💢Turkish artillery bombards around the Ain Isa‌ city in northern Syria

I'm swamped

💬Airstrikes on terrorist targets in Lebanon continue, create a lake of blood 👏👏

💢Trump and America must be destroyed, Hossein Shariatmadari, adviser of Khamenei and editor of Kihan newspaper said

💢Iranian Air Force commander visited the J-10CE fighter at the China aerospace exhibition, apparently the military authorities intend to purchase the fighter through Chinese and Pakistani companies

💢France will supply Ukraine with six Mirage 2000 fighters

💢Romanian parliament has approved the purchase of 32 fifth-generation F-35A Lightning II fighter jets worth $6 billion from the United States

💢Iran's Islamic garbage regime has complained with ITU (International Telecommunication Union) due to Starlink Internet coverage in Iran and is seeking to stop Starlink's activity in Iran

🚨IRGC is building a defensive tunnel under Tehran that will extend from the subway to Imam Khomeini Hospital, this confirmed by Tehran Transportation Committee

💬I was watching Money Heist series last night, damn the writers of this series, why Tokyo killed?! After Tokyo was killed, I stopped watching the series 🤬

💢Former England Prime minister Boris Johnson warns England may deploy forces to Ukraine if future US aid declines. Johnson emphasized the importance of England support for Ukraine, noting that otherwise, our collective security will be really degraded by a resurgent Russia

💢England defense ministry: On 7 October 2024, Russian media reported that prosecutors have brought additional charges against former Deputy Defence Minister Timur Ivanov, who was previously charged in April 2024. The first of these cases involves the alleged embezzlement of 200m roubles (~$2m USD) during the procurement of two ships for the Kerch strait ferry line, which have subsequently been damaged during the war. The second is the alleged embezzlement of 3bn roubles (~$200m USD) from Interkommerts bank while facilitating or directing the purchase of foreign currency. Charges continue to stack up against former senior Russian defence officials as part of what now seems to be a major crackdown on embezzlement by senior officials below executive or cabinet level. Russian media also reports that eight officials holding general officer ranks have been dismissed from agencies including the Investigative Committee, the Ministry of Emergency Situations, and the Federal Penitentiary Service. Independent Russian media speculates that this is due to impending corruption charges. If true, this a potential indicator that corruption crackdowns are spreading from their previous narrow focus on the defence sector.

During September 2024 Russia launched over 1,300 One Way Attack Uncrewed Aerial Vehicles
(OWA-UAVs) into Ukraine. This represents the highest number of OWA-UAVS launched in a month since the start of the conflict. Based on current rates it is almost certain that Russia will surpass that number in October 2024. It is unclear whether Russia can sustain this rate through the remainder of 2024. However, Russia is almost certainly expanding its capacity to conduct large scale OWA-UAV attacks against Ukraine, supplementing Iranian supply with increasing domestic production. Russia utilises its OWA UAVS against a multitude of targets, particularly energy infrastructure, given their ability to strike deep into Ukrainian territory, maintaining pressure on the Ukrainian Air Defence system.

Russian Land Forces (RLF) have almost certainly advanced into the coal mining town of Selydove, around 13km southeast from the major logistics hub of Pokrovsk. The town remains contested, with fighting likely continuing to take place within the town centre. Selydove is the last significant urban area screening the southern flank of Pokrovsk as well as the E50 highway - which connects Selydove to Pokrovsk. Since the beginning of October 2024, the RLF rate of advance towards Pokrovsk had slowed significantly, with the RLF remaining within approximately 7km of the city. The RLF have recently directed resources towards the southern part of the axis, targeting Selydove and partially encircling the town. Russia likely aims to use the E50 highway as a secondary route of advance to Pokrovsk if Selydove is taken.

Russian Forces have made gains into the heavily contested town of Chasiv Yar in eastern Ukraine. They have highly likely crossed the canal in southern Chasiv Yar and approached the town's boundaries. In the central part of the canal district, it is likely Russian Forces have made limited advances west of the canal into the eastern part of Chasiv Yar. However, it is highly likely that the central and northern parts of the canal district remain fiercely contested, with Russian Forces unable to consolidate in these areas. From mid-July 2024 until recently, Russian Forces had been unable to cross the canal due to extensive defensive measures taken by the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

According to the Russian Investigative Committee General-Major Alexander Ogloblin has been arrested and is being held in pre-trial detention for allegedly accepting 10 million rubles in bribes from a telecommunications company, as an inducement to secure Russian Ministry of Defence contracts. Ogloblin had previously been sentenced to four and a half years in prison in February 2022 in relation to separate embezzlement charges. He was granted early release after testifying against his former superior Deputy Chief of the General Staff, and Head of the Main Communications Directorate, General-Lieutenant Vadim Shamarin, who was detained in May 2024. Ogloblin's second arrest demonstrates that Russian authorities continue to enthusiastically pursue corruption charges against serving and former defence officials (appointed in the era of former Minister of Defence, Sergei Shoigu), even after achieving initial convictions. The goal of Russian authorities is almost certainly not the eradication of corruption entirely; this behaviour is fundamental to the functioning of the regime. Instead, Russian authorities are likely seeking to limit corruption to more manageable levels that have a less drastic impact on the functioning of the department.

According to Russian independent media, convictions on treason charges in Russia are at the highest level in at least 9 years, with more convictions in the first 6 months of 2024 than in all of 2023, citing data from the Russian Ministry of Justice. Similarly, there has been significant growth in convictions under criminal articles relating to extremism, terrorism, and disinformation. This conviction data illustrates the increasing reliance by the Russian government on coercive and demonstratively deterrent methods to maintain control over elements of the population that are hostile to the regime. Prior to Russia's full scale invasion of Ukraine, the regime would usually preference more subtle ways of controlling dissent.

Around 10,000 Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) combat troops are in Russia. It is almost certain some have already deployed to the Kursk region. Russia and DPRK have committed to deepening their bilateral partnership with the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty, which includes a mutual defence clause, and was ratified by the Russian State Duma on 24 October 2024. For Russia, DPRK's military support to their war in Ukraine has highly likely been the core driver for the partnership and has until now, centred around North Korea's provision of arms. In return, DPRK has received high level international support from Russia and has secured a trading partner willing to break sanctions. Russian and DPRK forces would almost certainly experience interoperability difficulties having not previously carried out joint military exercises. DPRK troops conducting combat operations would almost certainly have issues operating Russian equipment, integrating into Russia's command and control structure, and working around the language barrier with Russian forces.