We have been demonstrating the second by porting large software stacks to Morello. This includes the entire FreeBSD userland and kernel (Linux is not quite finished), the userspace graphics stack, Weston (including 3D acceleration), the Qt and KDE core libraries, and a bunch of applications (Chromium is nearly finished). This is now at the point where people are starting to believe our claims about compatibility.

Our results are extremely exciting: It appears that key elements of the stack
were adapted for memory-safe execution with little difficulty (0.026% LoC changed), and that
CHERI memory safety and CHERI software compartmentalization had a strong potential
mitigation impact (ranging from 40% of past vulnerabilities for KDE up to 100% in key
supporting libraries). We described a number of limitations to our study, and key directions
for ongoing research and development

In total we compiled more than 6 million source lines of code for CHERI C/C++ successfully with only a very few changes: 2071 LoC or 0.034%

var ptr: [*]u32 = ...;
ptr.address += 1;
ptr.permissions = .read_only;

This is apocalyptic for us. We, and our users would strongly prefer missing C++17 features than a Boost.Math dependency.

If LLVM moves forward with this, we will very likely patch it out.

export executable "hello";

#link("c")
extern {
    fn printf(__format: *const u8, ...) -> i32;
    fn exit(__status: i32) -> unreachable;
}

export fn _start() -> unreachable {
    printf("Hello, world!\n");
    exit(0);
}