed in Mozilla's CA compliance tracker as Bug 2033170, here is how it unfolded:
April 2: an attacker contacted a DigiCert helpdesk agent through the company's customer support chat channel, posing as a customer. The lure was a zip file pitched as a screenshot. Inside the zip was a .scr file. On Windows, .scr files are executables, and this one carried a malicious payload.
Opening a file a customer sent through the official support channel is what an agent is supposed to do. Support staff are the one role designed to accept files from strangers.
DigiCert's endpoint security blocked four infection attempts. On the fifth, the support analyst's machine was infected.
DigiCert detected the infection, ran an investigation, and concluded the incident was contained.
Eleven days later, an external researcher tipped DigiCert off about misuse of DigiCert-issued code signing certificates in the wild. That tip led to the discovery of a second compromised machine, belonging to a different support analyst, infected through the same vector. The EDR on that machine had not been functioning correctly, so the original investigation missed it.
The second machine gave the attacker access to DigiCert's internal support portal. That portal lets support staff reach limited views of customer accounts, including initialization codes for ordered but not-yet-issued code signing certificates. Combining a stolen initialization code with an approved order let the attacker pull a real, validly issued code signing certificate. They did this 27 times.
DigiCert's own list of what went wrong:
- File-type filtering on the customer support chat channel did not catch the .scr
- EDR coverage was inconsistent and incomplete, creating a blind spot
- Initialization codes for code signing certificates were not adequately protected
DigiCert says it got lucky. An outside researcher found the malware abuse before DigiCert did. Without that tip, the second machine and the active certificate theft might still be running today.
Source: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2033170
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🚨 BREAKING: Porn site Motherless, hosting tens of thousands of suspected abuse videos, has been running on Dutch company Nforce's servers since at least 2024.
Nforce topped TU Delft's 2020 ranking of Dutch hosting providers with the most CSAM detected. Elimeleh denies responsibility, stating Nforce only provides infrastructure and has no access to client systems.
A joint NOS / Nieuwsuur investigation confirms the site is hosted by Nforce, based in Steenbergen, NL.
Nforce director Simon Shlomi Elimeleh has been servicing Motherless for over a decade.
The site pulls roughly 62 million monthly visitors and brands itself as a "moral free file host where anything legal is hosted forever."
Findings:
- Offlimits received 142 reports covering 12,000 videos in 2026 alone. 25 cases involved child sexual abuse material (CSAM).
- NOS analyzed 20,000 videos posted between May 1 and 7, 2026. "Incest" was the third most popular tag after "teen" and "amateur," totaling roughly 60 million views in one week.
- The single most-viewed clip of the past week (4.2M views) was tagged with disturbing words.
- CNN previously documented 20,000 "sleep" / "eyecheck" videos showing men lifting women's eyelids to confirm they were drugged or unconscious.
Dutch regulator ACM calls the situation "concerning" but admits it cannot pull content offline itself. The Dutch Public Prosecutor refused to confirm or deny any active investigation. Motherless' parent company Kick Online Entertainment S.A. (Luxembourg) was already fined by UK regulator Ofcom in February 2026 for missing age-verification controls.
The site is still online.
Their contact data: https://www.nforce.com/contact
Nforce topped TU Delft's 2020 ranking of Dutch hosting providers with the most CSAM detected. Elimeleh denies responsibility, stating Nforce only provides infrastructure and has no access to client systems.
A joint NOS / Nieuwsuur investigation confirms the site is hosted by Nforce, based in Steenbergen, NL.
Nforce director Simon Shlomi Elimeleh has been servicing Motherless for over a decade.
The site pulls roughly 62 million monthly visitors and brands itself as a "moral free file host where anything legal is hosted forever."
Findings:
- Offlimits received 142 reports covering 12,000 videos in 2026 alone. 25 cases involved child sexual abuse material (CSAM).
- NOS analyzed 20,000 videos posted between May 1 and 7, 2026. "Incest" was the third most popular tag after "teen" and "amateur," totaling roughly 60 million views in one week.
- The single most-viewed clip of the past week (4.2M views) was tagged with disturbing words.
- CNN previously documented 20,000 "sleep" / "eyecheck" videos showing men lifting women's eyelids to confirm they were drugged or unconscious.
Dutch regulator ACM calls the situation "concerning" but admits it cannot pull content offline itself. The Dutch Public Prosecutor refused to confirm or deny any active investigation. Motherless' parent company Kick Online Entertainment S.A. (Luxembourg) was already fined by UK regulator Ofcom in February 2026 for missing age-verification controls.
The site is still online.
Their contact data: https://www.nforce.com/contact
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