r0 Crew (Channel)
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Security Related Links:
- Reverse Engineering;
- Malware Research;
- Exploit Development;
- Pentest;
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SGN is a polymorphic binary encoder for offensive security purposes such as generating statically undetecable binary payloads. It uses a additive feedback loop to encode given binary instructions similar to LSFR. This project is the reimplementation of the original Shikata ga nai in golang with many improvements.

https://github.com/EgeBalci/sgn

#redteam #golang
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Attacking UNIX Systems via CUPS, Part I

CVE-2024-47176, CVE-2024-47076, CVE-2024-47175, and CVE-2024-47177 have been assigned around these CUPS issues.

CVSS 9.9

This remote code execution issue can be exploited across the public Internet via a UDP packet to port 631 without needing any authentication, assuming the CUPS port is open through your router/firewall. LAN attacks are also possible via spoofing zeroconf / mDNS / DNS-SD advertisements.


https://www.evilsocket.net/2024/09/26/Attacking-UNIX-systems-via-CUPS-Part-I/

A series of bugs in the CUPS printers discovery mechanism (cups-browsed) and in other components of the CUPS system, can be chained together to allow a remote attacker to automatically install a malicious printer (or hijack an existing one via mDNS) to execute arbitrary code on the target host as the lp user when a print job is sent to it.


https://gist.github.com/stong/c8847ef27910ae344a7b5408d9840ee1

#linux #rce #printer
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Happy New Year! May every binary reveal its secrets, every challenge find its solution, and the Year of the Snake bring you stability, inspiration, and success!
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New blog on using CLR customizations to improve the OPSEC of your .NET execution harness. This includes a novel AMSI bypass that identified by author in 2023. By taking control of CLR assembly loads, we can load assemblies from memory with no AMSI scan.

https://securityintelligence.com/x-force/being-a-good-clr-host-modernizing-offensive-net-tradecraft/

Proof-of-concept for the AMSI bypass and an implementation of a CLR memory manager is on GitHub. We can implement custom memory routines and track all allocations made by the CLR.

https://github.com/passthehashbrowns/Being-A-Good-CLR-Host

#redteam #net #clr
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