Certainly this is one of the worst situations in which the offensive can be placed.

Dangers of this description, to which the assailant is exposed, must be measured chiefly by the situation and character of the adversary.

Finally, the defender is obliged to take his measures soonest of the two, which gives the assailant the advantage of playing the last hand.

All that remains now for consideration on this subject belongs to the book on the plan of the war.

Convoys generally move more or less in rear of their own army, or, at least, at a great distance from that of the enemy.

We must now add a few words on the most natural organisation of such an attack.

This is a point which should be kept well in view in every diversion, in order that we may not dig our own graves.

We find the expression very frequently used by modern authors and also that they pretend to denote by it something particular.

Only he that does great things with small means has made a successful hit.

We enter this innermost part of its domain, where all other threads meet, not without a degree of diffidence, which, indeed, is amply justified

Theory is indebted to the last wars for being able to do this effectually now.

If we admit the second view, then subordinate advantages may be pursued on their own account, and the rest left to subsequent events.

But what war gained on the one side in force and consistency was lost again on the other side.

No doubt it seems as if, by thus advancing, we at once hazard the loss of what has been already gained.

These considerations on the limited object apply to its connection both with offensive war and defensive war; we shall consider both in separate chapters.

Lastly, even in wars carried on without allies, the political cause of a war has a great influence on the method in which it is conducted.

Thus the contradictions in which man, naturally timid, becomes involved by war, may be solved, if we choose to accept this as a solution.

In the chapter on the culmination point we have treated of the consideration due to this question in each particular case.

Whoever blames Frederick for this, and looks upon it as a sign that his spirit had sunk, would, we think, pass judgment without much reflection.

There is in it no unity, no energy, no rational choice of a commander, no authority, no responsibility.