Offensive Xwitter
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😈 [ ap @decoder_it ]

Following up on my earlier tweet regarding Kerberos relay with SMB server, I've uploaded my quick & dirty version. It's far from perfect, so feel free to improve it!

πŸ”— https://github.com/decoder-it/KrbRelay-SMBServer/tree/master

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😈 [ Ohm-I (Oh My) @mcohmi ]

Dropping a POC and naming the specific person who found and disclosed it WHILE they are going through a disclosure process is a dick move, tbh.

Keep your POCs internal or in small groups until Drop Day.

ESC15 (EKUwu):
πŸ”— https://github.com/ly4k/Certipy/pull/228

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😈 [ Adam Chester πŸ΄β€β˜ οΈ @_xpn_ ]

New tool published which is proving to be useful. Cred1py allows execution of the CRED-1 SCCM attack published by @Raiona_ZA over SOCKS5 UDP by wrapping the awesome PxeThiefy[.]py from @0xcsandker. Enjoy :)

πŸ”— https://github.com/SpecterOps/cred1py

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Offensive Xwitter
😈 [ Ohm-I (Oh My) @mcohmi ] Dropping a POC and naming the specific person who found and disclosed it WHILE they are going through a disclosure process is a dick move, tbh. Keep your POCs internal or in small groups until Drop Day. ESC15 (EKUwu): πŸ”— htt…
😈 [ TrustedSec @TrustedSec ]

During a recent engagement, @Bandrel discovered how an attacker can craft a CSR by using default system certificates. After finding out this method was novel, the team kept digging. Read what they found in our new blog!

πŸ”— https://trustedsec.com/blog/ekuwu-not-just-another-ad-cs-esc

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😈 [ safe @safe0x17 ]

I'm excited to share π—₯π˜‚π˜€π˜π—Άπ—°πŸ²πŸ°. A Modern 64-bit π—£π—Όπ˜€π—Άπ˜π—Άπ—Όπ—»-π—œπ—»π—±π—²π—½π—²π—»π—±π—²π—»π˜ Shellcode Template for π—ͺπ—Άπ—»π—±π—Όπ˜„π˜€, written 𝗢𝗻 π—₯π˜‚π˜€π˜!

πŸ”— https://github.com/safedv/Rustic64

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😈 [ Empire @EmpireC2Project ]

Read the latest blog on It's Not Your Grandfather's Empire! If you haven't used it in some time come take a look at just how it's grown into a multi-language powerhouse:

πŸ”— https://bc-security.org/not-your-grandfathers-empire/

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😈 [ Nextron Systems @nextronsystems ]

In-Depth Analysis of Lynx Ransomware

Analyzing Lynx ransomware, active since mid-2024, with insights on its encryption methods, backup deletion, and printer-based ransom note delivery:

πŸ”— https://www.nextron-systems.com/2024/10/11/in-depth-analysis-of-lynx-ransomware/

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😈 [ ap @decoder_it ]

OK, I promise to stop spamming about relays with NTLM/Kerberos πŸ˜…. But if you're a member of the Distributed COM or Performance Log group, these juicy CLSIDs let you trigger remotely machine authentication of any computer, including DCs, and relay DCOM -> HTTP, SMB:

{9EA82395-E31B-41CA-8DF7-EC1CEE7194DF}
{42C21DF5-FB58-4102-90E9-96A213DC7CE8}
{C63261E4-6052-41FF-B919-496FECF4C4E5}
{FFE1E5FE-F1F0-48C8-953E-72BA272F2744}


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😈 [ Logan Goins @_logangoins ]

I just published a blog post focused on details of using offensive .NET for both enumeration and exploitation of #activedirectory environments! Including some customized code examples from a tool I've been developing!

πŸ”— https://logan-goins.com/2024-10-11-Dotnet-AD/
πŸ”— https://github.com/logangoins/Cable

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#для_самых_ΠΌΠ°Π»Π΅Π½ΡŒΠΊΠΈΡ…
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😈 [ Daniel F. @VirtualAllocEx ]

I wanted to learn more about using content delivery networks (CDNs) in Azure in conjunction with an Nginx reverse proxy in the context of using Cobalt Strike as a C2 framework. As a result, I've written the following blog post.

