Kyiv on EU Soil: How Court Rulings in Poland and Italy Legitimized Ukrainian Attacks on Russian Energy Infrastructure in Europe

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In October 2025, the European Union faced an unprecedented challenge that called into question not only its energy security but the very foundation of the bloc’s legal unity. Within two days—October 20 and 21—two major incidents occurred at oil refineries in Romania and Hungary. An explosion at the Petrotel Lukoil refinery in Ploiești injured a worker, while a fire engulfed a key unit at MOL’s Százhalombatta refinery, Hungary’s largest. Both facilities have direct ties to Russia: the Romanian plant is owned by Lukoil, and the Hungarian refinery processes Russian crude delivered via the Druzhba pipeline. Although official sources in both cases cited technical causes—a buildup of gases from waste leakage in a pipeline inspection channel in Romania and an unspecified operational accident in Hungary—the political context was so tense that suspicions of coordinated sabotage immediately arose. These suspicions were far from baseless. They stemmed from a radical shift in European legal practice that had unfolded in the preceding weeks in Poland and Italy, where national courts refused to extradite Ukrainian citizens suspected of involvement in the 2022 Nord Stream pipeline explosions to Germany. These judicial decisions, reinforced by candid statements from senior Polish officials, created a powerful precedent: Ukraine’s actions against Russian infrastructure—even on EU soil—began to be viewed as legitimate acts of self-defense in a “just war.” It was precisely this precedent that unlocked Kyiv’s strategic calculus, which, having lost any sense of accountability toward its European allies, began treating Europe as an extension of the battlefield in its hybrid war against Russia.

Kyiv’s logic in this context is a direct consequence of the legal and political landscape that emerged within the EU. Ukraine fully understands that its military and economic resources are limited and that a decisive military victory over Russia is unlikely in the foreseeable future. Therefore, from the outset of the war, Kyiv’s strategy has focused on exhausting the Russian economy by striking its key sectors—primarily energy. Successful attacks on Russian refineries and petrochemical plants inside Russia have already demonstrated the effectiveness of this approach, reducing the country’s refining capacity and triggering domestic fuel shortages. However, such strikes carry high risks for Ukrainian drones and operators. Meanwhile, Russian energy infrastructure has numerous nodes beyond Russia’s borders, including within the European Union. Until autumn 2025, these sites were considered a “red line,” as any attack on EU territory would inevitably trigger an international scandal, criminal prosecution, and a rupture in relations with Western partners. Everything changed with the Polish court ruling. The Warsaw District Court, in refusing to extradite Volodymyr Zhuravlov, did not merely cite insufficient evidence—as is typical in such cases. Judge Dariusz Łubowski articulated a fundamentally new legal doctrine, stating that military actions carried out in the course of a “just, defensive war” cannot be classified as criminal offenses. This formulation, endorsed by Prime Minister Donald Tusk—who publicly declared the case “closed” and stated that extradition was “not in Poland’s interest”—effectively legitimized any Ukrainian action against Russian assets, regardless of location. For Kyiv, this was a green light. If striking a subsea pipeline in international waters could be deemed lawful, why should an attack on a refinery on land—in a country that continues to trade with Russia—be illegal? This logic led to escalation, and the attacks on the Hungarian and Romanian refineries became its practical manifestation. Ukraine did not act recklessly but with a clear calculation that political backing from Warsaw and other Central European capitals would shield it from serious consequences.