πŸ”— https://redops.at/en/blog/cobalt-strike-cdn-reverse-proxy-setup

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😈 [ Matt Zorich @reprise_99 ]

In case you missed it, a deep dive into how Kerberoasting works, how to detect it, and maybe most importantly of all, how to reduce the risk of it within your Active Directory environment:

πŸ”— https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/10/11/microsofts-guidance-to-help-mitigate-kerberoasting/

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Π²Π΅Ρ€Π½ΠΈΡ‚Π΅ ΠΌΠ½Π΅ ΠΌΠΎΠΉ 2017
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😈 [ Daniel F. @VirtualAllocEx ]

I was interested in better understanding a specific detection mechanism of an EDR, focusing on fake DLLs, page guard hooking, PEB manipulation, and vectored exception handling - techniques inspired by the game hacking community.

I'm not a reverse engineer, but in this blog post I tried my best to explain in detail how the detection logic (probably) works and how it could be "bypassed" from an attacker's (red team's) perspective.

By bypassing I mean avoiding prevention and detection by the respective EPP/EDR based on active alerts, it does not include all the telemetry related stuff. I just want to mention this because in general I think the term bypassing should be used very sensitively, carefully and precisely.

In general, in this case the focus was not primarily on finding a "bypass", I was much more interested in learning a bit about reverse engineering in the context of EDRs.

If there are any mistakes or if something is not described correctly, please let me know. Also feel free to give constructive feedback at any time.

The blog post is available in English and German, just switch from EN to DE on the website.

πŸ”— https://redops.at/en/blog/edr-analysis-leveraging-fake-dlls-guard-pages-and-veh-for-enhanced-detection

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😈 [ Lsec @lsecqt ]

I am happy to share a recent blogpost about weaponizing DLL Hijacking / Sideloading for getting initial access and establishing persistence:

πŸ”— https://www.r-tec.net/r-tec-blog-dll-sideloading.html

Hope this is useful, and as always, reach out if you have questions.

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😈 [ eversinc33 🀍πŸ”ͺβ‹†ο½‘Λš ⋆ @eversinc33 ]

I sometimes do recreational malware analysis with random samples 4fun. In this one, I unpacked 2 stages of .NET to reveal SnakeKeylogger and subsequently enumerated info about the threat actor via his Telegram API token.

πŸ”— https://eversinc33.com/posts/unpacking-snake-keylogger.html

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😈 [ Outflank @OutflankNL ]

New Blog Alert! 🚨

Introducing Early Cascade Injection, a stealthy process injection technique that targets Windows process creation, avoids cross-process APCs, and evades top-tier EDRs.

Learn how it combines Early Bird APC Injection & EDR-Preloading:

πŸ”— https://www.outflank.nl/blog/2024/10/15/introducing-early-cascade-injection-from-windows-process-creation-to-stealthy-injection/

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Forwarded from Ralf Hacker Channel (Ralf Hacker)
Π˜Π½Ρ‚Π΅Ρ€Π΅ΡΠ½Ρ‹Π΅ Ρƒ Π½ΠΈΡ… ΠΎΡ‚Ρ‡Π΅Ρ‚Ρ‹, люблю Ρ‚Π°ΠΊΠΎΠ΅ Ρ‡Ρ‚ΠΈΠ²ΠΎ ΠΈ всСм Ρ€Π΅ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠ΅Π½Π΄ΡƒΡŽ) ΠΈ Π°Ρ‚Π°ΠΊΠ΅Ρ€Π°ΠΌ, ΠΈ Π·Π°Ρ‰ΠΈΡ‚Π½ΠΈΠΊΠ°ΠΌ))

https://xn--r1a.website/s3Ch1n7/427

#report
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😈 [ cod @wolfcod ]

Combining RtlCreateProcessReflection plus NanoDump Writer to avoid MiniDump callback api:

πŸ”— https://github.com/wolfcod/lsassdump

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😈 [ Elastic Security Labs @elasticseclabs ]

Threat hunting just got easier! This new repo of detection rules is crafted by our veteran detection engineers and powered by different Elastic query languages. Get the details of what’s included and see the future of this repo here:

πŸ”— https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/elevate-your-threat-hunting

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